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Abstract 
 
The thesis uses original archival research to outline a novel account of social and world 
order change in the 1970s—from the collapse of Bretton Woods to the Reagan 
Revolution—that shifts the focus of explanation from the strategic vision and unilateral 
capacity of the US to determine outcomes to the pragmatic attempts of West German 
political and economic elites to cope with the crisis of post-war capitalism and to harness 
American power to this end. The main argument is that the parochial way in which 
German state managers sought to preserve the domestic compact between capital and 
labour prevented a more progressive and solidaristic resolution of the crisis and created 
the conditions for the neoliberal counterattack. Anxious to defend its export model 
against protectionism and inflation, German policy makers mobilized their country’s 
financial power to counter the interventionist and expansionary remedies of the European 
Left and to commit the United States in particular to monetary and fiscal discipline. 
While initially successful, this strategy proved self-defeating as it pushed the US into the 
Volcker interest rate shock that radically disinflated the world economy and ultimately 
undermined the basis for the German welfare state and its corporatist balance as well. 
The dissertation enriches and broadens our understanding of the origins of neoliberal 
globalization by focusing on an economically dominant state/society complex that is 
normally held to be inimical to the neoliberal onslaught. The crucial, but largely 
unintentional, German contribution challenges some of the critical accounts that see 
neoliberalism as an American imposition (Gowan 1999), a financial coup (Duménil and 
Lévy 2004), or an ideological conversion (Blyth 2002). My dissertation offers an 
alternative interpretation of the rise of neoliberalism as driven by a complex process of 
disembedding in which state power, class interests, and ideas are refracted through the 
prism of an interdependent world economy, and where the strategic and creative choices 
that some actors make to deal with the problems they confront reshape the range of 
options available to others. 
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Chapter 1: 
International Political Economy and the Crisis of the 1970s:  
Towards a Critical Reappraisal 
 
The last one hundred years of international capitalism have been punctuated by three 
major crises. The great depression of the 1930s broke the liberal world economy of the 
late nineteenth century into rival monetary and trading blocs and fuelled the rise of 
nationalist, authoritarian, and fascist forces that would plunge the major industrialized 
countries into a second world war. The great stagflation of the 1970s, in contrast, would 
issue in the defeat and rollback of organized labour, the dismantling of (welfare) state 
regulation, and the onset of an unprecedented wave of regional and global economic and 
financial integration. In effect and essence, the crisis of the 1930s would disrupt, whereas 
the crisis of the 1970s would accelerate capitalist globalization (Panitch and Gindin 
2012: 2; Gill 2012a: 13-14). A simple but crucial question of our times is whether the 
great recession that began with the financial crash of 2008 will play out to be more like 
the former or the latter.  
The concept of ‘crisis’—in the restricted sense used in this dissertation—refers to 
extraordinary turning points in the development of modern capitalism. Their exceptional 
nature and disparate impacts militate against the construction of a general theory of crisis 
in abstraction from this history. While the two previous crisis decades identified above 
have each been associated with the exhaustion of prevailing frameworks of accumulation 
and a tumultuous transition in the forms in which capitalism is constituted domestically 
and governed internationally, neither their causes nor consequences can be readily 
derived from any inherent logic of capitalism (Panitch and Gindin 2011: 2-4). The issue, 
therefore, cannot be simply to determine our contemporary position on a recurring 
sequence of de- and re-globalization (cf. Wallerstein 2009); or on an exponential curve of 
economic growth and political integration, for that matter (cf. Robinson 2013). There is, 
to be sure, an underlying secular rather than purely cyclical trend to the 
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internationalization of capitalism that needs to be accounted for. Yet the associated 
transformations are not confined to a scalar expansion either. Both crises have been 
succeeded by historically unique and largely unforeseen changes in the form and 
direction of global capitalism. The fact that they do not fit neatly either the ‘liberal vs. 
closed’ dichotomy or the ‘national to global’ trajectory, moreover, indicates that they are 
socially constructed—not simply regarding the perceptions of the human agents involved 
but also the outcomes to which their actions give rise. The complexly determined, 
politically contested, and thus open-ended character of crises is most famously captured 
by Antonio Gramsci’s observation that “the old is dying and the new cannot be born; in 
this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear” (quoted in Gill 2011: 237). 
That the stagflationary decade of the 1970s turned into a crisis for organized labour and 
the welfare state, or that the global financial meltdown of 2008 has become a crisis of 
public indebtedness was neither inevitable nor expected. Given that the crucial questions 
of ‘a crisis of what and for whom?’ are settled through contestation, they “cannot be 
addressed apart from the balance of power between classes and states” that define crises 
and give them direction (Panitch and Gindin 2006: 5), and can be answered conclusively 
in retrospect only. The new shape of societal and international organization that will 
emerge from the current crisis is thus likely to be qualitatively different from either of the 
two precedents. But as this future is neither clearly discernible nor completely determined 
yet, a better appreciation of the previous moments of capitalist crisis and transformation 
in the twentieth century may prove critical for understanding and shaping the world order 
of the twenty-first. 
Because of its epic proportions and cataclysmic consequences, the great depression of the 
1930s has grasped the attention and captured the imagination of every generation to 
follow—so much so that at almost every moment of (real or imagined) crisis, academics 
and policy makers have instinctively returned to the image of a globalized world falling 
apart as a worst-case scenario of what is likely to follow. 
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Once considered “the most significant watershed in the post-war history of the advanced 
industrialized states” (Sassoon 1996: 447; Reitmayer and Rosenberger 2008: 11), the 
stagflationary years of the 1970s have also attracted enormous academic interest. After 
all, in this decade, too, a major rupture occurred. Monetary turmoil, rampant inflation, 
rising unemployment and a generalized recession conspired to tear the ‘embedded’ liberal 
international economic order (Ruggie 1982) asunder—marking the end of the golden age 
of post-war reconstruction, sustained economic growth, and of welfare state management, 
redistribution and compensation.  
In the words of Harvard historian Charles Maier (quoted in Caryl 2010) “[t]his is the 
decade when things start to unravel”.1 And yet, in another sense, the crucial point about 
the crisis of the 1970s is that they ultimately didn’t (Krasner 1983a: viii). What stands out 
about the 1970s is that despite economic shocks and political conflicts, cooperation 
among the major capitalist powers continued and differences were successfully 
negotiated. Predictions of a breakdown of the world economy that were widespread at the 
time turned out to be groundless and exaggerated. Because these expectations proved 
wrong in the 1970s, one would do well to consider just how useful they are as a guide to 
the future. Rather than fixate on the disintegrative 1930s, this chapter contends that 
scholars of IR/IPE should turn instead to the question of why the outcome of the 1970s 
were so markedly different. 
For rather than rendering the 1970s uninteresting and irrelevant, the absence of major 
social and international conflagration needs itself to be explained. It points to a 
fundamental transformation of global capitalism that no serious attempt to chart its future 
course beyond the immediacy of the present crisis and the tired analogy of the great 
depression can afford to ignore. The 1970s, thus, are a ‘soft’ turning point that, while 
short of war and revolution, was nevertheless profound in the changes it brought about 
                                                 
1
 The late Eric Hobsbawm (1994: 403), who instinctively rebelled against the liberal-triumphalist thesis of 
the ‘end of history’ without being quite able, from the standpoint of the mid-1990s, to discern the contours 
of the new world order, argued for a similar watershed: “The history of the twenty years after 1973 is that 
of a world which has lost its bearings and slid into instability and crisis.” 
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(Wirsching et al. 2011: 20; see also Maier et al. 2010; Stein 2010). For not only did the 
West not fall apart, as it had done in the 1930s; on the contrary, the neoliberal resolution 
of the crisis of the 1970s that some of the main capitalist powers would hit upon set the 
West on a path of deepening integration and, with the fall of the Soviet Union, 
multilaterally coordinated expansion that has continued until today.  
Preoccupied with the question of why there was no replay of the great depression, 
mainstream approaches have been unable to reconcile the dynamics of expansion and 
integration that emanated from the crisis of the 1970s with the intra-West tensions that 
characterized this period. Critical scholarship, with some notable exceptions, has 
confronted a similar dilemma. But unlike their liberal and realist colleagues, this chapter 
argues, critical scholars have provided the analytical insights and conceptual tools that 
permit a systematic re-evaluation of how social and international conflicts defined this 
pivotal moment in the making of global capitalism. 
 
IPE and the Hegemonic Impasse 
The link between the crisis of post-war capitalism and the (re-)constitution of IPE as an 
Anglo-American subfield of IR has largely escaped the recent debate over the lineage and 
legacy of the discipline (Cohen 2008; for some significant observations, see Kirshner 
2011: 203). Scholars of the emerging field of IPE were driven in large part by what 
seemed to be a serious economic and political crisis of the cold war West.
2
 Yet they 
ultimately proved unable to account for the peculiar coincidence of cooperative and 
conflictive moments that accompanied the crisis and transformation of the capitalist 
heartland in the 1970s. The principal reason for the failure to resolve this disciplinary 
puzzle is that the question of social and world order change was viewed principally, 
                                                 
2
 It should be noted that “‘terminal’ crises for the transatlantic relationship have been identified almost on a 
one-per-decade basis since the 1950s” (Sola and Smith 2009: 2). The decisive difference is that this one 
coincided with a major global economic downturn. 
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though not exclusively, through the prism of a ‘crisis of US hegemony’. The debacle of 
the Vietnam War, social unrest and labour militancy at home, the mounting challenge 
from the Third World and the rise of Western Europe and Japan as major economic 
competitors—all these events were read as a loss of American global power that 
coincided with a profound destabilisation of liberal multilateralism. In the face of the 
breakdown of Bretton Woods, the oil shock and economic recession of 1973/1974, as 
well as transatlantic dissension over how to respond to these challenges, the spectre of the 
1930s had returned. Without the leadership of a preponderant state to underwrite a stable 
international order and smoothly operating world economy, many realist scholars 
concluded that a relapse into economic nationalism loomed on the horizon (cf. Krasner 
1976: 343; Gilpin 1975: 72; 1981: 239; 1987: 351, 394-408). 
Confounded by the emergence of economic instabilities and political frictions that they 
could not otherwise explain (Krasner 1983a: vii-viii; Grieco 1988: 486, 490-491; Nye 
1988: 236), many liberal institutionalists felt compelled to embrace the notion of a 
hegemonic crisis, even while they contended that institutions and regimes might be able 
to provide ‘post-hegemonic’ stability (cf. Ruggie 1982: 384; Keohane 1984a). 
Although the first paradigmatic debate of the newly constituted field of IPE was shaped 
decisively by a hard core of Harvard graduates (Germain 2011: 88), the notion of a crisis 
of US hegemony was not confined to mainstream IPE. Many critical scholars, too, had 
made the notion central to their analysis of world order change in the crisis years of the 
1970s, and some of the most groundbreaking and lasting contributions to the field were 
framed in these terms (cf. Cox 1981; Arrighi 1982). Guided by notions of hegemonic 
transition and American decline, however, the field was headed for an impasse (Cohen 
2008: 76-77). The image of international relations as successive bids for hegemony led 
realist scholars to assume an automaticity of hegemonic decline and counter-hegemonic 
challenge (Gilpin 1981; cf. Lake 1984: 144). Framed as a general law of systemic cause 
and effect, political rivalry and economic closure appeared to be the logical consequence 
of US hegemonic decline. The predictions of a more rivalrous and fragmented world 
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economy that followed from these theoretical postulates, however, turned out to be 
greatly exaggerated. The question that realists proved unable to account for is why, if the 
US was supposedly in decline, the liberal international economic order had not 
disintegrated as in the 1930s (Calleo 1982: 3; Krasner 1983b: 358; Rosecrance 1986: 57). 
The gap between claim and reality that opened up in the 1980s undermined the credibility 
of realist scholarship. But it did little to strengthen the liberal-institutionalist case. For, as 
a growing number of scholars now began to argue that US hegemony had not declined 
after all (Russet 1985: 231; Strange 1987: 571; Gill 1990: 70), the debate turned out to 
have been fundamentally misguided. Liberal institutionalists may have eschewed the 
realist scenario of great power rivalry and economic nationalism, but they, too, had held 
the assumption that the socio-economic and geopolitical turbulences of the 1970s had 
been caused by a crisis of US hegemony. With the erosion of US hegemony now in 
question, liberal-institutionalist theories lacked the grounds for empirical verification. If 
the predictions of US hegemonic decline had, at the very least, been premature, there 
has—as Robert Keohane (2002: x) would acknowledge two decades later—never actually 
been a test of whether regimes and institutions can in fact facilitate non-hegemonic 
cooperation. Moreover, because the bipolar distribution of material capabilities that had 
structured the international system after 1945 continued until 1990, Keohane (2012: 127) 
acknowledged, “an interpretation that explains institutions on the basis of the functions 
that they serve and a Realist one could both explain the patterns of cooperation that 
emerged and persisted”. 
Most significant is that in seeking to counter the defeatist proclamations that the 
organization of the liberal world economy had been fatally fractured, liberal-
institutionalist scholars tended to err on the side of continuity. Concentrating their efforts 
on demonstrating that the post-war international economic order was in fact alive and 
well, liberal-institutionalist scholars failed to see the social and international 
transformations set in train in the 1970s. This oversight is most apparent in John Gerard 
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Ruggie’s ground-breaking work on ‘embedded liberalism’, whose 1982 piece ranks 
among the most frequently cited articles in IR/IPE.  
While accepting the overall argument of international history as successive hegemonies, 
Ruggie contended that the specific character of each system could not simply be derived 
from the distribution of material capabilities. Power, he argued, “may predict the form of 
the international order, but not its content” (Ruggie 1982: 382). The post-war 
international system therefore rested not only on American predominance, but on a 
specific “fusion of power with legitimate social purpose” (Ruggie 1982: 382). To be 
politically acceptable and economically sustainable, the Anglo-American post-war 
planners understood, economic liberalism needed to be reconciled with state intervention 
and social protection (see Chapter 3). In a crucial sense, therefore, the new economic 
system was qualitatively different from the classical liberalism of nineteenth-century pax 
britannica (382). The central point Ruggie made is that as an institutional embodiment of 
authority and legitimacy, the international organization of the post-1945 world economy 
could outlive a declining hegemon provided there was “a congruence of social purpose 
among the leading economic powers” (384). 
The image of a compromise of ‘embedded liberalism’, involving what Ruggie elsewhere 
described as a “grand domestic and international political bargain” between the United 
States and Western Europe on the one hand, and “the major social groupings (agriculture, 
labor, and capital)” (1991: 203) on the other, is an enormously fruitful description of the 
particular world order constructed after 1945. The crux of the issue, however, is that, 
designed to defuse the declinist scenario, the concept of ‘embedded liberalism’ as used by 
Ruggie missed out on what was most decisive about the 1970s: the profound 
disembedding, rather than preservation, of the post-war international economic order, and 
the radical redefinition, rather than retention, of the social purpose to which policy 
autonomy was now to be put. Ruggie, it is true, “wrote just as Ronald Reagan and 
Margaret Thatcher were beginning to implement their very different visions of a smaller 
role in capitalism for state power” (Keohane 2012: 126). He and his interlocutors might 
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be forgiven for failing to see that it was the embeddedness, rather than the liberality of 
the capitalist world economy that was fundamentally at stake. And yet critical observers 
had early on understood that the “[i]nternational forces undermining embedded 
liberalism” did not emanate from the economic nationalism of the left, as the more 
sceptical Robert Keohane believed (1984b: 26), but from the transnational neoliberalism 
of the right (e.g. Cox 1981).  
Moreover, Ruggie has repeatedly reasserted his view that the ‘embedded liberalism’ 
compromise has been sustained throughout the 1970s since its key components—liberal 
multilateralism and domestic interventionism—have been preserved (2008: 4). Only in 
1996 does Ruggie begin to raise concerns about “the future fate of the embedded 
liberalism compromise” (1996: 80) and call for a renewal of the underlying social bargain 
(1996: 94). And only in the face of the recent global financial meltdown does he conclude 
that “the domestic political coalitions on which the compromise rested…have weakened 
or, as in the case of the United States, almost unraveled altogether” (Ruggie 2008: 4). By 
contrast, this dissertation argues that the turbulences of the 1970s are best understood as 
the crisis of embedded liberalism, involving a confrontation of social forces and 
culminating in the one-sided termination of the capital/labour compact in the Anglo-
Saxon world. This dissolution, it will be argued, had profoundly transformative (though 
not disruptive) implications for the international system. It is only in view of this crisis 
and transformation, frequently (though, it is argued, mistakenly) understood as the 
“challenge from a rejuvenated classical liberalism” (Richardson 1997: 13), that the 
concept of ‘embedded liberalism’ can illuminate what was truly unique—in the sense of 
unprecedented and irretrievable—about the post-war synthesis of social and international 
order. 
Struggling to explain the absence of counter-hegemonic contestation and economic 
nationalism, realism has found it easier to accommodate the resilience of US hegemony. 
In light of its failed expectations, the argument that US hegemony had not (yet) declined 
seemed to offer an easy way out. The corollary of this admission, however, has been to 
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deprive realist hegemonic stability theory of much of its empirical basis and analytical 
purchase. The clear-cut causal connection between US hegemonic decline and the 
destabilisation of the liberal international economic order during the crisis decade of the 
1970s has given way to the fuzzy notion of a temporary weakening of US hegemony that 
is both analytically vague and theoretically cumbersome. Reasoning back from the 
absence of the expected effects to the conclusion that a renewal of US hegemony must 
have occurred, the process whereby the United States supposedly managed to reassert its 
position of leadership remains largely unexplored (for an elaboration on this point, see 
Chapter 2).  
Moreover, if realists seem to have a better grasp on this decade with their privileging of 
power and national interest, there nevertheless remains an important gap. Why, with 
American power momentarily on the wane, did the secondary powers not take advantage 
of this situation to extend their power and influence and assert their independence from 
the US? After all, realism claims to account not just for the power-maximizing impulses 
of the leading state, but of all states, in particular great powers. Why, then, did West 
Germany
3
 and Japan, but also the United Kingdom and France, fail to engage in a realist 
game of power-political catch up? Keohane (1984a: 39) rightly demands that “[t]heories 
of hegemony should seek not only to analyze dominant powers’ decisions to engage in 
rule-making and rule-enforcement, but also to explore why secondary states defer to the 
leadership of the hegemon”. Examining the decisions, and perhaps most importantly the 
non-decisions, of these would-be challengers or defectors turns out to be critical; for it 
offers insights into the specific character of the international system in which they 
operate, and the specific state-society relations that underpinned their choices.
4
 
                                                 
3
 ‘Germany’ is used synonymously with the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) in this dissertation even 
though another Germany existed to the east. This is for ease of reading and not a political act of omission. 
4
 The fact that America’s putative rivals chose not to challenge their superior or break away not only 
suggests that the latter managed to hold on to its power; it also raises the possibility that the social and 
international order had undergone a transformation that sets America’s postwar hegemony apart from its 
putative predecessors. This dissertation argues that, rather than yet another iteration of preponderant power 
(and social purpose), a qualitatively new system of rule was created after 1945. 
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To explain why states chose to forego these opportunities, realists have pointed to the 
presence of a superordinate conflict between West and East. Their security dependence 
on the United States, so the argument goes, kept America’s allies in line. And yet, as we 
shall see in Chapter 4, America’s military predominance induced a variety of alternative 
and often competing security designs, most notably during the era of détente in the period 
under consideration. Moreover, if bipolarity provided the glue that held the West 
together, one should expect the collapse of the Soviet bloc to spell the end of the Atlantic 
alliance.
5
 The point is not simply that, twenty years on, this has yet to happen; but that the 
1970s set in train powerful processes of global integration that largely escape the realist 
frame of analysis. The secondary powers not only submitted to but have since supported 
the globalization of American power. And in this process, the liberal world economy has 
not only been maintained, but based on a new social foundation and multilateral 
infrastructure. However many political rivalries and economic tensions one may suspect 
to go on underneath, the surface phenomenon of neoliberal globalization cannot be 
derived from the military superiority of the United States alone. The search for a more 
compelling answer has led some realist scholars to shift attention from the military-
strategic to the politico-economic terrain (Gilpin 2000; Layne 2006; Mastanduno 2009). 
Their attempt has been to tie in the reassertion of American power with the making of 
neoliberalism—an argument that is taken up in Chapter 2. But in this respect, too, we 
need to heed Keohane’s call for a shift in perspectives, and examine how and why 
America’s partners not only accepted but supported and, I will argue, generated 
neoliberal forms of economic organization and governance. 
Benjamin Cohen’s (2008) sympathetic review of hegemonic stability theory 
underestimates the degree to which both realist and liberal inflections have been 
confounded by the peculiarities of the seventies’ crisis. But what is far more striking, and 
even less appreciated, is that IPE scholarship refused to revisit the empirical evidence and 
revise its underlying assumptions. Instead of systematically reconsidering what had 
                                                 
5
 In fact, it is precisely this scenario that has been invoked by a number of authors over the last two decades 
(Saull 2007: 187). 
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happened, scholars withdrew from the international history and structural dynamics of 
cooperation and conflict that the field of IPE and its master concept of ‘hegemony’ had 
initially sought to explain.
6
 The problem-driven and substantive exchange that had 
opened up in the wake of the seventies’ crisis, and that had to a limited extent included 
critical theories, narrowed down to what Ole Wæver (1996) termed the ‘neo-neo’ 
synthesis—a new research programme of both realist and liberal scholars modelled on 
rational choice theory and in search of “more limited, precise, formula-like assertions that 
can be reduced to simple analytical statements amenable to tests and theory” (Wæver 
1996: 163). By the late 1980s, therefore, the original question of why the West had held 
together had been effectively rendered a ‘nonissue’ (Cohen 2008: 68). And with the fall 
of the Soviet Union, a global crisis whose consequences no one had yet understood was 
overshadowed by world-historical events that no one had foreseen. 
How can this apparent disinterest be explained? A comprehensive answer to this question 
would have to include another dimension that conventional narratives of the history of 
the field have ignored. Born in a moment of capitalist crisis, the raison d’être of IPE was 
prescriptive as well as explanatory and predictive.
7
 Given the intimate relationship 
between the foreign policy establishment and academic circles in the United States (Cox 
2011: 125-126; Germain 2011: 88), mainstream IPE needs to be understood not simply 
as a set of testable theories but as part of a political discourse that sought to influence 
decision makers and shape state responses in a volatile situation of international and class 
conflict. The liberal notion of ‘complex interdependence’ (Keohane and Nye 1977)—the 
multiplication of state and non-state actors and fractionation of military and economic 
power across issue areas—is a case in point. An ideological precept as much as an ideal-
typical approximation, the concept was meant not simply to describe an inevitable 
development towards a globally integrated political and economic order but to point to a 
desirable and contingent shift away from a territorially divided and potentially conflictual 
                                                 
6
 In 1984, Lipson complained that “[u]nfortunately, we still have an inadequate understanding of the 
relationship between the decline of American hegemony and the decade of instability that followed” (21). 
7
 Thanks to Stephen Gill for pointing out this critical dimension to me.  
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inter-state system (Gill 1990: 23-25). Against the backdrop of inter-allied disputes over 
trade and monetary affairs, growing economic interdependence among the advanced 
industrialized countries was understood to heighten mutual sensitivities to economic and 
political disruptions (e.g. Cooper 1972). Interdependence, in short, was seen as a 
challenge to be met with new institutional responses; novel forms of organisation that not 
only sought to integrate the national and international decision-making processes of the 
advanced industrialized countries but also to insulate them from the mounting pressures 
of subordinate social forces both within the Northern capitalist core and in the Global 
South.  
Much the same can be said about hegemonic stability theories during the crisis of the 
1970s. At a minimum, some of their pessimistic conclusions should be read as political 
commentary on the apparent unwillingness and inability of successive administrations 
from Nixon to Reagan to live up to the international responsibilities of the United States. 
But the prognosis of inevitable American decline and impending geopolitical 
disintegration may also be understood as a ‘self-falsifying hypothesis’. Designed less to 
predict than to prevent a post-hegemonic future, realist theorists of hegemonic crisis, and 
their apocalyptic forecasts in particular, may well have sought to convince policy makers 
of the necessity of restoring American predominance.
8
 Indeed the intellectual refutation 
of the declinist case by foreign policy intellectuals such as Henry Nau (1990) and Joseph 
Nye (1990) followed the renewed appreciation and active mobilization of America’s 
global power in the early Reagan years (Gill 1990: 70, 106-7). 
 
Cooperation and Conflict, Past and Present 
Premised upon the notion of a crisis of US hegemony and focusing on its likely 
consequences, the newly constituted field of IPE proved unable to account for the 
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simultaneity of cooperation and conflict and the qualitative transformation, rather than 
simply conservation, of the cold war West during the crisis of the 1970s. America’s 
global power was reinforced from the early 1980s onwards, and alongside a new 
economic doctrine of neoliberal globalization emerged.  
The crux of the matter is not simply that this connection has been left unexplained. It is 
that even though scholars have turned their back on the confounding period of the 1970s, 
the post hoc rationalizations of Western cohesion that have been devised in support of the 
grand theories of IPE have stayed with us. Theoretically inflated to lend support to either 
of the two contending grand narratives, they have come to define how questions of 
international cooperation and conflict are approached today. 
Realist scholarship has, for the most part, stuck to its original predictions. Those who 
foresaw the return of great power politics have introduced ‘intervening variables’, most 
notably the common threat posed by the Soviet Union (Webb and Krasner 1989; 
Mearsheimer 1994; Gilpin 2000), in order to explain why the centrifugal tendencies that 
surfaced in the 1970s were contained and why Western cohesion and US dominance 
were, at least temporarily, preserved. From this perspective, the 1970s mark the onset of 
a protracted process of geopolitical fragmentation that, although arrested at the time by 
politico-military bipolarity, has simply been deferred and can be expected to emerge at a 
later point in time. Accordingly, great power rivalries have been predicted to make a 
comeback after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1989, the transatlantic rift over the US 
invasion of Iraq, in the context of the rise of China, and in the wake of the contemporary 
world economic crisis (Mearsheimer 1990, 2001, 2006; Garten 1992; Kupchan 2002; 
Cox 2005; Kagan 2003, 2009; Layne 2009; Altman 2009).  
For many liberal scholars, too, the 1970s would come to designate a benchmark in 
international history. The fact that the advanced capitalist countries held together in the 
face of economic shocks and political tensions has been taken by as prima facie evidence 
of a fundamental transformation. Liberal peace theorists have argued that it confirms 
their thesis that foreign relations within the West had become pacified after 1945 (Doyle 
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1983: 231, 233-5). Liberal institutionalists have argued that growing economic 
interdependence and institutionalized political cooperation had shifted the strategic 
orientations of the major capitalist states away from power-political confrontation with 
one another (Keohane and Nye 1977; Rosecrance 1986: 141-2).
9
  
And where realists see the onset of a protracted process of geopolitical fragmentation of 
the world economy, temporarily halted by the Soviet threat (cf. Mearsheimer 1990; 
Waltz 1993; Gilpin 2000: 160), many liberal cosmopolitans see the release of the forces 
of global expansion and integration: the growing velocity and intensity of economic, 
political as well as cultural flows that—with the fall of the Soviet Union—are said to 
create an increasingly borderless world in which supranational institutions are poised to 
take over the functions that territorially limited political authorities are no longer able to 
perform (cf. Giddens 1990: 64; Held et al. 1999: 2; Held and Koenig-Archibugi 2005; 
Archibugi 2008). 
In retrospect, then, it is tempting to ignore the instabilities of a bygone crisis. Not only 
did they never amount to any serious international conflagration in the way realists had 
imagined; they were overtaken in the 1990s by an ostensibly novel and, for many, truly 
epoch-making dynamic of globalization. And yet with the problématique of the 1970s 
left unresolved, the realist challenge to liberalism continued to resurface in different 
guises whenever new uncertainties, instabilities, or disagreements emerged. If in the 
1970s the conundrum had been why international cooperation did not collapse as it had 
done during the 1930s (Krasner 1983a: viii, 358; for the analogy, see Calleo 1982: 10), 
after 1989 attention turned to the question of whether international cooperation would 
recede or deepen after the end of politico-military bipolarity (Mearsheimer 1990; 1994; 
Waltz 1993). In the wake of September 11, the challenge appeared to be whether the 
transatlantic alliance would be able to withstand the global war on terror and the 
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 Viewed through the lens of economic interdependence, the crisis of the 1970s is conceptualized as here 
take the form of adjustment pains—the ‘shock of the global’, as a recent compendium (Maier et al. 2010) 
has it. In like manner, the associated conflicts are primarily of a technical, managerial nature. They refer to 
incompatibilities of internal and external regulation and present themselves as policy dilemmas or 
collective action problems. 
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belligerent reassertion of American unipolarity (Keohane 2002: x; Cox 2005; Ikenberry 
2007; Kupchan 2002). The rise of Pacific Asia since the early 2000s has put US 
hegemonic decline back on the agenda (Mearsheimer 2006). And most recently, the 
divergent policy responses of the major capitalist economies to the global financial crisis 
have raised concerns about an incipient economic nationalism (cf. Gamble 2010; 
Ikenberry 2010). The issue is not that realists are correct in raising these objections, but 
that liberals have struggled to offer a compelling response. Focussed on the endpoint of 
globalization, liberal scholarship has neglected to theorize the ‘interim’—characterized, 
as it were, not only by periodic slumps and crashes but also by recurring conflicts of 
interests even within an overall context of deepening integration and closer cooperation.  
That the liberal paradigm remains vulnerable to realist critiques has been most apparent 
in the wake of the global financial crisis of 2008. The crisis has forcefully reminded 
liberal cosmopolitans of the fragilities of globalizing capitalism, as well as of the crucial 
role played by states in managing its contradictions. The integrative thrust of 
globalization seems to have been overtaken by the centrifugal forces of economic 
destabilization, social dislocation, and political conflict that threaten to roll back 
processes of societalization (Vergesellschaftung) on a global scale. Most recently, 
Keohane (2012: 134) has observed “that what could have been seen in the mid-1990s as a 
progressive extension of international regimes, with stronger rules and larger 
jurisdictions, has been halted if not reversed.” Rather than extending principles of 
accountability via global institutions (cf. Held and Archibugi 2005; Archibugi 2008), 
moreover, the advanced capitalist societies themselves seem to be approaching a ‘post-
democratic age of austerity’ (Streeck 2011). What such an erosion of political liberality 
in the advanced capitalist countries might mean for the theorem of their peaceful 
interactions remains an open question. But there is little doubt that the optimistic vision 
of humanity’s global future has been profoundly shaken. Instead of building towards a 
more humane form of globalization, the inadequacies and inequities of neoliberal forms 
of governance and development have become more painfully apparent than ever.  
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It is little surprise therefore that in light of the broad-based questioning of liberal market 
self-regulation, the return of the state as the principal crisis manager, and distributional 
struggles over the costs of the bailouts and burden of adjustment, a realist worldview 
should once again have reasserted itself. And yet the obvious problem is that even as 
liberal accounts have been repeatedly caught out by dynamics of crisis and competition 
they cannot easily explain, realist scholars have falsely predicted the return of inter-state 
rivalries at every critical juncture of the last thirty years. Realist scholarship, to be sure, 
continues to pose “a counter-narrative to the progressive and pacific narrative” of liberal 
scholarship (Keohane 2012: 134). But its assumption of international anarchy as the 
immutable precondition of modern international relations renders it insensitive to the 
social and international changes that have occurred in the advanced industrialized world 
since the 1970s. Caught in a cyclical conception of international history, it is unable to 
conceive of the post-crisis world order in terms other than power-political shifts. 
This brief overview is not to deny that important advances continue to be made within the 
two traditions of IR/IPE. But it is to suggest that their grand narratives may have 
exhausted their capacity to illuminate the present by way of the past, and that it is vital to 
reconsider ‘how we got here’ (Frum 2000). Ever since the hegemonic cul-de-sac, 
mainstream approaches have grown weary of asking larger questions about structural 
power and social and international change (cf. Keohane 2011: 39; Kirshner 2011; 
McNamara 2011). Much of mainstream IR/IPE today remains caught between liberal 
expectations of permanent unification and realist premonitions of geopolitical 
fragmentation that simply project the dynamics they see at work since the 1970s into the 
future. And yet at a time when a crisis of global capitalism makes a return to 
fundamentals all the more necessary, the discipline has shown little interest in re-
engaging with “the big, important real world puzzles” (McNamara, 2011: 65) that once 
brought scholars of different theoretical persuasions together.
10
 The premise of this 
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dissertation is that in order to think about the future of world order realistically but 
constructively, it is crucial to revisit this foundational moment. The first step in this 
historical re-examination is to turn to the third perspective of the inter-paradigm debate. 
What did critical scholarship have to say about the international implications of the end 
of capitalism’s golden age?  
 
Critical Theory to the Rescue 
Some of the earliest Marxist works on the crisis of prosperity capitalism had identified 
the uneven growth of the leading economies as a major factor undermining the post-war 
international order (Mandel 1970; Hymer 1972: 114, 122; Harman 1984; cf. Brenner 
2006). As West Germany and Japan re-entered the world market as major economic 
competitors to the United States, economic rivalries were said to intensify, and power-
political conflicts were expected to emerge (Hymer 1972: 134; Mandel 1975). In a sense, 
therefore, the foundational debate of IPE, as some of its American pioneers explicitly 
acknowledged (Keohane 1984a: 42-44; Gilpin 1987: 381), can be seen as a sanitised 
version of the exchange between Lenin and Kautsky about the possibility of ultra-
imperialist unity or inevitability of inter-imperialist rivalry. The political purpose, of 
course, was a very different one. The first generation of IPE scholars took the theoretical 
concerns but not the practical orientation from Lenin and Kautsky. Recasting the debate 
over imperialist rivalry vs. unity in politically acceptable terms, their theorizations of the 
crisis of the 1970s were not meant to challenge but rather to stabilize internationalized 
forms of capitalist rule. 
At the same time, the question of the causes and consequences of hegemonic decline, 
with its roots in classical theories of imperialism, opened up a space for critical 
scholarship (Wallerstein and Hopkins 1979; Arrighi 1982; McMichael 1985). By framing 
                                                                                                                                                 
through the lens of Carr’s The Twenty Years’ Crisis, he never once mentions the global financial crisis and 
only vaguely refers to a “decline in regime coherence” (Keohane 2012: 136). 
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the analysis of the emerging world order in terms of a hegemonic transition, critical 
approaches have been able to make some of the most path-breaking contributions to the 
field to date (e.g. Cox 1981) even as the subsequent “self-limitation” (Wæver 1996: 163) 
of mainstream IR to a game-theoretical exercise soon excluded radical voices.
11
 
Eventually, however, critical scholars confronted the same puzzle as their mainstream 
peers: how to make sense of continued cooperation of the major capitalist countries at a 
time when US hegemony seemed to be eroding (Overbeek 2008: 184). In short, there 
have been two divergent responses to this challenge: while some scholars see the 1970s 
as the beginning of the end of US hegemony and the transition towards an unstable 
interregnum (cf. Callinicos 2009), others interpret the period as a shift from a nationally 
anchored to a globally integrated capitalist order (cf. Robinson 2004). 
The first group of scholars has argued that the fragmentary tendencies that surfaced in the 
1970s are still at work today. The differential growth rates of the leading capitalist 
economies, the ‘long downturn’ that began in the late 1960s, and the shift in economic 
power from the North Atlantic to Pacific Asia are likely to lead to conflicts among the 
three regional centres of capital accumulation in the future (Callinicos 2009: 17; Rees 
2006: 47-67; Bello 2005: 71-73, 77-78, 97-99). From this perspective, exemplified in the 
work of Alex Callinicos, the United States is still set on a path of hegemonic decline. But 
in order to explain why the global instabilities associated with the transition to a 
multipolar order have yet to come, its decline is said to be a much longer-term process 
than originally expected (2009: 187; 2010: 115). Hence, just like the crisis of profitability 
and overaccumulation in the 1970s has been extended to cover the last forty years 
(Brenner 2006), the crisis of US hegemony has been drawn out into the twenty-first 
century.  
While Callinicos may be the only one to acknowledge that his earlier predictions were 
premature (2009: 197), there are a number of scholars that have resorted to similar if 
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more careful reformulations. In retrospect, the 1970s are presented as a momentary lapse 
or a ‘signal crisis’ of US hegemony (Arrighi 1994), followed by the reassertion of a less 
consensual, ‘minimal’ form (Cafruny and Ryner 2007), and perhaps a ‘late summer glow’ 
(Wallerstein 2003) or ‘belle époque’ in the 1990s, before the United States is said to be 
facing its ‘terminal decline’ (Arrighi 2005a; 2005b; Overbeek 2008). There is nothing 
wrong with expecting the decline of a powerful state to span several decades, of course. 
But the changing fortunes of US hegemony one can glance from these formulations 
suggest a problematic pattern of failed expectations and ex post adjustments. Starting in 
the 1970s, these scholars have taken divergences among the metropolitan powers as 
evidence of a nascent post-hegemonic order, only to conclude in hindsight that US 
hegemony, at least so far and at least in some form, has persisted. 
On the other end of the spectrum stands the work of William Robinson (2004), for whom 
the 1970s constitute the beginning of an epochal transformation—the moment in which 
capitalism outgrows its nation-state container and becomes truly global (2004: 5, 21). The 
post-war surge in cross-border flows of trade and investment and the increasingly 
transnational organization of production and accumulation are said to have created the 
“material basis for the emergence of a single global society” (2004: 9). Capitalist 
development has brought about a globally integrated capitalist class unbound by national 
or regional divisions, and a transnational state that acts in the interests of global 
capitalism as a whole rather than on behalf of any particular ‘national’ capital. In this 
view, US hegemony and the power-political conflicts that had been predicted in its 
absence have been superseded by the de-territorialized rule of global capital (for similar 
conclusions see Hardt and Negri 2000). 
Most of the liberal globalization literature has tended to operate with a loose definition of 
the term that refers to the growing velocity, intensity, and proliferation of economic, 
political as well as cultural flows across national borders (cf. Giddens 1990: 64; Held et 
al 1999: 2). Historical materialist approaches, by contrast, have argued that at the heart of 
these transformations lies the expansion and deepening of capitalist social relations. The 
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multicausality implied in the liberal-pluralist formulation diffuses what for historical 
materialist approaches, which equate globalization with global capitalism, is a 
fundamental paradox: how can the same developmental dynamics that are assumed to 
bring about an integrated world order be responsible for precipitating the economic crisis 
and social and political conflicts of the 1970s? If we accept the intrinsic crisis character 
of capitalism rather than rely on the notion of ‘external shocks’, an additional step in the 
argument is required before the very same forces that undermined Fordist patterns of 
mass production and consumption, the Keynesian compromise between capital and 
labour sustained by it, and the cooperative and consensual forms of international 
organization facilitated by it, can be plausibly drawn upon to explain the cohesion and 
deepening integration of the capitalist core (cf. van der Pijl and Fennema 1987: 298).  
Similar to the problems that plague liberal theories of globalization, critics have argued 
that Robinson’s account glosses over the contradictions that necessarily arise from the 
uneven spread of global capitalism across a multiplicity of states (McMichael 2001: 201-
202, 203). The social and inter-state tensions that emerged in the context of the seventies 
crisis are, in his view, reduced to mere “rough bumps of the emergence of transnational 
capital” (Robinson 2001: 177); in other words, they are extraneous to the character of 
neoliberal globalization, which derives its form and direction from the expansive logic of 
capital (McMichael 2001: 202). Such an account is vulnerable to the vagaries of the 
global political economy. It can claim plausibility only as long as capitalism operates 
smoothly and the geopolitical fault lines run outside the capitalist heartland; but 
whenever problems and tensions appear, the theorist is forced to resort to auxiliary 
arguments in order to reintroduce a measure of the unevenness and contradictions that 
have been erased from the conception of capitalist development as a scalar shift from ‘the 
national’ to ‘the global’.  
As a consequence, critical theories of IR/IPE have sat uncomfortably between the two 
mainstream paradigms that not only ended the conversation but also offered diametrically 
opposed interpretations of the dynamics of international order. And yet, the remainder of 
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this section argues, critical scholarship is uniquely positioned to transcend this dualistic 
vision.   
The most innovative critical studies of world order have been careful not to follow 
Robinson’s exaggerated conclusions any more than they have bought into the improbable 
predictions of Callinicos (van der Pijl 2007; Gill 2012a; Panitch and Gindin 2012). Their 
endeavour to theoretically explain and historically examine the coexistence of a ‘liberal’ 
and ‘realist’ moment in modern international relations has taken a number of different 
routes involving a variety of approaches and methodologies. Some have embarked on a 
macro-sociological inquiry into the historical origins and development of capitalism and 
the inter-state system (Teschke 2003; Lacher 2006). Others have addressed the interplay 
of territorial and economic logics of power at a more abstract-theoretical level (Arrighi 
1994; Harvey 2005). Still others have analyzed the limits and possibilities of globalized 
forms of capitalist rule through the lens of elite planning groups and their efforts to 
mediate economic and political differences in favour of a common outlook and strategies 
(Gill 1990; van der Pijl 1998; Graz 2003). 
My dissertation proposes that one way forward is to return to the historical conjuncture 
that has given rise to these two contending world order visions. Critical approaches hold 
three distinct advantages that make such a re-examination possible and productive. 
Firstly, their inquiries have been guided not by the search for law-like, timeless 
generalizations, but by an appreciation of the historical specificity of international 
systems. Secondly, their focus on the struggles of social forces over the definition of state 
power, social purpose, and the ‘national interest’ means that they are particularly well-
equipped to examine the substantive disagreements that emerged between states in this 
period beyond the abstract calculus of power or utility (Cox 1981; Gill 1993a; Bieler and 
Morton 2001). And finally, as a consequence of highlighting both social agency and 
historical variability, critical theories recognize that something important occurred in the 
1970s that could have happened differently.
12
 In other words, they are able to recover an 
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element of contingency that is lost in the two prevailing post hoc rationalizations on 
offer: the notion that an incipient globalization eclipsed the territorial sources of conflict, 
and the notion that structural bipolarity prevented such conflicts from erupting. The two 
interpretations differ profoundly in their vision of the future: the former sees the inter-
state system as having been positively transcended, whereas the latter only argues that its 
conflictive potential has been temporarily contained. Yet the results with regards to the 
crisis of the 1970s are surprisingly similar. In both cases, the outcome is structurally 
predetermined, and inter-state tensions are explained away rather than integrated into an 
account of global (and social) transformation. 
Armed with this critical conceptual lexicon, the goal of this dissertation is to trace the 
transatlantic fault lines that became visible during the seventies’ crisis, and that resolved 
into the globally integrated, US-centred, neoliberal world order that has prevailed over 
the last three decades. The crucial paradox in need of illumination is how the political 
operators of the leading states, and their capitalist and working classes, responded to the 
crisis, and precisely why, in a moment of considerable social and international tension, 
their actions would combine to produce a more tightly integrated and closely coordinated 
world economy than ever before. The puzzle, therefore, is how and why—despite 
extraordinary levels of economic instability as well as social and international tension—
the leading states reacted to the crisis in ways that would ultimately deepen and expand 
multilateral free trade, liberalize global finance, and enlarge the sway of transnational 
market forces over states and societies. And the guiding hypothesis is that these tensions, 
rather than being inconsequential, helped shape the neoliberal character of capitalist 
globalization.  
 
International History, Theory and Method 
With the opening of the official repositories and the release of previously classified 
records, this question can for the first time be addressed with the tools of archive-based 
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historical research (cf. Schulz and Schwartz 2010: 5). The emerging body of international 
historiography that has utilized this new material has been able to offer novel, revealing 
and sometimes counterintuitive insights into the key policy decisions as well as their 
wider constituencies and determinants (cf. Gavin 2004; Basosi 2006; Gray 2007; 
Zimmermann 2010; Trachtenberg 2011). Thanks to this historical groundwork, we are 
now in the unique position to revisit, re-evaluate and fundamentally rethink the answers 
that have been offered. 
Unfortunately, theorists of international relations have shown notoriously little interest in 
seeing how their theories match up against the historical record (cf. Wohlforth 1999). 
International historians, meanwhile, have eschewed explicit theorizing in favour of a 
detailed exposition of the personalities, events, and decisions that shaped transatlantic 
discord and collaboration. Frequently, this has resulted in a narrative that takes as its 
unquestioned backdrop precisely those larger economic and political transformations 
(e.g. America’s relative decline, growing economic interdependence) that are in need of 
being critically interrogated. On the whole, this neglect has meant that the conceptual 
implications of the new historical evidence have yet to be drawn out, synthesized and 
brought to bear on the question of world order change in the 1970s. 
Most IR/IPE literature has focussed on the role of the United States, and for some good 
reasons. The enormous economic and military resources at its disposal, and their 
purposive deployment in reconstructing and integrating its capitalist allies and former 
rivals into a liberalizing and expanding world economy, were truly unprecedented. Given 
that the US played a central role in the reconstitution of global capitalism after 1945, and 
given the reassertion of US power in the 1980s, it makes perfect sense to assume that it 
also decisively shaped its form and direction during the turbulent 1970s. And yet 
recognizing the centrality of the American state does not, in itself, warrant the conclusion 
that neoliberal globalization depended solely on US policy decisions (e.g. Abdelal 2007: 
25). Too narrow a focus on American foreign economic and monetary strategy might lead 
to a selection bias: the agency of the US in shaping the evolution of the world economic 
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order appears so mighty simply because other actors are excluded from view 
(Eichengreen 2004: 1543). There is a risk that by drawing too straight a line from the 
ultimate outcome to the original intentions, we credit American strategists with a much 
greater degree of foresight than they in fact possessed, and miss out on the uncertainty 
and contingency of the situation, the plurality of policy options, and, most importantly, 
the interactivity of state responses (Panitch 2000: 14). 
At the very least, therefore, the prevailing story needs to be supplemented by an analysis 
of how foreign powers and classes reacted to, and possibly affected, the course of events. 
In order to avoid this danger and complete the picture, a shift in focus is in order: from 
the agency of the United States to the actions and intentions of those states with a real, if 
perhaps unrealized, potential to give form and direction to international order. And 
empirically, this shift in focus ought to marshal the new evidence from the government 
records that offer a unique window into the decision-making process of the leading 
capitalist states in the critical period of transition from the post-war regime of ‘embedded 
liberalism’ (Ruggie 1982) to the globalized rule of financial capitalism.  
But, as I will argue in this dissertation, this shift from the hub of the system to its spokes 
is not simply a task we need to undertake for the sake of completeness. Theoretically, it is 
mandated by the unprecedented capacity of the United States to reshape the international 
system after 1945, the extent to which it was able to bring other powerful states and their 
elites into its orbit rather than exclude them from its sphere of influence, and the degree 
to which the new world order was based not on a hierarchy of power but on the active 
organization of consent (see Chapter 3). Analytically, therefore, it follows that this 
particular global formation, so different from previous imperial powers, is best studied 
through the eyes of those on the other side of the relationship. And empirically, this 
change in focus reveals that some of the key decisions and dynamics that drove the 
breakdown of the embedded liberal order, the rise of neoliberal globalization, and indeed 
the reassertion of American power, emanated from outside. 
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To fully comprehend the American Century, or in our case the ‘long 1970s’ of capitalist 
crisis and transformation, one would need to take into account the strategies of other 
significant actors—world war allies with colonial legacies and ambitions such as Britain 
and France, or the former axis powers that had vied with the United States for global and 
regional predominance. States, in short, that many realists and some Marxists in the 
1970s had identified as (re)-emergent great powers or even hegemonic challengers. We 
could also extend this analysis to emerging formations like the European Union (e.g. 
Mourlon-Druol 2010), or the challenge from the non-aligned movement and their efforts 
to revolutionize the world economic order or at least renegotiate the developmentalist 
model.  
However desirable, it is clear that such a multiplicity of perspectives is beyond the reach 
of a single dissertation. The choice for West Germany out of the many possible and 
productive standpoints to take, of course, reflects more than the linguistic limitations of 
the author. On the one hand, it is the country most securely incorporated into America’s 
world hegemonic order. Defeated, divided, and occupied, post-fascist Germany was most 
vulnerable to the emerging cold war antagonism and thus most likely to subordinate to 
the dictates of its American protector. A major recipient of Marshall aid and Fordist 
patterns of production and consumption, as well as the principal host of American 
multinationals and foreign direct investment, West Germany’s export-led economy was 
also most thoroughly intertwined with and most vitally dependent on the open and 
expanding world market that had been reconstructed by the United States. Germany thus 
represents the strongest possible test case for both geopolitical and socio-economic 
interpretations of the seventies’ crisis. The former holds that West Germany surrendered 
to the centripetal pressures of the Soviet Union and American military leadership. The 
latter envisions a West German state that had been completely and irrevocably absorbed 
into a dense transatlantic network of economic exchange.  
On the other hand, Germany is also the Western country with the most significant 
‘counter-hegemonic’ potential. Unlike the mostly symbolic defiance of a militarily 
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independent but industrially laggard France, West Germany formed the hub of a regional 
and potentially rival pole of accumulation. And unlike an economically ascendant but 
demilitarized and isolated Japan, West Germany had regained and greatly extended its 
military capabilities relative to most of its NATO allies as well as assumed a politically 
influential role in the twin projects of West European integration and Eastern détente. 
Curiously, therefore, West Germany was at once the country most firmly integrated into 
and most capable of transforming the world economic order just as the great wave of 
post-war economic growth broke on the shores of the Atlantic.  
But Germany is also important for another reason. Its economic model is generally 
considered to be structurally different from the Anglo-American variety of capitalism and 
held up by many to have remained resilient to the neoliberal onslaught that the 
governments of the United States and United Kingdom embarked upon in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s. And yet, as this dissertation seeks to elucidate, Germany in the crisis of 
the 1970s also acted as a progenitor of many of the policies that are today associated with 
the rise of neoliberal globalization. West Germany was one of the first (preceded only by 
Switzerland and Canada), and certainly the most significant of the capitalistically 
advanced countries to abandon the fixed-exchange rate regime, thus contributing mightily 
to the fall of one of the central pillars of Bretton Woods. The German Bundesbank was 
also the first central bank to adopt “an explicit monetarist strategy—long before similar 
switches occurred in Britain and in the United States” (Scharpf 1984: 284, quoted in 
McNamara 1998: 148). This technique of ‘monetary targeting’, introduced in 1974, 
prioritized the goal of ‘price stability’ and, once adopted by the US and UK at the end of 
the decade, signalled the departure from the post-war commitment to full employment. 
Combined with the legal autonomy of the Bundesbank, monetarism came to offer a 
template that would lead to a new wave of politically independent central banks 
embracing a neoliberal policy consensus around the world (Baker 2004).  
It is clear that no single-country focus can fully illuminate a systemic crisis. But in light 
of the significance of these contributions, an archive-based re-examination of the role of 
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the German state promises not only to deepen our understanding of the particular national 
experience but also to offer novel, if preliminary, insights into the genesis of 
neoliberalism more generally. 
A Note on the Archival Sources 
This dissertation is based on extensive archival research conducted from January to May 
2012 and bracketed by preparatory and follow-up visits between January 2010 and 
January 2013. Much of the evidentiary basis is drawn from archival sources that have 
only recently become declassified and accessible. The study is not always the first to 
examine these materials, but it brings to the records a particular set of questions that 
international historiography does not normally consider. While fruitful, the combination 
of theoretical approach and the principal—though by no means the only—method of 
investigation chosen for this study also raises a number of questions.  
First of all, the archival evidence is almost certainly incomplete. Some documents may be 
irretrievable or still classified, and some information may never have been committed to 
the record in the first place. The purpose of this study is therefore not to unearth 
spectacular insights but to contribute to a fuller understanding of the pivotal period of the 
1970s by adding an archival perspective to the repertoire of critical theory.  
The public records of the chancellery are the obvious starting point for such an inquiry. 
One significant limitation is that the minutes of the cabinet meetings are exempt from the 
thirty-year rule (stipulated in section 5, paragraph 2 of the Bundesarchivgesetz). They 
remain classified until edited by the Federal Archives, which releases the minutes in the 
form of an annual series. The most recent volume covers the calendar year of 1969, 
rendering the cabinet minutes of limited use for the time period under consideration. The 
publication of the minutes of the cabinet’s economic committee, proceeding by term of 
office, lags even further behind. In order to work around these restrictions and reconstruct 
the process of executive policy making, this research examines the internal briefs and 
memoranda of the chancellor’s office, as well as the top-level communications with the 
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major ministries and the central bank. The aim is to survey the terrain of policy options 
and, by way of approximation, circle in on the most significant policy alternatives and 
decisions.  
A second caveat is the question, raised by Barry Eichengreen (2004: 1543) in a review of 
one of the new works in international monetary history, whether we can take the realist 
language in these documents at face value. To put it bluntly, what may read like cunning 
manoeuvres on the geopolitical chessboard may be no more than the impotent great 
power fancies of mid-level bureaucrats.
13
 To correct for such a bias, the memoranda from 
the foreign office or embassies that routinely use the rhetoric of realpolitik in their 
situational analyses have been treated with particular caution. The principal focal point of 
this study is instead on actionable information produced and discussed by the German 
chancellor’s office, the finance and economics ministries and the central bank—the 
neuralgic centre of internal and external economic policy making.  
The ministerial bureaucracies have produced an overabundance of material that has yet to 
be fully categorized. Consequently, the most valuable source of documentation have been 
the personal files of chancellor Helmut Schmidt and his key economic advisor Horst 
Schulmann (involved in the construction of the European Monetary System (EMS) and 
the preparation of the Group of Seven (G7) meetings), placed at the Archives of Social 
Democracy, as well as the correspondence and collections of the central bank governors 
Karl Klasen, Otmar Emminger and Karl Otto Pöhl located at the Historical Archives of 
the Bundesbank. Another major source of information are the bimonthly meetings of the 
Central Bank Council (Zentralbankrat). This supreme body of the Bundesbank, 
consisting of the presidents of the central banks of the Länder, is a key forum of 
macroeconomic deliberation and monetary decision-making that is regularly attended by 
government representatives from the chancellor’s office and the economics and finance 
                                                 
13
 Realists display an admirable propensity to see through the rhetorical veil of liberal ideals and 
humanitarian concerns that is often cast over the ulterior motivations of foreign policy. They fall short, 
however, of applying the same degree of scepticism to the symbolic categories, such as the ‘national 
interest’ or the ‘balance of power’, that are closer to their own analysis (Keohane and Nye 1977: 4-5). 
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ministers. The meeting protocols and verbatim records of these discussions, located at the 
Historical Archives of the Bundesbank in Frankfurt, have been comprehensively 
reviewed for this study. 
Lastly, the method is open to the charge that to look at policy makers is simply to replace 
the theoretical state-centrism of realist IR/IPE with the empiricist state-centrism of 
diplomatic history. The answer to this possible objection is that it is precisely with a view 
to the social forces that act upon state administrators that the focus on decision-making 
elites has been chosen. Particular attention has therefore been given to the interactions of 
the core executive and major private-sector interests. The written correspondence of 
leading state personnel with private economic actors, as well as the informal and 
institutionalized contacts between them, has been closely studied. Chief amongst these 
are the meetings of the Foreign Trade Advisory Council (renamed Foreign Economic 
Advisory Council in mid-1974) hosted by the Ministry of Economics, which brings 
together key government officials with representatives of the export industry, private 
banks, and affiliated trade unions. The composition of the Council aims at a regional and 
sectoral balance, but in practice the large exporters and their financiers dominated for 
most of the post-war period and throughout the 1970s. With over forty council members, 
the Advisory Council was rather large and unwieldy. Only some members participated 
regularly and contributed to the work of ad hoc committees, however. In practice, 
therefore, the affairs of the Advisory Council were steered by a handful of influential 
personalities over long stretches of time. The track record of the Advisory Council is 
mixed. Sometimes it simply duplicated the lobbying activities of the peak business 
associations; at other times, it effectively mediated between the articulation of interests 
and the making of economic policy. Members were called upon not to represent 
individual firms or sectors but to offer independent, expert advice to the ministry. In 
principle, therefore, and sometimes in practice, this is the committee tasked with 
coordinating the general interest of the German export economy with the policy 
objectives of the state bureaucracy. 
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Language barriers as well as the lack of time and resources make it impossible to extend 
the archival method to the other state/society complexes featured in this study. While 
funds were not available for me to travel to the United States, much of the archival 
material pertaining to international monetary relations, foreign economic policy, and the 
G7 summit meetings has been published electronically as part of the Foreign Relations of 
the United States series. For countries such as Britain, Italy, and France, I have drawn as 
much as possible on those secondary works that are the first to make use of the newly 
available archival material. Written from the vantage point of West German state 
officials, and based on archival research that has yet to be systematically extended to 
other countries, the dissertation does not claim to offer a definitive account but raises new 
issues and questions for other researchers to take to the relevant archives. 
   
Structure of the Argument 
The guiding premise of this dissertation, elaborated more fully in Chapter 2, is that the 
emergence of neoliberal globalization in the 1970s is best approached as the unintended 
consequences of state and class actors pursuing their particular, and oftentimes 
conflicting, interests under conditions of growing economic instability and uncertainty. 
More specifically, the hypothesis is that German state managers played a decisive, though 
not always premeditated, role in steering the capitalist world towards a neoliberal 
resolution. 
Chapter 2 provides a literature review that identifies the three principal modes of 
explaining the rise of neoliberalism in terms of (1) hegemonic power politics; (2) the 
influence of social interests; or (3) a shift in economic ideas. It argues that the German 
experience challenges important aspects of these interpretative models, and outlines an 
alternative framework that locates the origins of neoliberalism in the force field of 
attempts of states and social forces to cope with the economic troubles of the 1970s.  
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Chapter 3 revisits the rise and fall of the Bretton Woods infrastructure of ‘embedded 
liberalism’. It de-emphasizes the unilateral agency of the United States, arguing that the 
breakdown of the monetary system was the result in large part of unsuccessful European 
attempts to ‘multilateralize’ American monetary power. France in particular helped sever 
the dollar/gold link in March 1968. The so-called ‘Nixon shock’, I conclude, cannot be 
understood as the opening gambit in an American project of ‘neoliberal globalization’ 
that US strategists imposed upon Western Europe and Japan.  
Chapter 4 focuses on the complex interplay of German state managers and dominant 
social forces that led to the experimental floating of the Deutsche Mark (DM) and 
ultimately the collapse of the fixed-exchange-rate system. I argue that floating enabled 
the German state to reorganize its relationship with the dominant export bloc, and pursue 
a monetarist policy that committed both social partners to mutual wage and price 
restraint—a very different constellation of interests than the multinational corporations 
and banks that are said to have promoted floating in the United States.  
Chapter 5 argues that in order to keep the world economy open for its exports and shore 
up its competitive position, German crisis managers pursued a grand economic strategy 
that sought to defeat the interventionist and expansionary responses of the European left 
in particular. The success of this strategy had contradictory consequences: it helped to 
stabilize the social consensus inside Germany but undermined it in states whose 
economies did not stand to benefit from anti-inflationary measures. Germany’s 
particularistic way of coping with the crisis and stemming imported inflation and 
protectionism contributed decisively, though not deliberately, to the “disembedding” of 
the liberal international economic order.  
Chapter 6 argues that in order to protect the cost advantage of its export model from the 
dangers of imported inflation, Germany strove above all to commit the United States to 
monetary and fiscal rigor. To this end, German state managers blocked the attempts of 
the Carter administration to organize a global Keynesian expansion, and scaled back their 
dollar support interventions. Both actions helped push the US into the Volcker interest 
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rate shock that radically disinflated the world economy and launched the attack on the 
organized power of labour.  
Chapter 7 argues that the neoliberal experiment in the United States was sustained by the 
coincidence of monetary restraint and fiscal latitude that drew in global investment, 
helped finance the massive tax cuts and military expenditures, and thus secured the 
political, economic and especially financial success of neoliberalism after the global 
recession of the early 1980s. The chapter highlights the particularly post-hegemonic 
nature of the new social and international order that emerged with the termination of the 
social consensus and the marginalization of labour. It points to the interplay of divergent 
and opposing strategies of crisis management as the principal driver of social and world 
order change in the 1970s and potentially today. 
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Chapter 2 
State Power, Social Interests, and Ideas:  
Rethinking the Origins of Neoliberal Globalization 
 
The first chapter has established that IR/IPE originally grappled with a very specific 
problem: whether or not Western unity could be maintained in the wake of the turbulent 
1970s that seemed to spell the end of American hegemony. To explain, from this 
position, how a moment of profound instability and discordance could instead gave rise 
to an even more open, integrated, and cooperative global political economy centred on 
the US has been enormously difficult. The inclination of both realist and liberal 
approaches, we have seen, has been to downplay the significance of the crisis and 
competitive dynamics of the 1970s—only to encounter similarly confounding tendencies 
of ‘conflict within cooperation’ (Porch 2007) thereafter. The first chapter has proposed to 
dispense with the nostalgic pessimism that the cold war delayed the inevitable return to 
anarchic normalcy, as well as the retrospective comfort that whatever tensions emerged 
were ultimately transcended by the forces of globalization. Instead, this dissertation has 
advocated for a critical-theoretical approach that—from the strategic view of German 
state elites and on the basis of newly accessible government records—integrates the 
transatlantic frictions of the decade into an account of the rise of neoliberal globalization. 
The purpose of the present chapter is to review the vast and diverse literature on the 
origins of neoliberalism and to interrogate how they fit in with this endeavour. I propose 
that one can usefully distinguish three models of explanations: (1) the argument that 
neoliberalism was imposed by the United States in a bid to restore its global dominance; 
(2) the argument that neoliberalism is the outcome of business groups or capitalist class 
forces, especially those associated with finance, seeking to restore their profitability and 
power vis-à-vis organized labour; (3) the argument that the displacement of 
34 
 
Keynesianism by neoliberalism is best understood as a paradigmatic shift in economic 
ideas.  
It should be noted that these interpretive models are not mutually exclusive, and that 
many empirical accounts draw on more than one (e.g. Helleiner 1994; Gowan 1999; 
Blyth 2002). The main argument is that the movement of states, social forces, and ideas 
towards neoliberalism proceeded unevenly, and the principal purpose of this chapter is to 
give historical-sociological depth to this specific form of unevenness.  
 
State Power and Neoliberal Globalization 
The first mode of explanation attributes the rise of neoliberalism to the attempts of the 
United States to recover its hegemonic position (cf. Gowan 1999; Arrighi 2003; 2005a; 
2005b. It is both closest to the original problématique of Western cohesion, and goes 
furthest in examining the inter-state conflicts that arose. This agency-centred account 
differs from the structuralist interpretation introduced in the previous chapter. The latter 
holds that the existential threat posed by the Soviet Union, coupled with the dangers of 
strong communist movements inside the advanced capitalist countries such as France and 
Italy, guaranteed core capitalist unity even amidst the economic instabilities and 
transatlantic tensions that emerged in the 1970s (cf. Garten 1992: 60; Gilpin 2000: 16). In 
this view, transatlantic cohesion is the immediate and unproblematic result of US-Soviet 
antagonism and the nuclear balance of terror. The former interpretation, by contrast, asks 
how and why the United States was able to control inter-allied tensions in the turbulent 
1970s. In exploring this question, some scholars have extended the analysis from the 
military-strategic to the politico-economic terrain (Gilpin 2000; Layne 2006; Mastanduno 
2009). America’s military superiority, for them, is only one of the instruments in a wider 
arsenal of statecraft.
14
 Building on this insight, a number of analysts have argued that 
                                                 
14
  Richard Saull’s (2007: 138) interpretation of this period holds that “the political-military leverage the 
US continued to hold over two of its major economic protagonists at this time—West Germany and 
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some of the most decisive global economic changes of the 1970s and 1980s—from 
President Richard Nixon’s closing of the gold window in August 1971 to Federal Reserve 
Chairman Paul Volcker’s war on inflation—need to be placed in the strategic context of 
hegemonic restoration. Neoliberal globalization, from this perspective, should be seen as 
the American hegemon’s bid to reverse its economic fortunes and to re-establish its 
political leadership (Helleiner 1994; Spiro 1999; Gowan 1999). As a project that sought 
to address the relative decline of American hegemony, neoliberalism is believed to have 
been engineered primarily by the Unites States (and, to a lesser extent, its British junior 
partner). And because it benefitted the economic and financial position of the United 
States in particular, it is assumed to have been enforced over and above the interests of 
Western Europe and Japan (Arrighi 2005a; 2005b).   
The promise of the ‘hegemonic restoration’ thesis is that it can help us understand how 
the controversies that characterized the crisis responses of the leading states in the 1970s 
actually contributed to the rise of neoliberalism. The problem, we shall see, is that it 
attempts to do so from the point of view of the United States alone. The most provocative 
and problematic account in this regard is that of Peter Gowan (1999). For him, the 1970s 
are indeed a period of intensified economic competition as well as “[s]erious inter-state 
tensions pitting groups of protectorates against the US” (Gowan 2003: 4). While crisis 
and conflict opened up an array of possible trajectories, the United States, Gowan argues, 
was able not only to constrain but to decide these struggles in its favour. Although 
“[t]here were a range of options for the leading capitalist powers to choose from”, the 
United States ultimately succeeded in imposing its preferred solution. Neoliberal 
globalization, Gowan asserts, was “the outcome of international political conflicts won 
by the American government” (Gowan 1999: 4-5).  
                                                                                                                                                 
Japan—meant that it could afford to sacrifice intra-western co-operation and harmony in the economic 
sphere knowing full well that the ruling classes in Bonn and Tokyo would only go so far in challenging US 
hegemony and their protectorate status in the Cold War”. 
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The process by which the United States is supposed to have prevailed over its core 
capitalist partners will be examined in greater detail in Chapter 3. More important at this 
point are the analytical challenges that inhere in accounts that—following a research 
technique that Peter Gowan (1999: x) describes as ‘backward mapping’—“read back 
from ultimate policy outputs to hypotheses about policy goals”. 
Backward mapping is an invaluable tool of research whenever access to the internal 
process of decision-making is restricted. The obvious shortcoming is that it can only shed 
light on those decisions that were ultimately taken. Because the policy outcome is the 
point of departure and the aim is to infer the factors that produced it, backward mapping 
is bound to miss out on, and indeed tends to underestimate, the plurality of options under 
discussion. In light of the new documentary evidence, it is now possible to identify the 
full range of available options, and to distinguish those that were seriously considered 
from those that were ruled out a priori. To do so is to explore what may be “crucial ‘non-
decisions’…often neglected in histories of the globalization process” (e.g. Helleiner 
1995: 325).
15
 The reasons states chose to refrain from particular foreign (economic) 
policies, I propose, offer novel insights into the political and economic determinants of 
neoliberal globalization.  
A second issue with backward mapping is that it tends to equate intention and result. 
Deducing the interests of policy makers from the consequences of their actions assumes 
that what policy makers (and the broader social and political interests they represent) got 
is what they had wanted in the first place. In reality, motives and outcomes may well 
diverge. The result of a course of action may be different from the desired or expected 
effect. This is so for two reasons: first, policy decisions may have been made on the basis 
of incomplete or inaccurate information, and thus fall short of the end they were meant to 
achieve. Our analysis needs to leave room for such miscalculation and incapacity. And 
second, in international politics the decisions of one country confront those of others. 
States have to continuously adjust their behaviour to that of their counterparts. In this 
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 Susan Strange (1986: 26) considers a different set of non-decisions (cf. Helleiner 1995: 338, fn. 10). 
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continuous chain of action and reaction, it is unlikely that the designs of any one actor 
should completely determine longer-term developments.   
Proceeding from the maxim of cui bono, a strategy of ‘backward mapping’ is prone to 
discount alternatives of action and their unintended consequences, and to overstate the 
single-mindedness and prescience of state elites. The risk, in sum, is to unduly exaggerate 
the unilateral agency of the United States in the making of neoliberal globalization 
(Panitch 2000: 14; Krippner 2011: 88, 187). While some sceptics have contended that 
“[t]he rise of neoliberalism, and its subsequent reproduction, cannot be explained by the 
role of the United States in the world-system” (Plehwe, Walpen and Neuhoeffer 2006: 8; 
Jones 2012: 13), the key to a more sophisticated understanding of both the nature of 
America’s post-war hegemony and its transformation in the 1970s lies with the other core 
capitalist states.  
It may well be, as Gowan asserts, that any counter-hegemonic projects were pre-empted 
by the United States. But unless we consider the actions of these potential contenders, we 
cannot rule out that they never really tried to begin with, and that the reasons for why 
neoliberal solutions emerged victorious reach deeper than the ability of the US to impress 
its will. Focussing on the German point of view in particular, the next chapters will 
address the following questions: What, if any, rival conceptions of world order emerged 
during this period? And how and why were such alternative conceptions ultimately 
marginalized and/or discarded? How far, and under what conditions, did the secondary 
powers come to accept the solution favoured by the United States, and why? 
 
Neoliberalism as a Social Project 
The second cluster of explanations—encompassing a broad spectrum of theoretical 
approaches that range from critical pluralist to elite theories and Marxist perspectives 
(Hawley 1984: 163)—shifts the focus from the international to the social conflicts that 
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accompanied the rise of neoliberalism. The argument, at is most basic, is that 
neoliberalism was the product of a collective effort to restore the profitability and 
authority of business, most notably in the midst of an economic and social crisis that 
threatened to undermine both (cf. Duménil and Lévy 2004; Epstein and Jayadev 2005; 
Harvey 2005; Stein 2010). The social agents behind this project are conceptualized 
variously as capitalist elites, organized business interests, a rentier class, or multinational 
firms and banks (Hawley 1984: 163); the shared assumption is that these actors, through 
various direct and indirect channels of influence, were able to translate their preferences 
into neoliberal policies that advanced their interests at the expense of the ‘embedded 
liberal’ compromise with organized labour.  
For the most part, this literature has focussed on the United States and the United 
Kingdom as the most compelling cases for the influential role of business, and finance in 
particular, in the making of neoliberal capitalism. But as Stephanie Mudge notes in her 
review essay, “a tendency to focus on politics in Anglo-liberal countries…likely misses 
most of the ‘action’.” (Mudge 2008: 705). While there is a broad and, for the most part, 
sound consensus on the importance of business in the emergence of neoliberalism, “the 
ways in which neoliberalism has asserted itself on a global level” (Duménil and Lévy 
2004: 212-213) remains subject to divergent interpretations. 
One strand of scholarship has conjoined this class-based account of neoliberalism with 
the ‘imposition thesis’ introduced above. The works of Giovanni Arrighi (1994: 323) 
establish an explicit, if conceptually and empirically undeveloped, link between the 
influence of financial interests and the reassertion of American dominance. Gowan 
(1999: 68-69), too, argues that the internationalization of neoliberalism by the United 
States served the interest of its dominant class fractions. And Duménil and Lévy (2000: 
210) argue, rather vaguely, that “financial hegemony and American power combined into 
one dynamic”. Seeing neoliberal globalization as a joint project of state and class 
domination, needless to say, is subject to the same limitations outlined in the previous 
section. An additional drawback of these formulations is that the agency of social forces, 
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not only in the recipient societies but also in the United States itself, remains largely 
unexplored. This potential advantage of class-theoretic over statist analyses that treat the 
state as a ‘black box’ remains unrealized in accounts that simply assume the interests of 
these social forces to be coextensive with the state as their external representative. In 
Gowan’s formulation, for instance, states are rather unproblematically posited as 
pursuing the “national capitalist interest” of its dominant oligopolies (Gowan 1999: 63, 
65).
16
 Because their interests are assumed to be commensurate with those of the state, the 
agency of dominant social forces drops out of the subsequent analysis. As Greta Krippner 
(2011: 13) aptly summarizes the problem, “there is a kind of instrumentalism lurking in 
some of these accounts that supplants the interests of the financial sector for the interests 
of the state or simply assumes these interests to be identical.”  
It should be noted that the problem of instrumentalism applies equally to the 
containerized image of ‘national capitals’ enlisting their states in international 
competition (Callinicos 2009), and to the notion of ‘global capital’ governing through an 
international state apparatus (Robinson 2001; 2004; Sklair 2001). The visions of world 
order that arise from these narratives—imperialist competition vs. a global state and 
capitalism—are diametrically opposed. And yet in both cases, the duality of state and 
social power is lost. To fully appreciate the complex role of social forces, and more 
specifically the tensions of capital as an agent that operates and organizes across 
territorially bounded political authority, state action “cannot simply be reduced…to the 
instrumentalities of an executive committee of the transnational capitalist class” (Gill 
2012a: 14) any more than it can be assumed to follow the interests of competing national 
bourgeoisies.  
One important step towards a more nuanced analysis of the state/capital nexus is to 
interrogate how societal interests filter through the apparatus of the state. Scholars have 
generally argued that those social forces that called for and benefitted from neoliberal 
                                                 
16
 Although in Gowan’s empirical account there is some room for contradictions to emerge (Panitch 2000: 
14).  
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policies are also responsible for their adoption (cf. Duménil and Lévy 2004: 212-213). As 
admission to the upper echelons of decision-making authority is often restricted, this 
inference is important and indispensable. The problem is that we cannot determine 
conclusively that a policy decision has been shaped by particular societal groups simply 
because it meets their specific demands or advances their interests. Unless we gain access 
to the inner workings of policy making, we cannot rule out that a particular course of 
action may have been taken independent of social pressure and on the basis of very 
different considerations and calculations, even if that decision favoured some group 
interests over others (Chibber 2003: x). One prime example for this error is discussed in 
Chapter 6. The Volcker Shock and Reagan revolution served to greatly enhance the 
structural power of global financial capital. But, as Stephen Gill (1990: 213, 217) argues, 
this is best understood as an unintended consequence, and should therefore not be 
ascribed to a purposive ‘financial coup’ (Duménil and Lévy 2004: 165; Stein 2010: 227). 
My archival research demonstrates that state managers turned to a monetarist experiment 
of exorbitant interest rate hikes in 1979 not because of the demands of financial interests 
but because of the pressures exercised by the German state and central bank via the 
dollar/DM exchange rate (see Chapter 6).  
A more promising attempt to extend class-based explanations beyond the Anglo-
American context has been to emphasize the endogenous rather than externally imposed 
character of neoliberalism. Elaborated most systematically by proponents of the 
Amsterdam School of IR/IPE, this account is based on the functional distinction between 
finance and production and a corresponding difference between a ‘money-capital’ and 
‘productive-capital’ perspective of the capitalist class. The ‘money-capital’ interest, 
located in the sphere of circulation, takes a systemic view of capitalism and espouses the 
unrestricted, worldwide movement of capital, goods and services. The ‘productive-
capital’ perspective, on the other hand, is grounded in the sphere of production, and thus 
in a specific (although progressively expanding) geographic location. With production 
bound to a specific social and political setting, the reproduction of productive capital 
depends on bargains with labour and the support of the state. Productive capital thus 
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displays a greater affinity to principles of social protection as well as economic 
protectionism (van der Pijl 1984: 10; Overbeek 1990: 26; Overbeek and van der Pijl 
1993: 4: van Apeldoorn 2002: 28-29). 
From this perspective, then, the post-war political economies of North America and 
Western Europe were premised upon the primacy of ‘productive capital’, the 
incorporation of organized labour, and the suppression of financial interests. By contrast, 
the gradual erosion of the embedded liberal order has been associated with the reassertion 
of a ‘money capital’ perspective (Overbeek 1990: 20; Overbeek and van der Pijl 1993: 
ix). Multinational banks and corporations came to push for the removal of restrictions on 
their international operations and the repeal of the New Deal and social-democratic 
bargains that had limited their scope of action domestically. Rather than a one-sided 
imposition by the United States, the emergence of neoliberalism reflects a broader shift in 
the internal balance of power in the advanced industrialized countries. 
Two important caveats are generally raised in conjunction with this thesis. Initially 
confined to the Anglo-American heartland and the policies of Thatcher and Reagan, 
neoliberalism is said to have spread gradually, and unevenly, across the capitalist core in 
the 1980s and 1990s. Secondly, substantial variations in both the methods and the extent 
of the neoliberal transformations are to be expected according to different international 
contexts and national particularities (cf. Harvey 2005: 116; Duménil and Lévy 2004: 213; 
van der Pijl 1989a: 12-13). Of particular importance is the resilience of social forces, 
most significantly the organized strength of labour, and social structures that proved 
inimical to neoliberalism (Overbeek 1993: 15-16). Accordingly, West Germany has been 
cited as a case-in-point for a country that under a social democratic government remained 
wedded to the principles of embedded liberalism and unwilling “to turn the wheel 
drastically in the 1970s” (Overbeek 1993: 16). 
Recognizing the leads and lags of ‘neoliberalization’ and the diversity of state-society 
relations, this body of literature has sought to avoid presenting the rise of neoliberalism in 
42 
 
too uniform a fashion.
17
 Overall, the image of a temporally differentiated and socially 
variegated convergence on a neoliberal form of capitalism is an apt description of the 
social and international order that emerged in the aftermath of the seventies’ crisis. But 
while this ideal-type approximation captures the subsequent transformation of the 
capitalist core in the 1980s and 1990s, it is of limited use in analyzing the initial 
responses to the post-war crisis of those states and social forces outside the Anglo-
American heartland. 
In Germany, students of the Amsterdam School have noted, the very distinction between 
productive and money capital that informs class-based accounts of systemic change does 
not seem to apply, as industry and finance have historically been integrated into a unified 
bloc of the ‘big three’ universal banks that own, finance, and supervise the largest 
industrial corporations (van der Wurff 1993: 182). This unified export bloc of finance and 
industry, my dissertation argues, did not push for neoliberal reforms. Throughout the 
1970s, it fought a defensive struggle against the revaluation and flotation of the DM, the 
tax burden imposed by the extension of social provisions under the social-liberal coalition 
under Brandt, and the more radical proposals for extended codetermination and 
investment controls emanating from the trade unions and the youth organization and left 
wing of the SPD. The social balance of power, corporate elites understood, was 
unfavourable to a more comprehensive and forward-looking mobilization of capitalist 
class power.
18
 Even the “moderate German form of Thatcherism”19 that shone through in 
the reform proposals of the infamous Lambsdorff Paper that toppled the social-liberal 
coalition in 1982 never fully materialized until the ‘third way’ social democratic 
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 Although it should be noted that Harvey’s attempt to chart “the complicated and geographically uneven 
paths of neoliberalization” (2005: 116) goes too far in the opposite direction. Harvey applies an extremely 
loose definition of neoliberalism to the diverse attempts of various ruling elites from Sweden to China to 
build or reassert their class power that deprives the concept of much of its meaning. 
18
 The former spokesman of the board of Deutsche Bank and president of the Bundesbank Karl Klasen 
noted that one ought to “assess realistically the ability and willingness of many entrepreneurs to negatively 
dissociate themselves from ideologies or even to positively transcend them… It is to be hoped that the ship 
has not listed too heavily yet” (Klasen to Günther von Berenberg-Gossler, 28 May 1974, BBk HA B 
330/8374). 
19
 Ehmke to Schmidt, 20 October 1980, personal confidential, AdsD HSA 6818. 
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government of Gerhard Schröder some fifteen years later. As Richard van der Wurff 
(1993: 182) sums up this situation, “the changes in the political landscape taking place in 
the early 1980s cannot be explained by a changing balance of forces between different 
fractions of capital”.  
Given the unbroken unity of industry and finance in the West German political economy, 
the question arises how else to account for the far-reaching changes in their external 
policies during the 1970s. But what is even more important is the question of how the 
crisis responses of the German state fed back into and possibly helped reshape the 
international system. The upshot of attributing the emergence of neoliberalism to a 
particular class fraction is to cast Germany—and other leading state/society complexes 
such as France and Japan—as relatively passive spectators that share in the global 
formation of neoliberalism only once, and in so far as, they undergo a regrouping of 
dominant social forces similar to the US and UK somewhere down the line.  
The main argument of this dissertation is that, despite the absence of a dominant class 
coalition that actively promoted neoliberalism, German state managers nevertheless 
contributed significantly, if indirectly, to its global emergence in several respects. Their 
decision to float the DM in 1969 and 1971 set a crucial precedent that undermined the 
fixed-exchange rate regime and exposed countries to destabilizing capital flows (Chapter 
4). Their adoption of monetarism in 1974 and subsequent promotion of European 
monetary integration compelled its neighbours to follow the anti-inflationary path of 
Germany. But while a low inflation regime offered comparative pricing advantages to the 
German export bloc and its incorporated trade unions, the extension of austerity through 
the European currency snake and, more successfully, the European Monetary System 
(EMS) eroded rather than stabilized the embedded liberal consensus in these countries. 
The decision of the German state to forego a global Keynesian solution and to tie its 
financial assistance to austerity provisions prevented a potentially progressive resolution 
of the crisis of the 1970s (Chapter 5). And the German pressure on the United States to 
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assume the restrictive burden for global capitalism played an important role in the turn 
towards the Volcker Shock (Chapter 6).  
 
The Power of Ideas? 
The final way of approaching the crisis of the 1970s is through the lens of a contestation 
between economic paradigms. The classical formulation, from a historical institutional 
perspective, has been provided by Peter Hall (1992; 1993).
20
 According to Hall, policy 
paradigms provide interpretative frameworks that help policymakers define problems, the 
possible solutions, and the means to achieve these goals (1992: 91-92). Hall described the 
displacement of Keynesianism as a learning process on the part of state managers that 
was provoked by economic crisis, characterized by an associated loss of confidence in 
established economic thought, and guided by the search for alternatives. The argument is 
that the stagflationary decade posed intractable problems that the predominant Keynesian 
macro-economic framework proved unable either to explain or to resolve. This situation 
of intellectual disillusionment and economic turbulence provided an opening for 
neoliberal ideas to gain plausibility and prominence after they had been marginalized 
from academic and policy making circles since the Great Depression. The rise of 
neoliberalism, in this view, proceeded gradually. It started with the experimental 
introduction of new policy instruments (of monetarism and pro-market reform) by state 
managers seeking to hold on to the policy goals of embedded liberalism, and culminated 
in the radical redefinition of the ‘social purpose’ of state policy under Thatcher (and 
Reagan).
21
  
While Hall’s analysis is confined to Britain, Kathleen McNamara (1998) has provided an 
account of how a neoliberal consensus emerged across Europe that prioritized low 
                                                 
20
 For Hall (1992: 95), “[t]he shift from Keynesian to monetarist modes of policy-making is ultimately a 
story about the movement of ideas.” 
21
 For instance, state and financial authorities might adopt new techniques of monetary targeting without at 
first accepting the natural rate theory of unemployment (Hickson 2005: 213). 
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inflation over full employment and that contributed to the success of the European 
Monetary System (EMS) constructed in 1979. The absence of such a consensus, in her 
view, explains the failure of the earlier European Currency Snake. Rather than each state 
going through its own separate cycle of policy failure and paradigmatic innovation along 
the lines outlined above, McNamara adds that policy makers also learned from each 
other. This process of policy emulation, in her view, was driven most centrally by 
Germany, which offered a prime example of how monetary restraint could more aptly 
manage the stagflationary crisis of the mid-1970s (McNamara 1998: 69, 152-154). 
McNamara elaborates a ‘diffusionist’ model of ideational change in which Germany 
emerged as one of the centres of dissemination (McNamara 1998). But she defers to Hall 
and others to explain where these ideas come from in the first place. 
For Hall, the state does not innovate and advance new policy on its own. What connects 
the state to civil society is the formulation of economic ideas rather than the articulation 
of narrow self-interests (1993: 289). In response to the economic crisis and 
impoverishment of Keynesianism “an outside marketplace in economic ideas” developed 
(Hall 1992: 104), and “[p]olicy changed…in response to an evolving societal debate” 
(Hall 1993: 288). The source of new economic ideas, accordingly, lies with non-state 
actors such as the media, think tanks, and political parties, as participants in this 
discourse and suppliers of new ideas (Hall 1993: 288-289).  
The rise of neoliberalism in this view is due primarily to the sustained endeavour of a 
small group of intellectuals led most prominently by Friedrich Hayek and Milton 
Friedman, who had preserved, developed, and disseminated free-market ideas after 1945 
and gradually shaped the opinions of wider circles of intellectuals, entrepreneurs, 
journalists, technocrats and decision makers. Similar to the Keynesian paradigm shift half 
a century earlier, a transatlantic advocacy network stood ready to seize upon the crisis of 
capitalism and established economic thought (Burgin 2012; Jones 2012). Proponents of 
an ideas-based account emphasize the avant-garde and educational role of neoliberal 
thinkers and eschew a “simplistic class analysis” that reduces neoliberalism to the self-
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interest of capitalist class or state elites. Their argument is that neither of them “knew 
precisely what sort of political economy would prove to coincide with their interests; 
rather, they had to be taught what it was they wanted” (Mirowski 2008: 117). And yet the 
notion that neoliberal intellectuals educated state managers and capitalists only works as 
an explanation if one ignores that their ability to translate ideas into action depends on the 
position of other groups in society (Schmidt 2011: 476). 
One of the advantages of ideational accounts over state-centrist and class-based 
explanations is their apparent ability to capture the German contribution to the global rise 
of neoliberalism. German economic and political philosophy, it is argued, had developed 
a peculiar and influential version of its own. The new liberal economic doctrine, 
developed by a circle of economists associated with the so-called Freiburg School, 
outlined an explicitly non-Keynesian approach to macro-economic policy. At the centre 
of ordoliberalism was the conviction that the state had to play a critical yet closely 
circumscribed role in economic life (Ptak 2009: 100). The purpose of economic policy 
was to create and maintain a constitutional framework in which market forces could 
operate freely and efficiently. This required a strong and proactive state with the capacity 
to prevent and break up concentrations of private economic power, and to sustain and, if 
necessary, recreate the conditions of market competition (Ptak 2009: 102).  
After 1945, ordoliberals presented their version of neoliberalism as the sound alternative 
to laissez-faire capitalism and a tendentially totalitarian economic planning (Nicholls 
1994). Under the Christian-Democratic chancellor Konrad Adenauer and his economics 
minister Ludwig Erhard, ordoliberal ideas served as a blueprint in the reconstruction of 
German capitalism after 1945. The post-war success of the social market economy 
premised on these foundations, and the presumed persistence of ordoliberal ideas, might 
explain why German state managers only belatedly and hesitatingly turned to Keynesian 
ideas (Allen 2005: 199-201), and why, in the subsequent crisis of post-war capitalism, 
they were quick to revert back to economic orthodoxy of price stability, monetary 
restraint and financial rectitude (Allen 1989). 
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But the specific and renewed appeal of the idea of an ordoliberal paradigm is that it 
promises to speak to the exigencies of the present. For the argument is not only that 
German political economy was premised on an endogenous form of neoliberalism. 
Alongside the Austrian School, German ordoliberalism has been acknowledged as “a 
second source of neoliberal inspiration” (Jones 2012: 121) and a precursor to the Anglo-
American version that gained global prominence in the 1980s (Bonefeld 2013: 235; 
Gamble 1979: 5; Ptak 2009: 99; Jones 2012: 125-126). Others have argued that 
ordoliberal principles shaped European monetary integration and became embodied in the 
European Central Bank (Blyth 2013: 101); and that Germany’s ordoliberal legacy is at 
the heart of the current Eurozone crisis or may offer a sound alternative to the both 
excesses of market fundamentalism and the fallacies of Keynesianism (Young 2013; 
Schnyder and Siems 2013). 
The efforts to construe ordoliberalism as a meta-narrative of German political economy 
reaching back to the writings of the Freiburg School run the risk of missing out on 
important discontinuities and transformations. The proto-fascist exonerations of the state 
that shines through in the works of some of the most prominent ordoliberals in the 1930s 
had to change drastically after 1945 (Berghahn and Young 2013: 3)—an insight that 
scholars who argue for an authoritarian strand of neoliberalism tend to overlook (cf. 
Bonefeld 2013; Ptak 2009). For the social market economy to succeed, it had to be 
rendered social in ways that deviated from ordoliberal prescriptions. Rebuilding 
capitalism required a compromise between the market organization envisioned by 
ordoliberals and the social protection that had been afforded by the nationalist welfare 
state established by Bismarck and extended during the Weimar Republic (Blyth 2013: 
113). The welfare state and redistributive designs by Alfred Müller-Armack clearly broke 
with ordoliberal orthodoxy, and his hopes that the interventionist and stabilizing 
measures of the ‘social market economy’ would be temporary remained illusory 
(Berghahn and Young 2013: 5). But the ordoliberal vision remained unfulfilled in other 
important respects as well. The ideal of establishing a competitive system of private 
property in which market power was checked by the state and dispersed into a large 
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number of small and medium-sized units required the breaking up of Germany’s highly 
concentrated and centralized ownership structure which far exceeded the oligopolistic 
competition that American post-war planners had in mind (Berghahn 2010: 5-6; 
Berghahn and Young 2013: 4); even the less utopian proposals that sought to empower 
the state to check dangerous concentrations of market power proposed by Walter Eucken 
and Franz Böhme failed to translate into legislation; they were long delayed and 
significantly watered down by the opposition of organized capital (Nicholls 1994: 335-
336; Neebe 2004: 327). The law for trade union codetermination hardly fits ordoliberal 
precepts either (Nicholls 1994: 338-339). 
The continuous influence of ordoliberal ideology on macro-economic policy making is 
therefore open to debate. In the same way that scholars have begun to question the extent 
to which Keynesianism ever ruled supreme in the post-war period (cf. Newton 2004), we 
may wish to question the coherence and efficacy of ordoliberal thought in this period. 
Even those who chose to speak, nevertheless, of an ‘ordoliberally’ inspired 
macroeconomic framework have argued that its influence waned dramatically in the 
1950s and 1960s (cf. Nicholls 1994; Nützenadel 2005 Rittershausen 2007: 20).
22
 
Ordoliberalism “receded from the academic scene, and by the mid-1960s…was at best an 
afterthought, a circumscribed historical aside in the primarily Keynesian agendas of 
policy-makers” (Rittershausen 2007: 41). Following Hall’s model of paradigmatic 
change, this should hardly be surprising.
23
 Although it is questionable whether 
Germany’s post-war economic boom was founded upon ordoliberal principles, there is no 
doubt that it had exhausted itself by the mid 1960s. The important difference is that the 
German economy entered into recession earlier than other advanced capitalist countries. 
Policy makers and politicians were therefore looking for alternative modes of regulation 
at a moment when Keynesianism could still lay claim to scientific validity and 
managerial mastery (Nützenadel 2005: 304). To be sure, the turn towards Keynesianism 
                                                 
22
 Indeed those who have done so have been keen to present the less economically successful decades of 
German political economy to a Keynesian coup. 
23
 is at once to admit that a paradigmatic shift towards Keynesianism that occurred in the mid-1960s 
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was belated (Abelshauser 1991), brief and superficial (Allen 1989), and never extended 
to monetary policy (Bibow 2009: 182). Yet this more nuanced appreciation of 
Keynesianism, important as though it is, should not come at the cost of unduly inflating 
the resilience of the rival ‘ordoliberal’ paradigm. Nothing is gained by replacing one 
unhelpful abstraction by another.  
One possible way out of this quagmire would be to claim that ‘ordoliberalism’, reduced 
to a concern with price stability, found an intellectual habitat in the institutionally 
independent and austerity-minded central bank that resisted the Keynesian experiments of 
the late 1960s and early 1970s. In this view, ordoliberalism could survive and provide a 
blueprint for the EMS. And yet this is to grossly exaggerate the influence of 
ordoliberalism on the monetary architecture, culture and policy of the German central 
bank (Johnson 1998: 56; Bibow 2009). 
The much praised political independence of the German central bank came about by 
historical happenstance rather than by design.
24
 It was a product in large part of the fact 
that a federal German state did not exist when the precursor to the Bundesbank—the 
Bank Deutscher Länder—was established (Buchheim 1999; 2001; Marsh 1992: 144-145; 
Bibow 2009: 158). Most importantly, it was not influenced by, and in fact contradicted, 
ordoliberal conceptions of an appropriate monetary framework. The ordoliberal credo 
that only market-conforming state regulation is permissible militated against the practice 
of central banks (independent or otherwise) to set the rate of interest. To do so was to 
constantly interfere with the price-finding mechanism of the market (Bibow 2009: 169).
25
 
Even in political practice, the ordoliberal luminary Walter Eucken rejected the idea of 
central bank autonomy as introducing a dangerous ‘pluralism’ “that would jeopardize the 
unity of state policy” (quoted in Bibow 2009: 170). And in the mid-1950s, the advisory 
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 An exhaustive account of the origins of German central bank autonomy has been provided by Bibow 
(2009: 155), who argues that ‘ordoliberalism’ “had no…impact on the country’s emerging monetary order 
at all” (155). 
25
 The automatism of monetary policy devised by Friedman fulfilled this premise but was based on 
Keynesian monetary theory. Friedman also rejected central bank independence. 
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council of Erhard’s economics ministry, which included a number of high-profile 
ordoliberals, “designed and recommended a model…that was essentially Keynesian in 
spirit” and that envisioned the goal dependence of the central bank (Bibow 2009: 184). 
That the Bundesbank nevertheless emerged as formally independent from government 
directives owes to the power-political considerations that pitted Erhard against his 
internal rival Schäffer, the federal states against the government, and the SPD against the 
incumbent CDU (Bibow 2009). The central bank, too, was interested in preserving its 
autonomy. But when confronted with the great inflation of the late 1960s and early 
1970s, its members were disposed to give up the legal independence of the Bank 
(Johnson 1998: 24). 
Moreover, Johnson (1998: 56) claims that “there is little evidence that [ordoliberalism] 
had a direct impact on the culture of German central banking.” Monetary policy-makers 
were influenced not only by the historical experience of hyperinflation and the fascist 
state-directed war economy but also by the collapse of liberal capitalism amidst economic 
recession and mass unemployment. The Bundesbank has cultivated a myth of single-
mindedly defending the stability of the DM out of a sense of historical responsibility to 
the German population which, it has been repeatedly argued by policy makers and 
academics, was haunted by the collective memories of hyperinflation in the 1920s. The 
reality was far more mundane. Equally important to the German public and policy 
making elites, and thus just as likely to have influenced monetary policy, was the fear of 
economic recession and mass unemployment (Johnson 1998: 24-25). The reason why one 
was elevated above the other cannot be explained with reference to ordoliberalism either. 
Ordoliberals, to be sure, had stressed price stability as the essential precondition for a 
functioning market economy (although Keynes, too, argued that the productive and 
financial sectors “cannot work properly if the money, which they assume as a stable 
measuring-rod, is undependable” (quoted in Bibow 2009: 170)). But the Bundesbank 
members that sought to defeat the great inflation in the early 1970s adopted a series of 
highly interventionist measures—opposed, it should be noted, by the devoutly Keynesian 
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economics and finance minister Karl Schiller—that would have been anathema to 
ordoliberals (Johnson 1998: 24).
26
 
Far more important than economic philosophy were the tangible benefits that derived 
from internal discipline. Carl-Ludwig Holtfrerich (1999; 2008) has argued that 
Germany’s post-war elites found that their export economy could obtain a crucial 
comparative advantage over its trade rivals if wages and prices could be kept at lower 
levels.
27
 The fixed-exchange rate regime of Bretton Woods enshrined this advantage. 
Moreover, as we shall, it was a similar concern that motivated German state managers in 
the 1970s. 
Lastly, there is no straight line between the ordoliberal ideas that—tempered by political 
expedience and economic necessity and combined with otherwise incommensurate ideas 
of income redistribution, social benefits and subsidies—underpinned the German 
Wirtschaftswunder, and the techniques of crisis management that the Bundesbank 
adopted in the wake of the 1973/1974 recession. Monetarism—the idea that the central 
bank should ensure a tightly controlled and steady supply of money—had to be created 
from scratch and involved a combination of Keynesian and ordoliberal principles 
(Johnson 1998: 57). Germany also did not simply go out to preach the benefits of its form 
of neoliberalism to others. What is far more important, this dissertation shows, is that 
German policy makers had found a way of coping with the crisis of the 1970s; their 
attempt to protect and bolster this crisis management strategy is what defined the limits of 
the possible for many other countries. All this is to suggest that ideas are profoundly 
malleable.  
                                                 
26
 Nor should the institutional autonomy of the Bundesbank be credited for this shift. The Bundesbank itself 
only gained its independence, from the government as much as from the export interests of banks and 
industry, through the decision to float the DM (Johnson 1998: 53, 59, 101; cf. von Hagen 1999: 411). 
27
 As the German Minister of Economics Ludwig Erhard wrote to Vocke on 2 August 1950: “If, namely, 
through internal discipline we are able to maintain the price level to a greater extent than other countries, 
our exports’ strength will increase in the long run and our currency will become stronger and more healthy, 
both internally and with respect to the dollar” (Holtfrerich 1999: 345; recently quoted in Cesaratto and 
Stireti 2010: 72). 
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The German case raises important questions regarding the general model of ideational 
and policy change. The emphasis on ideological entrepreneurs that shape the terrain of 
the debate is bound to bring back the question as to what extent ulterior motifs (‘material’ 
interests) underpin these articulations, and how we best to distinguish these interests (are 
they objectively derived or themselves socially constructed?) from the ideas that may 
promote or conceal them.  Keynes, for one, was “sure that the power of vested interests is 
vastly exaggerated compared with the gradual encroachment of ideas” (John Maynard 
Keynes, The General Theory of Unemployment, 1936, quoted in Jones 2012: 1). The 
question is whether we can be quite so certain. But there is an even larger problem. 
Hayek modelled the Mont Pelerin Society on the insight of Keynes that ideas have the 
power to shape the opinions of policy makers in the long run (Burgin 2012: 217).
28
 And 
Friedman took his cue from the British constitutional lawyer Albert Venn Dicey when he 
argued that previously marginalized ideas gradually radiate outwards from a small core of 
true believers to a new generation of scholars and, when circumstances called for action, 
to society at large (Burgin 2012: 219-221). For Friedman, “only a crisis—actual or 
perceived—produces real change. When that crisis occurs, the actions that are taken 
depend on the ideas that are lying around” (quoted in Blyth 2013: 103). 
Clearly, the notion of a paradigmatic shift, driven by intellectuals that painstakingly 
reshape the ideological environment in which policy makers make their decisions, 
reflects what both Keynesian and neoliberal thinkers thought they were doing (Helleiner 
1994: 145). The question, of course, is whether we are well-advised to derive our mode 
of explanation of how economic thought shapes social reality from the self-understanding 
of those agents actively engaged in propagating and proselytizing these ideas (cf. Burgin 
2012: 217-222). Ideological entrepreneurs, in the heat of the moment or in nostalgic 
retrospective, may well overstate the intellectual coherence and the causal efficacy of the 
paradigms they promote. Taking their interpretation at face value is to miss that, as 
Monica Prasad (2006: 21) has argued, “even quite narrowly defined economic ideas are 
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 “When Hayek was preparing to found the Mont Pelerin Society, he turned to Keynes’s representation of 
the relationship between ideas and historical change” (Burgin 2012: 217).  
53 
 
polyvalent and even self-contradictory, so that the same idea may come to mean quite 
different things at different times or to different audiences.” Open to multiple 
interpretations, ideas do not unproblematically translate into policy; they are shaped, and 
frequently twisted out of recognition, by the circumstances of the time. Political 
opportunism or economic necessity may determine which ideas get selected and how they 
are defined.    
It is of course possible, and potentially productive, to push the inquiry further by raising 
the objection that what seems ‘politically opportune’ or ‘economically necessary’ in 
moments of crisis is also socially (read: ideationally) constructed (Blyth 2002: 22-23, 35-
44; for a sympathetic and compelling critique, see Hay 2004). According to such a 
constructivist reading, the interests of actors, particularly under conditions of uncertainty, 
are themselves mediated by ideas rather than objectively predetermined (e.g. McNamara 
1998: 57-59; Blyth 2002: 33). However valuable, the insight that all interests are social 
artefacts can be a source of considerable confusion (Hay 2004: 210). Does this include 
the interests of those non-state actors that supply new economic ideas to policy makers? 
And does it include the interests of policy makers that translate these new economic ideas 
into policies? The answer is that while a constructivist study could be fruitfully extended 
along these lines, such an analysis cannot be organized around the concept of 
‘neoliberalism’ as a catch-all term (Rogers 2013: 2, 5). For it is possible, and indeed 
likely, that the ideas that ideological entrepreneurs seek to disseminate (especially when 
associated with capitalist entrepreneurs) are different from the ideas that motivate their 
actions. And it is just as likely that the ideas that led political operators to implement 
neoliberal policies (such as electoral considerations) differed from the ideas that were 
inscribed in these policies. The case of the Italian Communist Party, briefly discussed in 
Chapter 5, illustrates this issue. Ideas may have been an important factor in explaining 
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communist support for austerity measures; but surely, these ideas had little in common 
with neoliberal ideology. 
29
   
By contrast, this dissertation demonstrates that the ideas that guided social forces and 
state actors were diverse and, in the end, very different from the changes in belief-system 
that these actions brought about. Most importantly, Chapters 4 and 5 argue that West 
German state managers were never driven by neoliberal (or ordoliberal) ideas, but more 
immediately concerned with finding ways to deal with the particular problems thrown up 
by the post-war crisis of capitalism. The reason they decided to let the DM float had 
nothing to with a belief in the market as a more efficient price finding mechanism. The 
reason they chose monetarism to curb inflation was to more effectively intervene in the 
distributive conflict between capital and labour. And the reason they singled out price 
stability was that it offered export opportunities that could help secure social peace. The 
infamous monetary and financial austerity that German state managers embraced in the 
1970s was meant to sustain the embedded liberal compromise at home. In as far as 
German state elites were guided by a larger interpretative framework rather than 
pragmatic considerations, Chapter 5 argues, they looked back to the economic nationalist 
fragmentation of the 1930s as the scenario that needed to be prevented.   
 
Structured Choices, Patterned Interactions, and Unintended Consequences 
The explanatory models examined in this chapter differ according to the causal weight 
they ascribe to the factors of state power, social interests, and economic ideas. In the final 
analysis, however, they suffer from a similar deficiency: their accounts of neoliberal 
transformation tend to extrapolate from the properties of the dominant state/society 
complex in the system. Whether the emphasis is on a hegemonic imposition, a 
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 The case of the Italian Communist Party, briefly discussed in Chapter 5, illustrates this issue. Ideas may 
have been an important factor in explaining communist support for austerity measures; but surely, these 
ideas—associated with an anti-consumerist asceticism—had little in common with free-market ideology. 
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parallelism of social forces, or the diffusion of ideas, the US is considered to be the prime 
mover in a neoliberal direction. Other social formations partake in this systemic change 
to the extent that they possess comparable characteristics. Decision-making elites may 
have been exposed to the same ideas, subject to the same societal pressures, or stood at 
the receiving end of the hegemonic relationship (or have hegemonic interests of their 
own). Those societies with a different ideological environment, domestic balance of 
forces, or geopolitical situation can converge on the Anglo-American model; but they are 
precluded conceptually from adding to this transformation. In each of these explanations, 
unevenness is confined to different tempos and gradations of the same general movement 
from the crisis of embedded liberalism to neoliberal globalization.
30
 To extend the 
account beyond the United States and the United Kingdom requires greater attention not 
only to the diversity of capitalist political economies but also to their interactivity. 
The first step in this process of theoretical reconstruction is to examine the precise 
relationship between state and class agency. The point here is not to theoretically assert 
the autonomy of the state from society, but to more carefully delineate how far, and under 
what conditions, state actors may be compelled to pursue policies that deviate from the 
interests of capitalist owners or the conditions for capitalist reproduction.    
The privileged position of business within the political process of decision making has 
been widely acknowledged within critical pluralist and Marxist scholarship (e.g. 
Miliband 1973; Poulantzas 1973; Lindblom 1977). This should not be mistaken for an 
‘instrumentalist’ conception of the state, however. On the contrary, the fact that business 
systematically seeks to influence state policy reflects a concern that its interests may not 
otherwise be adequately represented. This is a sign not only that capital is fragmented 
into rival groups that may seek to gain particular advantages, but also that it has to come 
to terms with competing group interests and its antagonistic relationship to labour. This 
competition, to be sure, is far from equal. And yet in capitalistically developed societies, 
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 See, for instance, the argument by Eric Helleiner (1994: 15) that “the ideological shift to neoliberalism 
took place at varying rates of speed and degrees of intensity in different countries”.  
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where the power to command labour and appropriate surplus has been divested from the 
power to rule, and where the latter has been made subject to a limited form of 
representative democracy (Wood 1981), there is a latent possibility that the interests 
expressed through the agency of the state may contradict not only this or that special 
interest but the ‘general will’ of the capitalist class as a whole. 
From the perspective of state managers, the problem is threefold. First of all, they face 
not only competing societal demands or rival business factions (Hawley 1984: 162); they 
may also confront contradictory interests of the same social group (Hawley 1987: 145). 
Germany’s dominant export bloc, Chapter 4 explains, opposed both an appreciating DM 
and comprehensive capital controls. Even if the operators of capitalist states may be 
structurally predisposed to prioritize capital over other social constituents (Lindblom 
1982), such incompatibilities may require states to make independent and proactive 
decisions (Hawley 1987: 145). Second, apart from a clear-cut quid pro quo (e.g. 
campaign contribution in exchange for legislative action), what capital wants is not 
always unequivocally clear. The structural power of capital tends to be proscriptive rather 
than prescriptive; it may circumscribe which policies cannot be taken without significant 
sacrifices, but it rarely offers guidelines for positive state actions. Moreover, the 
dynamics of capital accumulation not only restrict state agency but may also go against 
the preferences of large segments or influential groups of the capitalist class, thus raising 
opposing pressures for the state to arbitrate. 
The dilemma confronting state managers is not simply how to reconcile ‘maintenance 
functions’ that may come into conflict with one another (O’Connor 1973). It is rather 
how to translate these abstract requirements into actual policy in the first place. Even 
under normal conditions, the prerequisites for continued capital accumulation, and the 
question of which of several possible functions the state is to prioritize at a given 
moment, are subject to multiple interpretations. The problem, in short, is that capitalism 
does not come with a manual. In moments of crisis in particular, state managers and the 
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agents of capital and other social groups are engaged in an interpretative effort that 
increases the possibility for independent state action as well as misguided decisions. 
While capitalist firms have the bottom line as the yardstick of success and failure, states 
grapple to find an equivalent indicator that can serve as a criterion of decision making. 
The problem is that the costs and benefits of state policy are not as readily quantifiable. 
In lieu of an absolute and objective measure, state officials tend to take the performance 
of their foreign counterparts as the point of reference. Realist scholars are the first to 
recognize the relational context in which states define their interests (Waltz 1979). But 
where realists identify systemic anarchy and the imperative of state survival as the matrix 
of strategic calculation, critical analysts have suggested that in matters of political 
economy state action is guided by the competitive and thus inherently comparative nature 
of capitalism (Gowan 2002; 2005; Bichler and Nitzan 2009).
31
 Contrary to 
Mearsheimer’s (2001: 35) controversial claim that “the difficulty of determining how 
much power is enough for today and tomorrow” compels states to maximize their 
influence, state managers seek, as a rule of thumb, to do better than their peers. This 
differential concern is most obvious in the attempts of states to create an attractive 
investment climate especially under conditions of global capital mobility; but it also has 
implications for how states cope with economic crises, as Chapter 5 demonstrates with 
regards to Germany. In this respect, states as crisis managers tend to be ‘defensive 
positionalists’ rather than ‘utility-maximizers’: they are concerned not only with how 
overall losses can be contained through international cooperation, but also with the 
relative distribution of the burden (Grieco 1990; 1993).  
This, then, relates to a third problem that state operators face: they do not make policy in 
isolation from one another, but in an international milieu in which their decisions 
confront and potentially collide with those of other centre countries and elites. At the 
international level, then, the difficulties of securing the extended reproduction of capital 
                                                 
31
 There is a historical argument to be made that the rise of capitalism has transformed the geopolitical 
calculus of power. 
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multiply. As the ambiguities of how best to sustain capital accumulation need to be 
negotiated among the sovereign equals of the capitalist core, they may translate into 
political disagreements over the preferred course of action. States therefore seek to 
influence one another’s policies and promote their favoured solutions—unilaterally as 
well as in cooperation, and inside and outside the established channels. Under America’s 
post-war hegemony, an elaborate apparatus of interconnected state agencies, international 
organizations, and public and private coordinating mechanisms has been constructed to 
resolve the tensions between economic interdependence and political sovereignty and to 
foster cooperative forms of leadership and crisis management (van der Pijl 1984; Gill 
1990; Panitch 1994). And yet governing global capitalism through a multiplicity of 
economically and politically integrated but formally independent states places limits on 
the extra-territorial reach of the leading state and the unity of globalized forms of rule. 
The territorial constitution of the global political economy renders the international rule 
of law incomplete and, at least in principle, exposes it to the partial interests of individual 
states who have to reconcile domestic and international responsibilities (Gill 1992: 270), 
and who may seek to advance the particular interests of capital invested or originating 
from within its borders in ways that differ from the balancing role they perform 
domestically (Lacher 2002: 160-1). 
None of this is to argue that inter-imperialist rivalries continue to be a feature of the 
modern international system. The concern is instead to recover these incompatibilities 
and tensions in inter-capitalist regulation from accounts that exaggerate their hostile 
character and disintegrative consequences, as well as from accounts that reduce them to 
merely technical problems of collective action. Contrary to liberal assumptions about the 
mutually beneficial effects of global economic exchange, capitalist globalization is an 
important source of instability and competition among the major firms and their home or 
host countries (Gowan 2005). Contrary to realist expectations of zero-sum geopolitics, 
however, the differential pursuit of state interests under these conditions need not itself be 
destabilizing (Trachtenberg 2003). In other words, these inter-state ‘conflicts’, in a 
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strictly limited and demilitarized sense of the term, are neither subordinate nor 
antithetical but integral to the form and direction of capitalist globalization. 
What emerges from this sketch is a set of analytical propositions that allow us to 
approach the ‘disembedding’ of the post-war international and social order as an 
interactive process driven by a multiplicity of states and social forces. At any given point, 
and especially in times of crisis, the operators of the core capitalist states face the difficult 
choice between a number of policy options; state managers settle on a course of action on 
the basis of the particular domestic and international circumstances of their state and 
economy, and often in direct comparison to the policies of others. The choices they make 
feed back into and reshape the international context in which other state administrators 
have to make theirs. The search for global and national remedies, then, is shaped not only 
by uncertainty but also by tensions and contradictions, as the solutions adopted by some 
may pose problems to others, and as states seek to project their power and influence 
internationally in order to advance their objectives and structure one another’s choices.  
Neoliberal globalization, then, can be seen as the composite product of mutually 
interdependent strategies of crisis management. By focussing on the structured choices 
and patterned interactions, so the guiding hypothesis, one may arrive at a fuller 
understanding of neoliberalism as being more than a political project emanating from a 
dominant state, class, or paradigm. 
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Chapter 3 
Unwinding Bretton Woods:  
Beyond America’s Bid for Supremacy 
 
The nineteenth and twentieth century have seen two spectacular waves of capitalist 
globalization (Hirst and Thompson 1996; O’Rourke and Williamson 1999; Frieden 
2006). Conventional attempts within IR/IPE to explain these two tidal movements in 
terms of successive hegemonies and alternating phases of stability and chaos peter out in 
the 1970s, as Chapter 1 has demonstrated. To explain why the former led into the abyss 
while the latter has so far been sustained (albeit at escalating socio-economic and 
ecological costs), we need to turn to critical theories of social and international order. 
Although the two great cycles of expansion and integration are outwardly similar, they 
are rooted in two distinct configurations of societal and geopolitical relations. The first 
part of this chapter provides a brief history of how these domestic and international forms 
of rule have combined to produce the rise, demise, and resurrection of a liberal world 
economy. Once we put to rest the idea that Britain and the United States performed 
functionally equivalent roles of global ordering, it is possible to examine the crisis of the 
1970s for what it was: a crisis of post-war capitalism rather than a crisis of hegemony. 
This, then also, allows us to examine the actions of the United States and its allies in a 
different light: they were concerned not to hasten, manage or reverse hegemonic decline, 
but to control the direction of a post-golden age era of capitalism that was registered first 
in a series of mounting monetary turbulences.   
The liberal cosmopolitan world order of the middle decades of the nineteenth century was 
based upon the developmental difference and passing complementarity between an 
industrial-capitalist and liberal-constitutional Britain on the one hand and the still 
predominately agricultural and aristocratic regimes of Continental Europe on the other 
(Lacher and Germann 2012). This temporary symbiosis between differently constituted 
societies was short-lived for two reasons. First, the anciens régimes of Europe shifted 
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from being subordinate suppliers of primary goods for the British-centred world market 
to competing projects of late industrialization. And second, the ruling elites of the leading 
states took similar measures to absorb working-class demands for popular sovereignty 
that proved to be incompatible internationally.  
Towards the end of the nineteenth century, therefore, the great powers converged upon 
broadly similar forms of nationalist-imperialist forms of rule and development that 
stabilized these societies internally at the cost of pitting them against one another in the 
international arena. The combined effect of social stabilization and catch-up 
industrialization at home was to externalize social contradictions into colonial conquest, 
to militarize the relations between the great powers, and to prompt societies to turn their 
backs on free trade and to march towards total war (Polanyi 1957). 
That humanity would see a second, and far more successful, attempt to move towards the 
‘stark utopia’ of the ‘self-regulating market’ after the carnage and crises thrown up by the 
first was by no means preordained. Capitalism had been thoroughly delegitimized in 
many parts of Europe and the world, and for the market economy to become accepted as 
the organizing principle of society, a major social and international reconfiguration was 
necessary. This required not only substantial social and material concessions to 
subordinate forces, but a concerted effort by governing elites to ensure that national 
projects of ‘domesticating’ the working classes would not come into conflict with one 
another again. In this view, what happened in the West after 1945 is truly exceptional. By 
exporting Fordist methods of production and consumption and encouraging equivalent 
compromises between organized labour and corporate capital, the United States set out to 
recast its imperial rivals in the image of its own state/society relations (Maier 1977; 
Rupert 1995). Unlike the British system of imperial governance—inherently fragile as it 
excluded those core states with the power to challenge it (Darwin 2009: 5)
32—the US 
incorporated rival imperialisms into a multilateral framework of security, trade and 
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 In this crucial respect, the British’s global rule “was not hegemony in a fundamentally Gramscian sense” 
(Gill 1993b: 43; Lacher and Germann 2012). 
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investment designed to manage social and economic contradictions (Gill 2008: 59-61). 
And in contrast to the fleeting coincidence of industrial and agricultural export interests 
that had formed around British free trade in the mid-nineteenth century, a new system of 
public and private international organizations now sought to forge a durable transatlantic 
consensus among governing elites, internationally oriented capitalist owners, and 
reformist trade union leaders (Gill 1990: 126). In sum, under the post-war leadership of 
the United States, there was both a top-down levelling of societal unevenness, and an 
unprecedented, and transnationally mediated, harmonization of social and world orders. 
There was no complete assimilation, however (Milward 1984: 357). National variations 
persisted, and the global designs of the US, even at the height of its power, were never 
either complete or uncontested. The ripple effects of the Russian revolution and 
decolonization had removed as much as one-sixth of the globe from the Western sphere-
of-influence (Hobsbawm 1994: 7; Smith 2005: 120). In these spatial terms alone, “the 
liberal world economic order could at best be semiglobal” (Stokes 1988: 625). More 
important still was that the resumption of the cold war against the Soviet Union—waged 
by the US and UK since 1917 and interrupted only by a temporary alliance of liberal 
capitalism and communism against the axis powers (Gill 2012b: 511)—introduced 
(geo)political and military considerations that collided with, and often superseded, the 
economic interests in the largest and freest possible flow of trade and investment (Smith 
2005: 96). In the late 1940s and early 1950s, the United States not only sought to rebuild 
global capitalism, but also to confront politically, militarily and economically an 
explicitly anti-capitalist, alternative model of social organization and development 
(Neebe 1996). 
The objective of dismantling the old colonial empires was another controversial question. 
Opening up the former colonial dependencies to global markets pitted American policy 
makers against British and French interests in the preservation of preferential monetary 
and trading zones. The unravelling of the British Empire proved to be particularly 
cumbersome, posing perhaps as much of a challenge to America’s global designs as 
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Soviet ‘expansionism’ (Smith 2004: 379). And while the US wanted to have an 
economically integrated and politically unified Western Europe, France sought to restrain 
German power by tying it into a much more closely confined project of European 
integration (van der Pijl, Holman, and Raviv 2011: 388-391). 
At first glance, the incorporation of a defeated, divided and occupied Germany appears to 
be fraught with less tension. For whereas Britain and France only hesitatingly 
surrendered to American designs, West German economic planners came to see the 
liberal multilateralism championed by the United States as the road to political 
rehabilitation and economic reintegration (Neebe 1996: 99). An open global trading 
system offered the best possible chance of gaining access to technology, investment and 
raw materials and of re-establishing themselves in the markets that had been lost during 
the war. This was coupled with the political imperative of submitting to American 
military and political leadership of the West rather than meditating between the two 
blocs. The image of American hegemony that mainstream and critical scholars have 
employed in order to capture the predominately consensual nature of the transformation 
of the post-war order most aptly describes the emerging relationship between the US and 
Germany. American plans for a global and national reorganization of capitalism, 
premised upon a regime of rising productivity and redistribution, uniquely coincided with 
German plans for a social market economy and an open trading system as the most 
promising road to prosperity and prestige. Where other countries resorted to Keynesian-
style intervention and protectionism, Germany’s post-war settlement with organized 
labour was most directly sustained by seizing upon the export opportunities provided by 
the US-centred liberal world economy (Rhenisch 1999: 70; Cesaratto and Stirati 2010: 
73). 
Yet even here, the congruence of American and German interests should not be 
overemphasized. The issue, first of all, is not simply that some of Germany’s post-fascist 
elites had to be compelled to accept an economically (and politically) liberal capitalism 
(cf. Berghahn 1986; Bührer 1990: 149-150, 154; Erker 1999: 14, 16; Grunenberg 2008: 
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159). The point is rather that even those state officials and business representatives who 
came to look favourably upon the ambitious American vision of an integrated world 
market raised doubts as to the likely success, the appropriate pace and scope, and the 
optimal means of liberalization. How effective and durable would American globalism 
be? Could US demands that Germany act as a trailblazer of economic liberalism 
backfire? And wasn’t German industrial prowess best brought to bear in direct bilateral 
bargaining rather than in large and unwieldy multilateral negotiations? 
The ideal of global free trade was wholeheartedly espoused only by the economics 
minister Ludwig Erhard. His missionary zeal to forge a domestic welfare compromise on 
the basis of Germany’s comparative advantage in an unmitigated competition of national 
productivities was as unrivalled as it was controversial. Most capitalist elites did not 
support him in his efforts to liberalize Germany’s domestic economy (Grunenberg 2008: 
159) even as they agreed with him that the EEC was a dangerous diversion from the 
global orientations of West German capital (Neebe 1996: 121; Milward 1986: 239). And 
even the ministerial bureaucracy had doubts about the success of this international 
economic strategy (Rhenisch 1999: 85). 
The assessment of Erhard’s position on the EEC by the foreign office illustrates these 
reservations:  
“The federal minster of economics is of the belief that the integration of the free world will 
proceed in the form of an ever further liberalization of the movement of goods, services and 
capital, a reduction of tariffs and other protectionist barriers, i.e. corresponding to the OEEC. If 
one thinks this way one has indeed to see in the integration of the Six ‘an island of disintegration 
in a by now more open world’. In that case, Germany would indeed be impeded in its freedom of 
movement and threatened in its vitally important linkages to the other world powers by the 
burdensome marriage with a protectionist France. The Foreign Office does not entirely share the 
federal economic minister’s economic plan for conquering the world because such a vehement and 
extensive thrust into free space has to encounter its limits at one point, be it an economic crisis or 
another shock. Then only that which is politically organized will endure, namely the Community 
of the Six or, after the accession of Britain, that of the Seven, or else German economic expansion 
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will fall back onto itself” (the memo, dated 4 October 1956, is quoted in Neebe 2004: 301-302; my 
translation).  
Pace Reinhard Neebe, who reads this passage as proof that foreign economic planners 
continued to think in outdated territorial terms, I find little in this excerpt that is 
particularly archaic. Fast forward a decade and a half, and the concerns that economic 
growth might not continue indefinitely, that liberal multilateralism could come up for 
revision, and that a politically integrated European core would prove to the best possible 
guarantee against national retreat seems surprisingly prescient.  
But even where the outlook of German elites coincided with American designs for a 
liberal world economic order, the convergence emerged at least in part out of potentially 
conflicting motivations (Neebe 1990: 166). While the United States wanted to firmly 
anchor Germany within Western Europe and the transatlantic alliance in order to 
foreclose an independent path of economic development and political sovereignty, 
German policy makers sought above all to re-establish Germany’s global economic 
position.  
Though largely congruent, the post-war economic offensive of German business also 
exceeded the transatlantic area in some important respects. It comprised German ventures 
into Latin America, which seemed to offer markets that could easily be penetrated by 
German exports due to the disinterest of the US and the lower quality of British products 
(Neebe 1991: 22). It also involved plans of a number of influential German industrialists 
for a joint Franco-German advance into the Third World (Rhenisch 1999: 79-80).
33
 And 
it involved, most critically, sustained if initially frustrated efforts on the part of West 
German industry to revive its traditional markets in the European east and south east 
(Spaulding 1996; Rudolph 2004). In addition to reconnecting to already established 
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 This ultra-imperialist vision, not necessarily representative of all of German business, was developed in a 
series of high-level meetings between German and French industrialists initiated by Adenauer in March 
1953. The guiding idea was that the European economy could be rendered ‘crisis-proof’ by mitigating 
competition at home and instead jointly exploiting the raw material supplies and outlet markets of Africa in 
particular, where European corporations would not get in the way of their international competitors 
(Rhenisch 1999: 79-80).  
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contacts, “West German industry saw these regions as a fallback should the Western 
world economy for some reason not function as predicted or lapse into another 1930s-
style crisis” (Berghahn 1996: 27). From the launching of West Germany’s export 
offensive to the mid-1950s, therefore, some of the most internationalized, outward-
looking and export-oriented segments of West German capital found themselves in 
opposition to the cold war strategy of the United States that sought “to instrumentalize 
foreign trade for the purpose of waging economic warfare against the Soviet Union and 
its satellites” (Neebe 1996: 121).  
To ameliorate these tensions, Germany’s foreign economic strategists sought to 
dissociate West Germany’s external economic interests from its foreign policy 
commitments wherever these two came into conflict (Rudolph 2004: 34; Neebe 2004: 
509). The latter, it was soon understood, would necessarily involve some form of political 
integration into the West. The former, it was hoped, might be spared from particularly 
painful political concessions that reintegration into the West was expected to entail. 
Framed by Ludwig Erhard in terms of an ‘open global trade policy’, it was meant to 
encompass the entire world economy and thus opposed to the bifurcation of the world 
economy that America’s cold war strategy reinforced.  
The embrace of liberal multilateralism and its associated ‘depoliticization’ of 
international economic relations are best understood as a tactical choice. To be sure, the 
particular mode of integration into the liberal international economic order and the 
subordination to American politico-military leadership was profound. It had removed 
once and for all the material basis of what were now ideologically discredited autarky 
conceptions, and the arch-conservative, illiberal, anti-democratic, and authoritarian forces 
that had supported them. The most reactionary remnants of the nobility and political 
elites inside and outside of the West German government were now left to cultivate their 
distaste for American materialism and liberal democracy in the cultural and spiritual 
rather than political and economic sphere (Conze 2005a). The Europe that they continued 
to imagine as a Christian Abendland (Occident) free from both Eastern barbarism and 
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Western decadence
34
 had little to do with the political and economic union that was 
actually being constructed.  
And yet however irreversible, the end of Germany’s Sonderweg ought not to be mistaken 
for a complete separation of economic rationality from any (geo)political considerations. 
In this respect, the binary distinction between a cooperative ‘trading’ and conflictive 
‘territorial’ state developed by Richard Rosecrance (1986) and adopted by scholars such 
as Hans-Peter Schwarz (1994: 130-132) and Richard Neebe (2004) is bound to fail as a 
guide to Germany’s foreign economic policy. In their writings, West Germany’s turn 
towards liberal multilateralism after 1945 constitutes a paradigmatic shift away from the 
obsolete categories of nation-state and territorial power and towards accepting the 
economic rationality of an effective, functional, and unimpeded worldwide division of 
labour. Britain, it is said, had already accomplished this transition with the repeal of the 
Corn Laws in 1846 and the embrace of free trade. By contrast, the ideological and 
military mobilization of German society, which in the early twentieth century sought 
twice to win territorial control over the European continent, is said to indicate that 
Germany had not yet accepted global markets as the arbiter of policy choices. German 
political and economic elites, in this view, remained caught in the territorial logic of “the 
military-political world” of the pre-industrial era that measured success in terms of the 
size of territory, military might and population and that strove for closed empire and 
largest possible degree of autarky. According to this account, it is only after 1945 that a 
conceptual catching up with Germany’s status as a ‘trading state’ was achieved and that 
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 The so-called Abendland (occidental) conception of Europe emerged in the interwar period in response 
to the danger of communism looming in the East as well as the perils of liberal democracy imported from 
the West and embodied in the Weimar Republic (Conze 2005a: 208). Europe, as imagined by members of 
the Abendland movement, was a culturally defined association of national-conservative elites, anchored in 
orthodox Catholicism and made up of the hierarchically organized, authoritarian-corporatist societies 
(Conze 2005a: 207). Unsurprisingly, the idea of Europe as Abendland, with its explicit rejection of 
modernity and invocation of an idealized, pre-political, monarchical and clerical past, found many of its 
proponents within the nobility, particularly from southern Germany and with attachment to the Habsburg 
monarchy and the Austro-Hungarian Empire (more so than to the protestant Prussia of the Hohenzollern) 
(Conze 2005b: 63). After 1945, the Abendland conception held that the European continent ought to stay 
clear of Eastern barbarism and Western decadence, renovate its Christian foundations and restore its former 
world status. 
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its corresponding interests in economic capacity-building and technological innovation 
were identified with an open world market and peaceful international cooperation (Neebe 
2004: 33-34).  
This ideal-typical categorization is problematic in two respects. First, it presents the 
choice in favour of a multilateral trading order as the only economically rational one, i.e. 
as the only one in accordance with the realities of global interconnectedness. What is lost 
in this account is a nuanced understanding of what exactly was being constructed and 
consented to. The post-war global economic order, after all, deviated in important 
respects from the ideal of the truly unimpeded reign of market forces that had prevailed 
in the mid-nineteenth century. This new order involved a reconfiguration of the 
relationship between states and markets that is not easily captured by the notion of the 
subordination of foreign (economic) policy to the requirements of global economic 
interdependence (Neebe 2004: 13). To be sure, an important story can nevertheless be 
told within this framework about how politically controversial this choice was and how 
various obstacles needed to be overcome; but focussing on how between 1945 and 1965, 
German political and economic elites came to accept an open, interconnected world 
economy as the parameters of action misses out on the truly innovative feature of global 
and national reconstruction: the qualitatively different nature of the embedded liberal 
order which involved the construction of “a framework which would safeguard and even 
aid the quest for domestic stability without, at the same time, triggering the mutually 
destructive external consequences that had plagued the interwar period” (Ruggie 1982: 
392).  
The second problem, and flipside of this argument, is that divergent opinions and 
alternative options are relegated to the second class of what is generalized to be an old-
fashioned, territorial mode of thought. This, arguably, is a step back from the distinction 
between formal vs. informal empire that recognized a broad spectrum of organizational 
possibilities of economic structure and political power and that illuminates the debate 
between the two world wars. To equate scepticism and opposition vis-à-vis the liberal 
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multilateral world established by the US with an inherited and hopelessly anachronistic 
way of thinking is to fundamentally underestimate the contingency of the situation and 
the range of options. In short, there may have been reasons for why political and 
economic elites were concerned about the type of incorporation envisioned by US 
planners that had little to do with being trapped in an outdated mindset. For German 
strategists to think of the post-war economy in terms of regional blocs, for instance, does 
not seem particularly backward-looking if one takes into account the bifurcation of the 
world economy by the cold war, the uncertain prospects of America’s drive towards 
world market integration, and the still undecided fate of the British Empire. 
It is important to recognize therefore that even though German and wider European elites 
had departed from their inter-imperialist conceptions of exclusive spheres-of-influence, 
the interests of transatlantic political and economic forces did not simply fall into line. 
They had to be carefully and continuously coordinated through a variety of private 
political, economic and security forums, foreign relations councils, and even more 
broadly, scientific and cultural associations and academic exchanges—each of which 
served to develop and disseminate key aspects of the novel, consensual form of inter-state 
and capitalist class rule (van der Pijl 1984: 183-184; Gill 1990: 126-127). 
Moreover, within the context of an open and expanding capitalist world market, the 
social and institutional variations among the reconstituted state/society complexes gained 
an important role in shaping their relative economic fortunes. A qualitatively new and 
substantially narrowed form of ‘unevenness’ asserted itself as the two former rivals of 
American globalism—Japan and West Germany—began to outpace the United States 
(Brenner 2006). As a consequence of this capitalist catch up, the social and economic 
limits of welfare state capitalism and assembly line production were reached, and the 
‘embedded’ liberal international and social order came under considerable strain in the 
second half of the 1960s.
35
 Yet in as far as we can identify the contours of a challenge 
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 “Distributional disputes are minimized in an age of abundance, but the politics of productivity, so 
successful in the 1950s and 1960s, broke down in the decade of the 1970s” (Biven 2002: x). 
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and alternative to the faltering Keynesian form of state and Fordist regime of 
accumulation, it emerged first and foremost from the global left: student and working 
class insubordination, the anti-imperialism of the Third World, and Soviet communism 
(Suri 2003; Schmidt 2010; Gill and Solty 2013). The approaching crisis of post-war 
capitalism was thus never simply about decelerating growth, stagflation, or declining 
profitability—at a deeper level, it involved the loss of political authority and social 
control in the face of a reawakening of the democratic impulse of the multitude.  
The crisis decade that followed demonstrated that economic and, in the context of cold 
war détente, even security competition among the core capitalist powers had been 
profoundly demilitarized. The deepening integration of American and European 
economies—with US multinationals at the vanguard—precluded a return to the beggar-
thy-neighbour policies even as the golden age of reconstruction came to an end (van der 
Pijl 1984; Gill 1990; Panitch and Gindin 2005). Even at the low point of transatlantic 
relations in the early 1970s, American strategists were reassured by a National 
Intelligence Estimate that “German automobile and chemical industries… leading French 
aluminum, chemical, and pharmaceutical firms”, as well as other “important opinion-
shapers” with “considerable clout at home”, “are acquiring a vested interest in preventing 
mutual restrictions on foreign investment”.36 And yet inter-state and intra-elite conflict 
had been transformed rather than transcended. For much of the post-war period, these 
struggles evolved around strategic questions regarding the privileges and responsibilities 
of the American hegemon, and the pragmatic concerns of its junior partners to enlist its 
global power in the pursuit of their particular political and economic objectives. Rather 
than being superficial and inconsequential, these disagreements came to shape how the 
crisis of post-war capitalism came to be approached, debated, and, in the end, resolved. 
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 National Intelligence Estimate, “Problems in US-West European Relations”, 14 December 1972, Foreign 
Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XLI: Western Europe; NATO, 1969-1972 (Washington: 
Government Printing Office: 2012), doc. 86, p. 363. 
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The Embedded Liberal Order of Bretton Woods 
The monetary system of Bretton Woods was at the centre of attempts to ensure the 
external compatibility and internal stability of the newly reconstructed capitalist 
economies after the catastrophic collapse of the world economy in the 1930s. To prevent 
competitive devaluations and create stable conditions for multilateral trade, post-war 
planners chose a regime of fixed exchange rates centred on the dollar and anchored in 
gold. At the same time, the new system would depart in important respects from the 
principles of the classical gold standard, which had required that any debt which one 
country owed to another was to be settled through a transfer of gold. Because national 
currencies had to be exchangeable for gold, an outflow of the auric metal would reduce 
the money supply and induce a contraction of the economy. The Bretton Woods 
arrangement sought to shield national economies from these painful adjustments. In order 
to relieve deficit countries of the pressure of having to deflate prices and wages in order 
to restore balance-of-payments equilibrium, a new international organization (the 
International Monetary Fund) was created that could provide short-term financial 
assistance and permit parity changes (Obstfeld and Taylor 2004: 37-38; Eichengreen 
2008: 91-92). Moreover, the Bretton Woods arrangement also imposed restrictions on the 
international flow of capital that were feared to destabilize exchange rate parities and 
liberal trading patterns (Helleiner 1994: 5, 33-35; Eichengreen 2008: 3, 92-93).
37
 
By softening the rigidities of the classical gold standard within a stable and rule-based 
exchange rate regime, the Bretton Woods system sought to free governments from the 
imperative of achieving external at the expense of internal stability. The aim, in short, 
was to synchronize global and national forms of capitalist regulation that had previously 
worked at cross purposes. According to Ruggie (1982: 393), this balance was “the 
essence of the embedded liberalism compromise: unlike the economic nationalism of the 
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 Viewed through the lens of the infamous ‘policy trilemma’, the architects of Bretton Woods chose to 
constrain capital mobility in favour of fixed exchange rates and monetary autonomy (Obstfeld and Taylor 
2004: 37-38; Schmelzer 2010: 48). The policy trilemma holds that policy makers can only attain two of the 
following three possible policy preferences: fixed exchange rates, capital mobility, and monetary autonomy 
(cf. Obstfeld and Taylor 2004: 29). 
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thirties, it would be multilateral in character; unlike the liberalism of the gold standard 
and free trade, its multilateralism would be predicated upon domestic interventionism.” 
Crucially, the independent policy space thus created was to be used for a specific social 
purpose: the construction of an internationally compatible and socially legitimate form of 
capitalism that could reconcile economic liberalism with widespread demands for social 
protection (Schmelzer 2010: 41-42). 
It is in this sense that the ‘embedded liberal order’ of Bretton Woods came to be based 
upon the international organization of a series of social compacts between capital and 
labour along the lines of the New Deal (Keohane 1984b: 19; Streck 2011: 10). What was 
being negotiated, however, was not a re-embedding of the market into society in the way 
Polanyi (1957) had hoped. Full employment, welfare state provision, and mass 
consumerism served instead to further entrench capitalist economies by channelling 
working class resistance into institutionalized bargaining for higher wages and 
compensation (Lacher 1999; Lacher 2007). Viewed from the bottom up, it should be 
clear that the post-war international economic order could offer at most a partial 
resolution between social democracy and market economy. The exhaustion of prosperity 
capitalism in the 1970s brought the inherent tensions into sharp relief. Because processes 
of commodification had expanded from workplace to lifeworld even during the post-war 
era (Lacher 1999: 350-351, quoting van der Pijl 1997: 30), the crisis of embedded 
liberalism in the 1970s did not simply reverse these socio-economic and political gains 
but inaugurated a new form of market society and common sense. 
In like manner, the disintegration of the monetary core of Bretton Woods that enshrined 
the embedded liberal compromise did not just turn back the wheel. Instead it involved a 
sea-change in the constitution and governance of international capitalism that differed 
profoundly from previous monetary orders. As the United States reneged on its 
commitment to redeem dollars in gold in August 1971, and the major central banks 
ceased to defend exchange-rate parities two years later, a historically novel global credit-
money system of floating national currencies came into being (Graeber 2011: 362). And 
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as capitalist firms, banks, and speculators set out to hedge against the risks or benefit 
from the opportunities presented by widely fluctuating exchange rates, a rapidly growing 
global market in foreign exchange and new financial instruments came into being 
(Kapstein 1994: 20, 37-38; Sobel 2002: 68-69; Ingham 2008: 207-208; McNally 2011: 
92-93). The collapse of this part of Bretton Woods, to be sure, may have been “one of the 
most accurately and generally predicted of major economic events” (Garber 1993: 461). 
But that the capitalist world economy would move, in the span of a few years, towards an 
even more integrated ‘non-system’ of a pure dollar standard, market-based exchange 
rates and unregulated capital flows was anything but clear at the time. 
Following hard on the heels of the monetary turbulences of the late 1960s and early 
1970s, theories of hegemony emerged as the dominant framework for analyzing and 
predicting systemic change (cf. Kindleberger 1973). To many contemporaries, the 
decision to de-link the dollar from gold signalled its end as the world’s reserve currency 
(Eichengreen 2011: 62). The ‘fall of the dollar’ was in turn taken as a symbol of 
American decline. In mounting trouble since the early 1960s, one of the central pillars of 
post-war US hegemony had disintegrated, leaving only its military superiority intact (cf. 
Gilpin 1987: 345). The erosion of American power also seemed to entail the abdication 
of its post-war leadership (cf. Keohane 1982: 15-16). Closing the gold window was 
denounced by state officials and intellectuals on both sides of the Atlantic as an utterly 
selfish and irresponsible act. By renouncing its international commitment to dollar/gold 
convertibility, the Nixon administration had prioritized its national economic interests 
over its responsibility for maintaining a stable international economic order (Calleo 1982: 
90; Gowa 1984: 96; Mastanduno 2009: 130). After twenty-five years of alliance 
leadership, it seemed that the United States had turned inwards once again. Worse still 
than a retreat from internationalism, the imposition of a ten percent surcharge on foreign 
imports that Nixon had announced at the same press conference was interpreted as an 
aggressive and confrontational stance of the US vis-à-vis its allies that bore the risk of 
escalating into an all-out trade and monetary war (Bergsten 1972).  
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Under these conditions, many scholars of international political economy concluded that 
just as American hegemony had underpinned an open, stable, and dynamic economic 
order, its demise in the 1970s would usher in a new era of financial instability and 
multipolar rivalry (Hudson 1972; 1977; Parboni 1981; Spiro 1999 still holds this view). 
Indeed, it was in part the perception of an imminent American unilateralism—
compounded by Japanese isolationism and European disunity—that motivated the liberal 
internationalist elements of the US foreign policy establishments to create, with the 
foundation of the Trilateral Commission in 1973, “a European-American-Japanese 
committee for the resolution of monetary and international trade problems”38 (Gill 1990; 
Gill 1999: 132; Overbeek and van der Pijl 1993: 114). 
Time has cast doubt on the notion of hegemonic crisis and monetary and economic 
breakdown that called these forces into action. First, the United States has shown an 
astonishing ability to shape and dominate the supposedly ‘post-hegemonic’ monetary 
order (Walter 1991: 177). The dollar has retained its pre-eminent and largely unrivalled 
position until today (Eichengreen 2011: 2), reflecting the continued strength and growing 
responsibilities of the US in a vastly expanded and interconnected global financial 
system. And despite a succession of ever widening and deepening financial crises that 
culminated in the global crash of 2008, the ‘G7 nexus’ of financial and monetary 
governance among the principal capitalist states, the IMF and the World Bank has grown 
closer together rather than fallen apart (Gill 1999).  
That the concept of hegemony survived the enormous gap between anticipated and actual 
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 This description of the Trilateral Commission by German archival sources (BAK B 136/657; Kohnstamm 
to Schmidt, 1 February 1973, AdsD HSA 6110) captures its role as a private forum of crisis management in 
which economic and political disagreements could be voiced and potentially overcome, and in which joint 
policy initiatives as well as institutional mechanisms such as the G7 summits were developed. The 
Rockefeller Archive Center opened its collection of Trilateral Commission (North America) meeting 
records (1973-1995) in 2011—too late to be included into the analytical focus and empirical database of 
this dissertation. Judith Stein (2010), who was granted early access to the collection, uses a few of the 
records to analyze Jimmy Carter’s membership, and Dino Knudsen, PhD fellow at the University of 
Copenhagen, is completing a historiography of the Trilateral Commission on the basis of this 
documentation. The online finding aid, somewhat unpromisingly, describes the contents of the records as 
pertaining mostly to the publications of the Commission, but it will be up to Knudsen to assess the full 
scope and significance of these records. 
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outcome is nothing short of remarkable (cf. Sobel 2012). It owes partly to the variety of 
theoretical approaches that have adopted and adapted a hegemonic lens. But the 
framework also gained a new lease on life by way of an important interpretative shift. 
Initially, scholars writing from this perspective took the breakdown of Bretton Woods as 
a sign that an ailing American hegemon was no longer willing and able to provide 
systemic leadership (Kindleberger 1973). But when the disintegrative consequences that 
many of these scholars had predicted failed to materialize, the narrative changed from 
terminal decline to resurrection. 
Accordingly, the breakdown of Bretton Woods was no longer seen as the final act in the 
erosion of America’s post-war hegemony but as the stepping stone to its successful, if 
perhaps impermanent, restoration (cf. Arrighi 1994).
39
 With the benefit of hindsight, what 
was initially taken as a symptom of America’s hegemonic demise came to be cited as a 
cause of its restoration (Sobel 2012: 185).
40
 In retrospect, the infamous ‘Nixon shock’ of 
August 1971 that closed the gold window, imposed an import surcharge and supposedly 
ended the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rate (Gowa 1984: 92; for a 
comprehensive critique of this view see Ritter 2007) appears not as an act of 
mercantilism but as the first in a series of measures of financial liberalization that are said 
to have restored the economic competitiveness and political dominance of the United 
States (cf. Helleiner 1994: 21, 202; Gowan 1999; Spiro 1999). 
This narrative builds upon and extends a series of studies that emerged in the immediate 
crisis years and that sought to chart the main lines of currency and trading conflict 
between the US and its advanced capitalist partners and prospective rivals throughout and 
beyond the 1970s (cf. Hudson 1972; 1977; Block 1977; Parboni 1981). Viewed through 
the prism of inter-imperialist rivalry, American unilateralism was read as a 
comprehensive strategic response that sought to counter the economic ascendance and 
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 See Basosi (2006) for an archive-based elaboration of this argument.  
40
 “Many suggest that this was a demonstration of US weakness and decline, but the ability to change the 
rules of the international monetary regime unilaterally can also be seen as an exercise of US hegemonic 
capacity” (Sobel 2012: 185). 
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associated political challenge of Western Europe and Japan. For both the original 
analyses and subsequent reinterpretations, US actions in the 1970s sought to restore 
American dominance over the Western alliance and its wider sphere-of-influence. The 
critical difference between the first and second set of literature, and a source of 
imprecision and misconception, however, regards the methods used as well as the 
outcome obtained.  
First, no matter how resourceful and effective in its beginnings, America’s grand strategy 
was believed by contemporary writers to have ultimately backfired. The original analyses 
predicted a retaliatory response from Western Europe and Japan, possibly in alliance with 
the third world, against American attempts to reassert its domination (cf. Hudson 1977: 
vii, 1; 176-184; Parboni 1981: 118). If indeed we assume that the United States truly set 
out to improve its relative position at the expense of Western Europe and Japan, limiting 
and, as some have gone so far as to argue, even sabotaging their economic growth 
(Gowan 1999: 21), the question arises why such a coalition never actually appeared. The 
original declinist scenario draws attention to the secondary powers insofar as they were 
considered to be potential contenders which, rather inexplicably, chose to forego the 
opportunities presented to them.  
Proponents of the hegemonic restoration thesis, however, have largely failed to follow up 
on the issue of resistance. With the benefit of hindsight, they have simply reinterpreted 
the lack of any serious allied contestation as a sign of the depth and success of US 
domination—a testament to the superior ability of the United States to impose its will on 
a powerless Western Europe and Japan. And yet in order to build a convincing case, the 
absence of any sustained counter-hegemonic challenge—or at least the absence of serious 
attempts to assert greater independence from the US-dominated system of rules and 
institutions—needs to explained. It is clear that the plausibility of this account stands and 
falls with its ability to illuminate the actual process of allied re-subordination. What 
needs to be demonstrated, from the point of view of the objects of American strategy, is 
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how the United States so effectively pre-empted any political and economic alternatives 
from emerging. 
Another question concerns the techniques that the United States is said to have employed: 
freeing the dollar from its golden fetters while preserving its role as world money, 
moving to a system of floating exchange rates in which the dollar could depreciate, 
appropriating the petrodollars from the first oil shock, and pushing for the removal of 
capital controls—in retrospect, these measures are said to add up to a unilateral strategy 
of ‘financialization’ that aimed at restoring the comparative advantage and reasserting 
America’s supremacy over its main allies and prospective rivals (Gowan 1999; Spiro 
1999).
41
 
The initial studies, by contrast, saw the United States departing in the very opposite 
direction. The end of the dollar/gold link, accompanied by import quotas, agricultural 
export embargoes, and ‘forced loans’ from foreign dollar holders, seemed instead to 
indicate an increasingly state-directed and mercantilist patterning of trade and 
investment.
42
 For Michael Hudson—one of the most astute observers of America’s 
financial power—these actions amounted to the ‘ending of laissez-faire’ rather than its 
extension to the financial sphere (Hudson 1977: 143). In reality, it is anything but clear 
that the United States solely or unequivocally enlisted the support of ‘free market forces’ 
in its efforts to sustain its global power (cf. Spiro 1999: 153; Basosi 2006).
43
 It is only 
with the benefit of hindsight, and by way of a doubly ‘liberal’ but equally dubious 
                                                 
41
 According to Gowan, for instance, the US had decided to move towards a pure dollar standard at the end 
of the 1960s, saw the international monetary crisis of 1971 as an opportunity to push this through, entered 
into IMF G-20 negotiations simply in order to buy time and wait for a crisis to develop, and encouraged an 
oil price hike at least in part in order to drown the system in a flood of petrodollars (Gowan 1999: 20-21). 
42
 The examples are the Multi-Fiber Arrangement of 1973, the Trade Act of 1974 against ‘unfair trade’, and 
the tightening of so-called ‘voluntary export restraints’ imposed on East Asian countries. 
43
 For an English review of Basosi (2006), see Nuti (2011), who argues that Basosi “asks whether Nixon’s 
decisions should not be classed as the founding moment of the subsequent wave of economic globalization 
based on deregulated capitalism” and “seems to find a causal connection between the decisions of August 
1971 and the developments of the global economy that followed” (244). 
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interpretation of the historical record, that a prescient and coherent strategy of ‘neoliberal 
globalization’ can be attributed to the United States. 
The remainder of this chapter and the next set out to challenge this view empirically by 
highlighting the crucial role played by America’s allies in the collapse of the dollar/gold 
link and the fixed exchange rate system. The unmaking of these two key components of 
Bretton Woods, I conclude, was a process led by states in the plural. It was driven by 
dynamics that had little to do with either the demise or defence of American hegemony. 
What was fundamentally at stake was the question of how states should respond, 
individually and collectively, to a capitalist crisis that began as monetary jitters but soon 
assumed far wider economic and social proportions. 
 
 Prolonging the Agony: The United States and Bretton Woods  
Designed to facilitate the post-war reconstruction of capitalism globally and nationally, 
the Bretton Woods monetary architecture contained a crucial contradiction.
44
 It was 
meant to be rigid enough to prevent the competitive devaluations that had distorted world 
trade in the 1930s, and at the same time flexible enough to give states the policy space for 
macroeconomic expansion and welfare programmes (Hetzel 2008: 100-101). Its success 
in facilitating economic growth came at the expense of a series of exchange rate 
adjustments and currency crises that were amplified by a growing gap between rising 
foreign dollar holdings and the declining gold stock of the US (Eichengreen 2007: 42-
43). 
While gold was chosen as the anchor of the new system, the US dollar, alongside the 
British pound, was designated as an international means of payment. The United States 
committed to exchange dollars into gold at an official price of $35 per ounce, while all 
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 The Bretton Woods monetary system was never fully implemented; it never worked as intended; and it 
was inherently unstable (Strange 1984: 271; see also Milward 1984: 357). 
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other national currencies were pegged to the dollar. Their exchange rate could be changed 
under conditions of ‘fundamental disequilibrium’—a definition of which was carefully 
excluded from the IMF’s Articles of Agreement (Eichengreen 2008: 95). Under Bretton 
Woods, therefore, a deficit would not automatically result in an equilibrating outflow of 
gold and a corresponding contraction of the economy. 
As long as the US guaranteed convertibility, dollars were ‘as good as gold’. And yet the 
economic recovery that Bretton Woods sought to make possible undermined the stability 
of the system. As Western European and Japanese economies expanded, foreign dollar 
holdings began to outgrow the gold supplies of the US. As a consequence, confidence 
that the United States would be able to honour its obligation to exchange dollars into gold 
upon demand started to erode. Under these conditions, central banks faced a dilemma: if 
they continued to hold dollars, they faced the risk of a devaluation of the dollar and 
corresponding capital loss. But if they converted their dollar holdings into gold, they 
might set off the dollar crisis they wished to avoid (Eichengreen 2007: 46). 
Because its operation required continuous adjustments and adaptations that had to be 
negotiated, the Bretton Woods system never successfully ‘depoliticized’ monetary 
relations among the allies (Gavin 2004: 30). Its built-in contradictions meant that 
problems emerged almost as soon as the system became functional. There was little doubt 
from the early 1960s onwards that the current system of exchange rates fixed around a 
dollar/gold standard would not be able to withstand the mounting pressures without 
fundamental reform. Just as maintaining Bretton Woods contained an important power-
political dimension, the future shape of the world monetary system would emerge as one 
of the focal points of competitive conflict among the advanced capitalist countries.  
Throughout the 1960s, the monetary strategy of the US was essentially conservative. The 
United States sought to preserve rather than transform a system whose cracks became 
increasingly apparent. Its efforts were focussed on trying to slow down the outflow of 
gold and improve its balance-of-payments. The United States sought to avoid a deflation 
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of its domestic economy that it could not afford. And it sought to avoid more far-reaching 
monetary reforms whose outcome it might not be able to control. 
The whole arsenal of statecraft was deployed to this purpose (Zimmermann 2002; 
Matusow 2003: 769; Gavin 2004). The US pressured Germany and Japan to ‘offset’ the 
foreign exchange costs of its military expenditures by purchasing military equipment or 
holding Treasury bills (Gavin 2002: 71; Zimmermann 2002). In the wake of a first 
speculative bout against the dollar in 1960, the US established the gold pool in order to 
keep the price of gold on the private market at the official rate of $35 per ounce. It 
committed its defence ministry to ‘buy American’, tied foreign aid and military support 
to the purchase of US goods and services, imposed a tax on foreign interest income and 
urged US firms either not to invest abroad or to repatriate their profits (Eichengreen 
2011: 54). In addition, the US resorted to a series of creative book-keeping measures: 
renaming the US balance-of-payments deficit, redepositing, and double-counting, 
increased IMF gold holdings in the US Treasury, counting medium-term US Treasury 
securities as an inflow of long-term capital rather than a means of financing the deficit, 
and reporting Special Drawing Rights as a growth in reserves (cf. Hudson 2003: 292-293, 
325, 326). 
In retrospect, the ability of the United States to postpone the inevitable is remarkable and 
a true testament to its international power. The US managed to radically reduce the 
proportion of official settlement deficits in gold from 99% in 1958 to 8% in 1964 (Walter 
1991: 192, fn. 48). It succeeded in getting its partners to continue to accumulate dollars 
and securing, in the case of Germany, a formal commitment not to convert dollars into 
Treasury gold. As late as 1969, therefore, some US monetary officials still hoped that the 
current system, along with the special rights and responsibilities it conferred on them, 
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could be maintained with a modicum of international monetary reform and domestic 
economic restraint (cf. Matusow 2003: 769).
45
  
 
French Resistance 
The incentive for change, by contrast, rested principally with the Europeans. While the 
US tried to prop up a failing system for most of the 1960s, its allies became increasingly 
worried and restive. American efforts to avoid monetary reform were most notably 
frustrated by French resistance: a series of rhetorical attacks on the dollar/gold standard 
backed up by systematic conversions of dollars into gold. This section argues that the 
monetary strategy of France, though well-publicized, has been ill-understood. As we shall 
see, the objectives of even as antagonistic a state as France were reformist rather than 
revolutionary. The aim was not to sabotage the existing monetary order, as has 
sometimes been claimed by proponents of hegemonic stability theory, but to create a 
more stable and equitable system. Paradoxically, it was French insistence on fundamental 
reform, combined with American efforts to maintain the status quo, that set in motion the 
forces that would remove the golden anchor of the Bretton Woods system.   
French concerns about the imbalances that plagued the Bretton Woods system had been 
raised repeatedly since the early 1960s. As early as 1961, the French government had 
adopted and adapted the views of the most prominent critic of the dollar and the US 
deficit, French economist Jacques Rueff.
46
 Dollar seigniorage—the ability to issue a 
national currency that foreigners had little choice but to accumulate—afforded what 
Charles de Gaulle and his finance minister Giscard d’Estaing called ‘exorbitant 
privileges’ to the US while undermining the international monetary system. It allowed the 
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 “Throughout the spring and summer of 1969, [Treasury Secretary David] Kennedy and his energetic 
deputy, Paul Volcker, staged discreet bilateral conversations with European counterparts about variants 
such as the ‘crawling peg’” (Gray 2007: 300). 
46
 However, it was not until the press conference of President Charles de Gaulle on 4 February 1965 that 
France set out to attack the status of the dollar as the world’s reserve currency. 
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United States to run a ‘deficit without tears’, as French economist Jacques Rueff (1963: 
322) had put it in an article that laid the ground for the official French critique. This in 
turn, enabled the US to pursue policies that ran contrary to European interests. Monetary 
expansion at home and military expansion abroad, exemplified in President Johnson’s 
plan for a Great Society and the intensification of warfare in Southeast Asia—flushed the 
world with paper dollars and exported inflationary pressures to other countries. 
Moreover, American multinationals could tap into surplus dollar funds in order to buy 
European companies. As accumulating dollar reserves undermined confidence in the 
dollar and threatened the stability of the system, it raised the constant danger that the US 
would choose monetary self-interest over international monetary stability.  
In order to prevent such a situation, de Gaulle called for the replacement of the 
dollar/gold standard and a more prominent role for gold at a press conference in early 
1965.
47
 His proposals, concretized by the new French finance minister Giscard d’Estaing 
one week later, were followed up by consistent demands for the United States to improve 
its balance of payments, an increase in the official price of gold, and its use in 
international settlements. In order to support this position, this verbal criticism was 
underpinned by a number of concrete steps that were aimed at increasing pressure on the 
reserve-currency system. Giscard d’Estaing called on other major financial powers to 
follow France in making all official payments and receipts in gold (Bordo et al. 1994: 
14). Moreover, French criticism of the role of the dollar had been paralleled by the 
systematic conversions of dollar holdings into gold. When its balance-of-payments 
position became less favourable and large purchases of US Treasury gold subsided in late 
1966, France had reduced its dollar holdings to about half a billion dollars.
48
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 Faced with the rising costs of repressing the national independence struggle of the Algerian people, and 
under the immediate threat of a military coup d’état, the French political class chose to enthrone de Gaulle 
in order to resolve the political and economic crisis of the Fourth Republic. Basing its power on the army, 
and, until the granting of Algerian independence in 1962, French settlers and colonialists, the Gaullist 
regime constituted a form of autocratic rule backed by plebiscite that relied on a foreign policy of dramatic 
gestures in order to maintain support. 
48
 Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, “French Actions in the Recent Gold Crisis”, 20 
March 1968, pp. 3-4. Available at 
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France also stalled negotiations over Special Drawing Rights, and set out to attack the 
secondary reserve currency—criticizing Britain’s balance-of-payments deficit and 
repeatedly recommending a devaluation of the pound sterling (Weil and Davidson 1970: 
114). When the pound came under pressure in the fall of 1967, France refused to 
participate in its rescue (Kindleberger 1985: 125; Weil and Davidson 1970)
49
, and made 
public that it had withdrawn from gold pool intervention in June 1967. This revelation 
may have been intended to prevent a run on the franc after the pound was devalued in late 
November (Hudson 2003: 301); but one secret CIA report confirmed suspicions that 
France had helped precipitate a sell-off of pounds and dollars and rush into gold both 
through its public statements and by leaking other sensitive information to the financial 
editor of Le Monde, Paul Fabra.
50
 Most observers held that French aggression reached its 
high-point in late 1967 (cf. Kindleberger 1985: 125), and the same report concluded that 
France had shied away from further confrontation for fear of a full-fledged monetary 
crisis.
51
  
New evidence suggests, however, that France continued its monetary assault on Bretton 
Woods even after the sterling crisis of November 1967. In the first half of March 1968, 
the Banque de France—controlled by the Finance Ministry and the Elysée Palace 
(Bussière 2006: 173)—secretly placed large demands for gold on the London bullion 
market, betting against the ability of the remaining gold pool members to keep the price 
at $35 per ounce. With 200 to 350 million dollars per day, overall turnover on the London 
market reached unprecedented heights on the eve of the British decision to suspend the 
                                                                                                                                                 
<http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/89801/DOC_0000118650.pdf>, 
[accessed 30 August 2013]. 
49
 France had refrained from attacking the reserve position of the pound in the sterling area in the 1961-
1963 negotiations for British membership of the Common Market because it didn’t want its franc zone to 
come under scrutiny; and it provided loans and credits to Britain even after 1965 because it didn’t want to 
force Britain to make adjustments that might increase the competitiveness of its industry (Weil and 
Davidson 1970: 107-108). 
50
 Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, “French Actions in the Recent Gold Crisis”, 20 
March 1968, pp. 5-6, cited in Gavin (2004: 172). 
51
 Ibid., p. 7. 
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gold pool.
52
 The individual orders attributable to the Banque amounted to as much as 50 
million dollars each. With these actions, revealed in a private and confidential memo to 
German Chancellor Kiesinger, France had led a speculative attack against the monetary 
gold reserves of its allies that destroyed the gold pool.
53
 France therefore pursued an even 
more aggressive strategy and played an even more prominent role in the breakdown of 
the monetary core of Bretton Woods than previously recognized. 
For the replacement of the gold pool by a two-tiered pricing structure, in which the price 
of gold in the private market was allowed to diverge from the official $35 per troy ounce, 
was a portentous decision. Henceforth, the US would restrict dollar/gold convertibility to 
official transactions among central banks. Because state managers and central bankers 
understood that the United States would renounce even this limited liability when 
confronted with substantial demands for gold, the agreement of the former Gold Pool 
members not to buy or sell gold on the private market effectively severed the ties 
between the dollar and gold.  
Unwittingly, therefore, the French monetary strategy had helped put the capitalist world 
economy on a de facto dollar standard—a reality that Nixon’s de jure suspension of 
dollar/gold convertibility in August 1971 only formalized. The United States had 
succumbed not simply to the inexorable logic of globalizing markets or an economically 
driven “burst of gold hoarding” (Kindleberger 1985: 125), but to the politically calculated 
assault of one of its principal allies. 
The aggressive gold conversion policies of de Gaulle are, of course, a staple of 
hegemonic stability theory, and the argument that France brought down the dollar/gold 
standard seems to fit well with its description as the classical case of a ‘spoiler’. Too 
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 These figures are for March 11-13. Meltzer (2009: 716) notes that on 14 March 1968, the day that the 
British announced that the gold pool would remain closed, the US and Britain had sold 350 and 250 million 
dollars of gold. 
53
 Höcherl to Kiesinger, 20 March 1968, BAK B 136/3335, private, confidential. The information was said 
to come from an “unimpeachable” source within Samuel Montagu, one of the major bullion trading houses 
in the London market that have traditionally handled the transactions of central banks (cf. Warwick-Ching 
1993: 252). 
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weak to offer a monetary alternative, yet too strong to be a passive regime-taker, France 
is said to have squeezed the United States for side-payments until the monetary system of 
Bretton Woods collapsed (Kindleberger 1976: 21-22; Kirshner 1997: 192-203). Yet what 
is missing in this abstract designation of France is the crucial distinction between the aim 
and (unintended) outcome of policy action. In reality, France was no more the system’s 
spoiler than the US was its hegemon in decline.
54
  
First of all, the French policy of converting dollars into gold, although most consistent, 
was neither unequalled nor without precedent, as other central banks had begun to 
regularly purchase US Treasury gold as early as 1957 (Loriaux 1991: 184). “During the 
period of 1958-60, Great Britain converted $1.8 billion while France, Belgium and the 
Netherlands together converted $1.5 billion” (Loriaux 1991: 185). As concerns over US 
payments imbalances grew stronger in the wake of the rush on gold in the London market 
in 1961, France was among those countries most resistant to convert dollars into gold 
(Loriaux 1991: 185). In 1962 Giscard signalled that “France was certainly willing to hold 
its dollars for a time, as long as others agreed as well” (Gavin 2004: 80); yet “[w]ithout 
assurances that other European nations would restrict hoarding of gold, the French 
government began increasing its conversion of dollars to over $100 million in each of the 
first two quarters of 1963” (Gavin 2004: 88). 
Secondly, French monetary policy in the first half of the 1960s was cooperative rather 
than confrontational. Together with the Netherlands, France proposed to replace gold 
species payments by gold-guaranteed obligations. It cooperated in the creation of the gold 
pool, and proposed the idea of ‘swap’ arrangements to counter speculation (Loriaux 
1991: 185; Coombs 1976: 74-78). Despite growing criticism of the US balance-of-
payments position by the Elysée Palace, the Bank of France engaged in currency swaps 
with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (Bordo et al. 1994: 12). And for a short time 
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 Cf. Loriaux (1991: 189), who criticizes the depiction of France from within the framework of hegemonic 
stability theory: “If we return to Kindleberger’s thesis, it is unclear that there is a theoretically useful place 
for a “spoiler” in a world ordered by a hegemon that has turned “predatory”. 
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in 1964, it seemed that French and American reforms might actually converge (Gavin 
2004: 80).
55
  
Thirdly, rather than reflecting de Gaulle’s elusive quest for grandeur, French monetary 
strategy was based on serious concerns about the inflationary effects of American policy 
on the stability of the international monetary order and the capacity of French monetary 
authorities to contain domestic inflation (Loriaux 1991: 184, 188).  
Most importantly, then, the notion of France as the antagonist of an ailing hegemon 
neglects that the ultimate objective of French actions were intended to reform the world 
monetary system rather than hold it to ransom. It is true that in his academic writing and 
personal campaign against inflation in France and globally, the prominent French 
economic Jacques Rueff had vigorously advocated a return to the gold standard. But 
while the de Gaulle government was profoundly influenced by his analysis of the 
problem (Chivvis 2006), it did not adapt his radical solution (Bordo et al. 1994: 11)—
notwithstanding bureaucratic rivalries that existed between the Elysée Palace and the 
finance ministry (Bussière 2006: 173). Drawing on a long-standing series of reform 
proposals (the recommendations of the 1922 Geneva conference, the French proposal for 
the 1936 Tripartite Agreement and the French Plan for Bretton Woods of 1943), France 
pursued a coherent and consistent monetary strategy that was aimed at creating a more 
symmetrical monetary arrangement under which no single national currency would enjoy 
the privileges of seigniorage.  
Thus, in September 1964, Giscard d’Estaing proposed the creation of additional liquidity 
through a collective or composite reserve unit (CRU) that G10 members (plus 
Switzerland) could draw upon in exchange for their national currency and in proportion 
to their gold holdings, and that could be used alongside gold for settling international 
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accounts. Under such a system, the privileges (and obligations) of reserve currency 
countries would be shared more widely (Gavin 2004: 80). 
It was only once the US had rejected reform proposals and adopted an expansionary 
policy after 1964 in order to finance its war against Vietnam and contain inner-city 
revolts through poverty reduction schemes that France decided to go on the offensive 
(Loriaux 1991: 188; Chivvis 2006: 714). From then on, official invocations of the gold 
standard were employed as a tactical threat whenever negotiations over monetary reform 
became stuck (Bordo et al. 1994: 13, 16). The objective, thus, was not a reinstitution of 
the classical gold standard but the creation of a system that was held to be closer to the 
spirit of the original designs of Bretton Woods and that would afford France a greater 
role in the making of international monetary policy (Bordo et al. 1994: 13-14). In sum, 
French monetary strategy was aimed at addressing the asymmetries within the existing 
framework. It is only when confronting American obstinacy that France grew ever more 
determined to take aggressive actions and risk a collapse of the system. 
The decision to institute a two-tiered market for gold—taken without French participation 
(Kindleberger 1985: 125)—effectively ended convertibility and initiated the long-feared 
demonetization of gold. This, of course, was the very opposite of the more prominent role 
for gold that French authorities had wanted. Yet however undesirable, such an outcome 
was in no way unexpected. In light of a worsening US balance-of-payments position, 
French officials knew very well that their policies were pushing the United States 
towards declaring inconvertibility. They had sought to prepare for such an event since the 
sterling troubles of 1966. Their goal, then, seems to have been to commit the United 
States to internal adjustment and international reform—even at the risk of an end to gold 
conversions.
56
 
Why was France willing to risk the delinking of dollar and gold? Was it a last-minute 
attempt to cash in dollars before the inevitable happened? Or did it form part of a still 
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broader strategy to reorganize transatlantic relations? Whatever the case, the 
revolutionary upheavals of May 1968 undermined and reversed French monetary policy 
(Arrighi 2003: 35-6). Student protests and working class solidarity, a general strike and 
middle-class mobilization threatened the authoritarian regime of de Gaulle and triggered 
a massive capital flight. In its wake, France lost over $2.8 billion of its $7 billion reserves 
of gold and foreign exchange (Kirshner 1997: 200).
57
 
In the eyes of German monetary authorities, May 1968 had demonstrated that even an 
“extraordinarily favourable and absolutely secured currency position” could be severely 
shaken by “a few weeks of social unrest”. In November 1968, it seemed that social and 
political upheaval in the capitalist heartland, including strikes in strategic sectors, more so 
than monetary imbalances, might have a real potential to threaten the world economic 
order.
58
 As the global wave of youth rebellion and civil disobedience linked up with 
resurging labour militancy and the anti-colonial challenge of the non-aligned movement, 
the closing stages of les trente glorieuses impressed themselves on the minds of the 
transatlantic ruling strata as a far-reaching crisis of domestic and international 
‘governability’ that demanded, but did not easily bring forth, a comprehensive and 
collective ‘counter-revolutionary’ response (Gill 1990: 175).  
In sum, the French invocations of the classical gold standard, backed by its conversions 
of dollars into gold, formed part of a rational, long-term strategy that sought to 
fundamentally reform, rather than undermine, the Bretton Woods system. The 
undesirable but not unanticipated outcome of this policy was to force the United States to 
effectively renounce its responsibility to ensure dollar/gold convertibility. The ultimate 
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decision to shut the gold window rested with the United States, but it was France that had 
inadvertently forced its hand. The closing of the gold pool was the final act in a series of 
confrontations that had undermined the ability of the United States to resist deflation and 
devaluation for almost a decade. In this sense, the press conference of de Gaulle in 1965 
marked a real turning point in US foreign economic policy: from stopgap measures 
intended to bolster the gold/dollar system to the search for a new monetary order (Gavin 
2004: 126).  
 
Re-Evaluating the Nixon Shock 
The Nixon shock, now past its fortieth anniversary, was then and is today understood to 
be a watershed moment in the transformation of the post-war transatlantic order. On 
August 15, 1971, United States President Richard Nixon announced to the world press 
that the United States would no longer redeem official dollar holdings into gold and cease 
to defend the parity of the dollar. The American decision to ‘close the gold window’ has 
come to symbolize the end of an era: the breakdown of the Bretton Woods post-war 
monetary regime of fixed exchange rates, centred upon the dollar as the world’s reserve 
currency and its guaranteed convertibility, at $35 dollar an ounce, into the more tangible 
and enduring asset of gold. Over the course of the decade, the capitalist world economy 
would move, through many fits and starts, towards a monetary ‘non-system’ of a pure 
dollar standard, floating exchange rates, and unrestricted capital movements.
59
 In the 
1970s, the world monetary system that today appears to be in fundamental crisis was 
conceived. 
And yet in light of the foregoing, one of the questions that need to be reconsidered is just 
how ‘shocking’ the Nixon shock actually was. The Bretton Woods system, as we have 
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seen, was fraught from the start. In fact, the very success of the post-war reconstruction 
of Western European and Japanese capitalism would undermine it. The built-in fragility 
of Bretton Woods, increasingly apparent in the recurring and escalating currency crises of 
the 1960s, had made the end of dollar/gold convertibility a real possibility that had to be 
reckoned with—on both sides of the Atlantic. The closing of the gold pool now made it a 
practical inevitability. 
US state managers, for their part, had felt increasingly exposed to the gold conversions by 
its allies. They were concerned that other countries, including Germany, might join 
France in asking for a higher price of gold. There were also fears that France might 
aggressively devalue the franc (Rae 2003: 105). If other weak-currency countries 
followed its lead by devaluing or temporarily floating their currencies, this might disrupt 
international monetary relations and put upward pressure on the dollar, thus undermining 
the competitive position of the United States.
60
 By the late 1960s, US state managers had 
concluded that the US might have to suspend gold convertibility unilaterally and ought 
preferably to do so in a moment of market turmoil and gold losses in order to contain 
allied reactions.
61
 This, of course, is precisely what happened in the summer of 1971. 
But because of the practical inevitability of ending the formal dollar/gold nexus with the 
end of the gold pool in 1968, it should come as no surprise that allied state managers and 
their finance ministers and central bankers, too, had anticipated and prepared for such an 
event (Strange 1984: 272; Gavin 2004: 185; Trachtenberg 2011: 10). British monetary 
authorities had begun contingency planning after the gold crisis of March 1968, including 
several scenarios for floating the pound (Hamilton and Oliver 2007: 496-497, 503-506). 
France had anticipated and prepared for the closing of the gold window by the United 
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States at least since the sterling devaluation of 1966.
62
 This, then, raises the possibility 
that the Europeans knew full well what they were doing when converting dollars into 
gold in the spring and summer of 1971.  
In the final analysis, the image of a Gaullist contender exaggerates the degree to which 
France really was isolated. In reality, criticism of the United States was much more 
widely shared. Even radical proposals such as increasing the dollar price of gold found 
support among a range of actors, and for a variety of reasons. Swiss banks, South African 
gold-mining companies and their predominately French and British shareholders, as well 
as some officials in the US administration, supported the French demand for an increase 
in the gold price.
63
  
The French strategy of systematic dollar conversions was followed most closely by 
Belgium and Holland, which also regularly turned in dollars for Treasury gold (Segreto 
2003: 26). There is some indication that America’s allies may also have propelled the de 
jure suspension of the gold window. In a meeting of European Economics and Finance 
ministers in July 1971, the Commission and Community members considered “actions in 
reserve policy” that would prompt the US to change the financing of its balance-of-
payments deficit. Notably, the German delegation did not comment on this topic because 
of its particular political difficulties.
64
 One may surmise that these steps included 
breaking with the gentlemen’s agreement reached after the collapse of the gold pool, 
whereby central banks had agreed not to convert existing dollar holdings into gold but 
remained free to cash in any additional dollars acquired since 1968 (Eichengreen 2000: 
217). 
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In response to Nixon’s refusal to stem the speculative move out of the dollar in 
1970/1971, the central banks of Belgium and the Netherlands turned in $140 million 
dollars for gold (figures by Hudson 2003: 334).
65
 Germany expressed its intention to do 
the same (Eichengreen 2007: 18), while France cashed in $282 million dollars, which it 
used to pay back the loan from the IMF received in the wake of May 1968 (Hudson 2003: 
334). On 13 August 1971, the Bank of England asked for a guarantee on an additional 
three billion dollars worth of gold (Nichter 2008: 112-3; Gray 2007: 312; Eichengreen 
2011: 60).
66
 Faced with such massive demands for gold, the Nixon administration felt 
under tremendous pressure to move as quickly as possible in order to prevent any further 
losses of gold. Two days later, the gold embargo was imposed. 
Whether a coordinated action or a matter of sauve qui peut, it was the unified pressure of 
European states which forced the Nixon administration to resort to this final option and 
draw from a range of contingency plans that had been developed within the state 
bureaucracy in previous years.  
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Ideas to let the dollar float within a free exchange-rate system date back to the 
Eisenhower administration (Gavin 2004: 49), but the US only started in earnest to 
develop such plans after the turnaround in French monetary policy. As Gavin points out, 
some officials within the Kennedy administration, concerned about the vulnerability of 
the US to a possible rush out of the dollar and into gold (and suspicious of French offer to 
help the US solve its monetary problems), came quite close to forsaking the privileges of 
seigniorage in favour of a multilaterally managed, multi-currency system that would ease 
the constraints of having to maintain dollar/gold convertibility (Gavin 2004: 82-83, 85-
86, 87). 
Gavin (2004: 198-200) cites these plans as evidence against the much-maligned 
revisionist thesis of Gabriel Kolko that the United States was a modern-day empire or 
hegemon. Because US policy makers were prepared to give up the centrality of the dollar 
which they perceived as a burden, Gavin concludes that the post-war international 
monetary system did not simply serve to enshrine American dominance. “[I]f America’s 
goal had been to build a profitable economic empire during the Cold War”, Gavin (2004: 
200) sums up, “it could not have gone about it in a worse way.” This is correct as far as it 
goes, but it should be remembered that most analyses—radical and mainstream—never 
defined the goals of US planners in this narrowly self-centred and directly exploitative 
way. In fact, any attempt to create such a strictly hierarchical system would have 
encountered massive local and global resistance.  
The realist conception of ‘hegemony’ as leadership guided by a predatory impetus may 
be belied by the insecurity, uncertainty and dissatisfaction that some American 
geopoliticians had early on expressed with regards to Bretton Woods. But the more 
generally accepted, liberal and critical reading of hegemony as commanding consent by 
forgoing immediate self-interest for the sake of the functioning of the entire system 
perfectly describes the dilemma confronted by American policy makers after having 
committed to rebuilding global capitalism.  
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In the final analysis, the numerous proposals for radical reform that were ultimately 
shelved do not outweigh the series of actual policies designed to slow down the pace of 
change and control the direction of a disintegrating world monetary order. If anything, 
the dismissal of these plans demonstrates the inability of American policy makers to 
extricate themselves from their global responsibilities. US monetary authorities, in 
seeking to hold on to Bretton Woods despite its fragilities, demonstrated a concern not 
only for the relative position of the US but also for the stability of the international 
capitalist order as a whole.  
The construction and maintenance of Bretton Woods cannot be seen as a classical case of 
empire building in the limited sense of the term. In like manner, the termination of 
Bretton Woods after August 1971 does not fit the notion of a shrewdly orchestrated 
project of imperial restoration. A closer look at the long-standing and comprehensive 
preparations reveals that monetary authorities were as undecided about the costs and 
benefits of the existing monetary order as they were about what to replace it with.  
The most significant of these contingency proposals—because it had an actual impact on 
the shape of US foreign economic policy—were developed by the Federal Reserve in the 
wake of a run on sterling crisis in the summer of 1966. This so-called ‘Plan X’ outlined a 
strategy that in important respects foreshadowed the Nixon measures of 1971.
67
 It 
proposed that ceasing gold transactions and letting the dollar slide would confront US 
allies with two options: either to continue to accumulate more dollars in order to stabilize 
exchange rates or to cease intervention and accept an appreciation of the stronger EEC 
currencies vis-à-vis the dollar (Gavin 2004: 169-170).  
While Plan X outlined a tactical means, it left open what the objective should be. Would 
floating simply be a temporary deviation from the par value system or a “bold offensive 
stroke”68 that would undo Bretton Woods? In fact, it was recognized that the same means 
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could be used for “radically different” ends. The report imagined two scenarios. It should 
be used as “a last-resort measure” if a one-off realignment of currencies was sought and 
once multilateral efforts had failed to bring about such a result.
69
 It should be used 
offensively only “if the purpose of adopting that policy were to float the dollar more or 
less permanently”, for “the risks of aggressive counter-moves” that might lead to autarkic 
currency blocs was held to be very high.
70
 
The Nixon shock is best described as a combination of these two tactics. The aggressive 
nature of the Nixon shock did signal that the United States was seeking more than a one-
off realignment of currencies (Shultz and Dam 1978: 115); but the refusal in the 
subsequent negotiations with Europe and Japan to formulate any more concrete demands 
indicates that it was unclear just what sort of new monetary arrangement was desired. As 
Kissinger summed up the issue, professing more than his own ignorance of economic 
matters, “our handicap right now is that we don’t know exactly what we want, and what 
to put our weight behind” (quoted in Nichter 2008: 131).  
The Nixon administration had not yet decided to end the par value system of Bretton 
Woods, and this indecision would continue until its eventual collapse in 1973. Floating, 
one policy document suggested, was instead to be used as a bargaining and ‘fall back’ 
position in subsequent negotiations. The US should indicate that it is “prepared to live 
with the floating rate system indefinitely”.71 But this was still in aid of the attempts to 
improve the trade balance and protect American jobs in order to secure Nixon’s re-
election in 1972 (cf. Gowa 1983; Williamson 1977: 77; Matusow 1998: 132-137).  
The principal goal of the Nixon measures, as in the years before, was to externalize the 
costs of adjustment (Trachtenberg 2011: 13). By imposing a gold embargo and import 
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surcharge
72
, the United States sought to obtain not only a more favourable realignment of 
currencies, but also a greater sharing of the costs of its military apparatus, as well as 
significant trading concessions from its allies (Matusow 2003: 770-771). And by refusing 
to support the exchange rate of the dollar, US policy makers hoped to get Europeans and 
Japanese to revalue rather than buy up dollars to maintain parities (Gavin 2004; Konings 
2007: 50). Put in the context of the stopgap measures of the 1960s, the Nixon shock 
appears less of a definitive break with Bretton Woods but rather an extension and 
escalation of a long-standing strategy of arm-twisting that had aimed to avoid a unilateral 
dollar devaluation and domestic deflation. The Nixon shock needs to be understood in 
light of the decreasing effectiveness of previous measures, and the failure of a negotiated 
multilateral reform of the international monetary system (e.g. activation of the Special 
Drawing Rights) to show the desired results. Mark Trachtenberg rightly concludes that 
“the Nixon administration, even in 1971, did not set out to bring down the system” (2011: 
11). 
The subsequent shift towards floating, it should briefly be noted here, was just as 
unplanned. It is true that the idea of floating gained a prominent advocate in George 
Shultz, who replaced Connally in 1972. But it is only because international monetary 
negotiations remained mired in controversy (Williamson 1977) that the majority of US 
policy makers gradually came to see floating as a favourable long-term solution.
73
 Even 
then, the US administration remained split between the Fed and the Treasury over the 
issue of whether floating was to provide leverage at the bargaining table, serve as an 
interim step towards a renovated monetary system, or constitute a desirable end state 
(Volcker and Gyohten 1992: 130).
74
 When a negotiated dollar devaluation failed to calm 
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foreign exchange markets in February 1973, Germany prepared its European partners for 
a joint float against the dollar. Concerned that the lack of American leadership might 
push the European into a potentially hostile response, the Nixon administration still 
debated the merits of foreign exchange interventions to preserve the fixed-exchange rate 
system.
75
  
It is in this situation of uncertainty that geopolitical considerations assumed an important 
role. Nixon had long been concerned about a unified Europe going against the interests of 
the US. As the joint European float (announced on 11 March 1973 and coming into effect 
on 16 March 1973), became a reality, Nixon concluded that “European unity will not be 
in our interest”76, and Kissinger tasked then Deputy Secretary of Treasury William Simon 
in no uncertain terms to “create conditions in which the Common float is as hard to work 
as possible”77 (for a comprehensive analysis, see Trachtenberg 2011: 19-23). In practice, 
however, there was little that the United States could do. A monetary strategy of divide 
and rule could not be effective, as even selective support for individual European 
currencies would help sustain the overall coherence of the currency arrangement 
(Trachtenberg 2011: 23). Non-intervention was really the only option available “to 
prevent a united European position without showing our hand”.78 Nixon and Kissinger 
may have believed that “political considerations must completely override economic 
considerations in monetary and trade talks”.79 But in reality they only gave a politically 
motivated blessing to those within the administration that favoured a freely floating 
dollar.
80
 The geopolitical objective of preventing a unified Europe, forcefully articulated 
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if not well thought out, and the economic rationale of floating exchange rates thus 
converged on a non-intervention policy. The US at best ‘passively’ undermined the 
European currency snake by refusing to support a declining dollar in foreign exchanges 
(Hudson 1977: 95-96; Trachtenberg 2011: 23); but holding on to the ‘do nothing’ 
approach developed by Shultz and Simon prevented a return to a worldwide system of 
fixed exchange rates.
81
 
 
It is true that contemporary writers who saw Nixon’s measures as heralding a descent into 
global protectionism were mistaken (cf. Calleo 1982). But it is equally wrong to instead 
attribute a globalizing, free-market vision to the Nixon administration (cf. Basosi 2006). 
Alongside the protectionist import surcharge, Nixon also introduced mandatory wage and 
price controls that would last until 1974 (Jones 2012: 226-228). And as Greta Krippner 
explains the difference between Nixon’s closing of the gold window and Reagan’s 
exploitation of the pure dollar standard (Chapter 7), the former “was still an effort to 
escape the constraints of the global system and not yet an effort to harness global capital 
markets to domestic political objectives” (Krippner 2011: 91). The story of neoliberal 
globalization, this chapter concludes, cannot be told in terms of a single dramatic arc that 
extends from the Nixon to the Volcker shock. Short-run considerations had trumped 
long-term planning
82
, not least because inconvertibility had been forced upon the United 
States: by French participation in the run on gold that destroyed the gold pool in March 
1968; and, three years later, by a series of (possibly coordinated) European central bank 
requests for US Treasury gold.  
The dismantling of the gold anchor and par value system of Bretton Woods by the United 
States was not a single-handed, callous act of mercantilism, and even less did it mark the 
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beginning of a neoliberal strategy of global predominance. On the one hand, the United 
States played a far more constructive role in the management of a newly floating system 
by seeking to contain financial crises, as in the case of the collapse of the Herstatt Bank 
that, due in large part to German negligence, threatened to spiral out of control  (Panitch 
and Gindin 2012: 152-156). On the other hand, its economic strategists were far less self-
assured and prescient in their actions. Ending dollar/gold convertibility and dissolving a 
fixed exchange-rate regime was done cautiously and hesitatingly (Panitch and Gindin 
2012: 112); and it was paralleled by the efforts of the American foreign policy 
establishment to institutionalize monetary and economic coordination with their principal 
partners (cf. Gill 1990: 148; Panitch and Gindin 2012: 154-155).  
The IMF’s Committee of Twenty was established by the US in 1972 to continue the 
search for monetary reform. The so-called ‘Library Group’, named after an informal get-
together of finance ministers at the White House library in March 1973, sought to smooth 
tensions between the US and France after the collapse of fixed exchange rates. It later 
evolved into the finance ministerial Group of Five (G5), which provided inspiration for 
the first G7 summit in 1975. The subsequent institutionalization of top-level economic 
diplomacy, a novel feature of inter-capitalist cooperation peculiar to the crisis decades of 
the 1970s, was set out in a series of policy reports by the liberal internationalist Trilateral 
Commission and the less prominent and more security-focused Atlantic Council (ACUS) 
(Gill 1990: 148).
83
 Both envisaged the G7 summits as the pinnacle of a continuous 
process of international consultation that was to link up the principal state agencies of the 
advanced capitalist states and their internal decision-making processes (ACUS 1975: 67-
72; Ortona, Schaetzel and Ushiba 1976: 17-19; ACUS 1977: 16). The key objective of 
this process was to “[t]o secure top level harmonization and mutual understanding of the 
broad outlines of policies to be followed by the key governments”, whereas 
“implementation can be handled by the various echelons of national authority, working 
                                                 
83
 The reports of the Atlantic Council’s Special Committee on Intergovernmental Organization and 
Reorganization clearly echoed the positions of the Trilateral Commission. This is no surprise, as a number 
of Trilateralists were members of the Special Committee, and as the research project was funded by the 
Rockefeller Foundation, whose benefactor David Rockefeller had also founded the Trilateral Commission. 
100 
 
with staffs and national delegations in the pertinent intergovernmental organization, or in 
the domestic areas of each government, as circumstances in each situation dictate” 
(ACUS 1977: 29). The integration of state apparatuses, involving the economics and 
finance ministries as well as the central banks, served to enhance the collective capacity 
of managing economic and financial instabilities. But just as importantly, these 
multilateral forums, as well as the private planning bodies that proposed and endorsed 
them, involved regular and often informal and intimate exchanges that served to cultivate 
mutual trust, a shared sense of responsibility, and a common world view among ruling 
elites (cf. Putnam and Bayne 1984: 197-201; Baker 2006). Their recurrent character and 
overlapping memberships brought together, and brought forth, “people of vision and 
breadth…who could understand positions far wider than those of their own country” 
(Shultz 1993: 148). 
The numerous new initiatives and institutions for core capitalist collaboration that sprang 
up in the 1970s, and the many more that were proposed but remained unrealized, reflect 
that this was a period of turbulence and confusion as well of innovation. But they also 
leave little doubt that US state elites and the wider social, political and economic interests 
they reflected, had not withdrawn from global leadership. The future may have been 
unclear and even bleak, but there was an understanding that governing classes would 
travel the road together—though certainly not in lockstep.  
Fundamentally, therefore, we are dealing here not with an era of American decline.
84
 The 
US did not try to forestall its demise, and its putative contenders did not stage a rival bid 
for hegemony (cf. Panitch and Gindin 2012: 1). But neither can we understand this period 
exclusively in terms of a structurally conditioned and institutionally reinforced 
cooperative management of common problems. At the centre of inter-state conflicts was 
not the liquidation or renovation of American global power but the modalities and 
interactivities of diverse crisis management strategies. Given that “the American state had 
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 Parboni (1981: 118), by contrast, goes as far as to define the origins and character of the crisis in power-
political rather than economic terms: as the product of an inter-imperialist standoff between a declining US 
and an emergent Germany and Japan over the redivision of the world.  
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embarked on an uncharted voyage through the ‘stagflationary’ crisis decade of the 1970s” 
with the closing of the gold window (Panitch and Gindin 2013: 13), its international 
partners would seek to exert influence over the course that the US would take. To be sure, 
the European and Japanese governments would eventually choose to ‘renew their 
invitation’ to the United States, and both would ultimately assume even greater 
responsibility for collectively managing global capitalism (Panitch and Gindin 2004: 20; 
Panitch and Gindin 2012: 153). But the precise terms and conditions of this American-
centred capitalist international were up for negotiation, and resulted in part from tensions 
and conflicts that this dissertation argues need to be more closely examined. From this 
point of view, the end of the monetary regime of Bretton Woods, rather than a unilateral, 
intentional, and decisive ‘breakup’ by the US, is better understood as a collective, 
complex, and protracted process of unwinding—a process in which, the next chapter will 
show, the German experiment with floating would play a far more transformative role 
than the notorious Nixon shock. 
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Chapter 4 
State-Led or Capital-Driven? 
The Fall of Bretton Woods and the German Currency Float 
Reconsidered 
 
 
The previous chapter has argued that the US did not set out to unilaterally and 
aggressively end the monetary order of Bretton Woods when Nixon ‘chose’ to sever the 
dollar/gold link in August 1971. The present chapter pushes this narrative further by 
focussing on the role of the West German state in the shift from fixed to floating 
exchange rates. Its main argument is that while France had made the monetary status quo 
untenable and, unintentionally, pushed the world onto a de facto dollar standard, the 
German decisions to float the DM unilaterally in October 1969 and May 1971, and 
together with other European currencies in March 1973, contributed decisively to the 
collapse of the par value system. While this is further proof of the argument that 
America’s allies played a far more important role in the erosion of the embedded liberal 
order than previously understood, the immediate theoretical target of this chapter is a 
different one. The West German float has conventionally been cited in support of 
economistic theories of globalization. German state managers, in this view, confronted an 
ever larger influx of foreign capital, proved unable by administrative means to control 
them, and ultimately gave up their attempts to defend the parity of the DM. On the face 
of it, the German experience with floating seems to be a case in point for the argument 
that the breakdown of fixed exchange rates was an ‘inevitable consequence’ of 
globalizing financial markets. Following a period of artificial nation-state containment, 
the argument goes, technological advances and market developments amplified the 
ability of capital to flow across borders and undermined the capacity of states to control 
them. The par value system of Bretton Woods, according to this first wave of 
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globalization literature, was the first casualty of increasing capital mobility in the post-
war era (Eichengreen 2008: 1-2). 
The corollary of this interpretation is that policy makers—American or otherwise—are 
reduced to mere executioners of structural dynamics that are essentially beyond their 
control. Tensions might still emerge as states confronted or ignored these new realities, 
and there might be winners and losers in terms of who would be the first and best to 
adjust. But with state agency absorbed and the outcome preordained by the expansive 
logic of a globalizing capitalism, there would be little room left for any substantive policy 
making. West Germany may have initiated the transition to a floating system, but this 
move is devoid of any significant strategic considerations. 
The principal purpose of this chapter is to challenge this economistic interpretation. To 
do so, the first part of the chapter asks whether it is possible to integrate the German 
experience into the second wave of globalization theories that have sought to ‘bring the 
state back in’ (Helleiner 1995). States, rather than being the passive victims of an 
irresistible and irreversible force, are here held to have played a central role in guiding 
the transition from the post-war regime of embedded liberalism towards the globalized 
rule of financial capitalism (Helleiner 1994; Kapstein 1994; Gilpin 2000; Porter 2005; 
Frieden 2006: xvi; Sassen 2008; Krippner 2011; Panitch and Gindin 2012). And while 
many authors stress the importance of the US, they have sought to construct a more 
comprehensive, “synthetic ‘political’ history of the globalization process” (Helleiner 
1994: 2) as driven by a multiplicity of states. 
Building on the theoretical discussion of Chapter 2, these general accounts of the 
breakdown of Bretton Woods can be usefully divided into three levels of analysis: a 
‘systemic’ model that emphasizes inter-state competition, a ‘domestic’ model that 
emphasizes the role of societal groups, and a ‘cognitive’ model that emphasizes the 
influence of economic ideas as the driving forces in the dissolution of Bretton Woods 
(Cohen 1996: 274-5; Obstfeld and Taylor 2004: 32). Scholars drawing on these models 
have presented the shift from fixed to floating exchange rates in terms of a hegemonic 
104 
 
power politics, the growing international orientation of market operators, or the diffusion 
of neoliberal arguments.  
The first part of this chapter finds these explanatory models to be of limited analytical 
purchase in the German context. German state managers did not follow the monetary 
designs of an American hegemon; they confronted globally oriented economic agents that 
were strongly opposed to revaluation and floating; and they were unconvinced by the 
neoliberal argument for the efficiency of market-based exchange rates. The German 
experience, then, defies the prevailing explanations of the fall of Bretton Woods in terms 
of hegemonic power politics, the influence of global economic interests, or a neoliberal 
paradigm shift. 
The second part of this chapter argues that it is necessary to look at the ‘intermediaries’ 
of the structural pressures that confronted German monetary authorities. This twin 
perspective of state and capital reveals that the destabilizing influx of dollars German 
officials faced in the twilight years of Bretton Woods emanated above all from the largest 
German industrial corporations and financial institutions. Paradoxically, the way in which 
German firms and banks sought to pursue and protect their profits under conditions of 
monetary turbulence and uncertainty not only undermined the capacity of policy makers 
to maintain the parity of the DM, but also contravened their own preferences for an 
undervalued currency. Moreover, because the problem of inflationary dollar inflows was 
identified with the German export industry and its financiers, German state managers also 
aimed their solutions at them. As attempts to negotiate voluntary restrictions failed and 
administrative controls continued to be circumvented, German officials opted for a DM 
float in order to regain command over liquidity from these industrial and financial circles. 
Rather than ceding to global capital, floating allowed the German state to commit the 
dominant export bloc to an anti-inflationary programme that, as Chapter 5 explains, was 
at the heart of Germany’s subsequent ability to better manage the 1970s crisis than its 
partners. 
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West Germany: An Obedient Ally? 
The previous chapter has argued that the role of the United States in the dissolution of 
Bretton Woods has been emphasized at the expense of its principal allies. If and when 
their behaviour is considered, it is often presented in an overly stylized account in which 
France is the system’s ‘spoiler’ (Kindleberger 1976: 21-22; Kirshner 1997: 192-203) 
whereas Germany is an ‘obedient ally’ (Strange 1980: 46; Eichengreen 2011: 71; Lippert 
2011: 4)—a pliant anchor state of American power that went along with the monetary 
designs of its military protector (cf. Mastanduno 2009: 132). This schematic 
representation of allied interests may reflect the instrumental viewpoint of US policy 
makers, but it misses out on the particular character and consequences of German (or 
French) monetary policy. 
And yet it is certainly true that, in the face of not only French but a broader European 
challenge, the ability of the United States to put off monetary reform for so long rested in 
large part on the continuing support provided by the West German government and its 
central bank. Through the purchase of military materiel and of medium and long-term 
Treasury securities, as well as a formal commitment not to convert dollar holdings into 
gold, West Germany significantly extended the lifeline of Bretton Woods (Kreile 2006: 
156, 161; Zimmermann 2002: 239).
85
 It is therefore not unreasonable to assume that, 
since the German state aided American efforts to maintain Bretton Woods throughout the 
1960s, perhaps its role in the transition to a floating system in the early 1970s equally 
corresponded to, and coincided with, American interests in dismantling Bretton Woods.  
The commitment to cooperate with, and willingness to give in to, the United States is 
most commonly believed to result from West Germany’s dependence on the American 
military apparatus and the presence of American troops in a divided Berlin, Germany and 
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 As part of the offset negotiations, Germany was urged to reduce the balance of payments deficit of the 
US by purchasing weapons and military equipment from the US in the amount of the foreign exchange cost 
of stationing American troops in Germany. Contrary to France, German monetary policy “in the 1960s 
supported the de facto dollar standard and thereby maintained the Bretton Woods system. Yet, at the same 
time, the strength of the DM contributed to undermining it” (Kreile 2006: 161).  
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Europe (Zimmermann 2002: 228). There is no doubt that the military superiority of the 
United States gave it considerable political leverage.
86
 A defeated, divided and occupied 
Germany had to accept conditional sovereignty and a closely circumscribed foreign 
policy. West German policy makers were clearly aware that they had to avoid 
confrontations with the United States at any cost. Because of this situation, Germany was 
particularly vulnerable to the threat of a withdrawal of US troops, which the American 
negotiators used repeatedly in the ‘offset negotiations’ in order to obtain significant 
concessions and to obstruct a common European monetary policy (Zimmermann 2002: 
140-1).
87
  
And yet this geopolitical vulnerability worked both ways. Precisely because it made West 
Germany so dependent on the military and political leadership of the United States, it 
compelled policy makers to search for a greater degree of flexibility and autonomy. It 
was this sensitivity out of which Germany’s Ostpolitik emerged: a ‘demilitarized’ 
security strategy of pursuing national interests at a moment when the military 
commitment of the United States to Western Europe appeared more insecure than ever 
before (Niedhardt 2010: 33). 
Against the commonplace assumptions of alliance coherence, a number of recent studies 
in cold war history that have shown that structural bipolarity allowed for far greater 
flexibility in the foreign policy orientations of the secondary powers than previously 
thought. By playing out the superpowers against each other, less powerful countries were 
able to retain a degree of independence (Gaddis 1996: 137; Bozo et al. 2008: 2-3; Nuti 
2009: 2). More precisely, structural bipolarity necessitated such flexibility. Because the 
strategic decisions over military confrontation or rapprochement with the Soviet Union 
were largely determined by the United States alone, its allies were placed in a position 
where they had to pursue alternative and often competing security designs. The Gaullist 
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 The linkages between American troop commitment and German monetary support have been thoroughly 
analyzed and, on the whole, corroborated (Zimmermann 2002; Gavin 2004). 
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 Germany increased its foreign aid, repaid $587 million in postwar debts, eased trade restrictions against 
American poultry, and revalued the DM by 5 percent (Gavin 2004: 66).  
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bid to establish France and Europe as an independent third force, part of which consisted 
of efforts to redress the imbalances of Bretton Woods in favour of France, is the most 
striking case in point. But West Germany’s New Eastern policy (Ostpolitik) comes in a 
close second. For West German practitioners of the cold war were engaged in a delicate 
balancing act. The strategic conundrum posed by the cold war was how to avoid direct 
confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union on the one hand and 
superpower condominium on the other. The former might lead to a hardening of the 
fronts, while the latter might involve the mutual recognition and formalization of their 
respective spheres-of-influence. Both scenarios had to be avoided, as they were feared to 
reinforce the division of Europe and diminish the prospects of recovering the Eastern 
territories (Trachtenberg 1999: 151; Geiger 2008: 518) to which the commercial and 
property interests of a deposed Junker class and resurgent export industry continued to 
lay claim. The need to strike a balance between securing American commitment to 
Western Europe while avoiding a heating of the Cold War ultimately led to the 
development of an alternative vision of European security under Chancellor Brandt.  
New archive-based research has challenged the widely held belief that German Ostpolitik 
was embedded in, and at best improved upon, long-standing American efforts at reaching 
a rapprochement with the Soviet Union (for the traditional argument of complementarity, 
see Niedhardt 2004; for the new reinterpretation, see Lippert 2011: xii; Fink and Schaefer 
2009: 5).
88
 American détente had centred on efforts to defuse the military confrontation 
with the Soviet Union after it had established nuclear parity with the United States (i.e. 
the ability to launch a nuclear warhead that could travel inter-continental distances) in the 
late 1950s and early 1960s. European détente was a direct response to the loss of 
America’s nuclear advantage and subsequent attempts to ease superpower tensions. It 
turned out to be “most potentially divisive between the United States and its (until then) 
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 Carter (2013) considers the argument put forth by Lippert that Germany’s Osthandel lead to a 
transatlantic ‘rift’ to be exaggerated; but his critique is written from the vantage point of the Carter and 
Reagan administration, which were not only concerned about Soviet influence over West Germany, but set 
out to undermine Osthandel. The issue is less one of the intensity of the conflict but the incompatibility of 
the foreign policy objectives that were to be pursued through economic détente. 
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most loyal ally in Europe” (Bernardini 2010: 79). Germany’s Ostpolitik in particular 
grew out of the waning commitment of the United States to wage what would now 
amount to a mutually destructive nuclear war in order to protect West Berlin (even less 
likely than Western Europe) from a Soviet takeover (Lippert 2011: 15). And as the 
United States sought to reach a militarily less threatening modus vivendi  with the Soviet 
Union, the pressures increased for West Germany to pursue the ultimate objective of 
reunification by diverging from its hitherto unconditional support of the American 
direction (Lippert 2011: 18). The result was an alternative conception of security that 
conflicted with, rather than complemented, American objectives. For the US, détente was 
to be limited to the military sphere and to remain the prerogative of the two superpowers 
(Lippert 2011: 18). For Germany, détente was to encompass the full range of economic, 
political, cultural, and scientific exchanges and, above all, to become a joint European 
project. Lastly, whereas the Nixon administration inherited an Eastern policy that sought 
to stabilize but essentially continue the systemic conflict, the social-liberal coalition 
government under Brandt sought to peacefully transform it (Lippert 2011: 23, 25-26). 
The long-term vision of Brandt was that economic interdependence would promote 
political integration and give birth to a pan-European security system. 
What appear to be hopelessly idealist aspirations of a transformative dialogue across the 
iron curtain were based on sober political calculations as well as grounded in concrete 
material interest. The link between this geopolitical vision and economic and monetary 
relations within the West may not be immediately apparent but was in fact decisive. The 
economic dimension of rapprochement with the East was the precondition for a 
successful Ostpolitik (Lippert 2010: 81). The Brandt government was willing to make 
substantive economic overtures to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in the hope of re-
establishing normal relations with these countries. In this respect, West European 
integration was important in two ways. First, a thriving common market would increase 
opportunities for East/West trade. And second, the West European project was to serve as 
a model for what the Continent as a whole could become (Lippert 2011: 20, 37). 
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Germany’s new Eastern policy, therefore, also had an active Westpolitik as its strategic 
counterpart.
89
 In part, this was certainly intended to assuage allied fears over a new 
Rapallo. The commitment to NATO and European integration, as Schmidt would later 
confide, remained fundamental pillars of German foreign policy precisely because they 
were “at the same time a cloak for us, under which we can hide our power a little bit”.90 
In practical terms, and apart from the routine declarations of Germany’s transatlantic 
allegiance, the Western complement to Ostpolitik would come to rest “less and less with 
the United States and more with the European Economic Community” (Lippert 2011: 
15). And here, monetary issues played a critical role. 
The promotion of the European project in the late 1960s and early 1970s rested squarely 
on efforts to move towards economic and monetary union. This, it was explicitly 
acknowledged, was a requirement for a successful Ostpolitik. And for such a common 
position to emerge, an agreement with France was seen as key. “After all”, one policy 
document noted, “the pressure for a European breakthrough in monetary matters can only 
increase further during a phase of successful Eastern policy activities. This means, first 
and foremost, that the courting of France needs to be intensified.”91 From this 
perspective, then, German state managers were much more inclined to make concessions 
to France rather than continue to cater to the United States. Thus when Brandt embarked 
on its Ostpolitik, he was “not particularly disposed to make a strong effort in order to 
save the transatlantic bargain” that had hitherto characterized German monetary relations 
with the US (Zimmermann 2001: 68).  
For the US, the monetary support provided by Germany as part of the offset agreements 
was a double-edged sword. While it helped stabilize monetary relations in the short term, 
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 Katzenstein (1982: 208) goes as far as to suggest that the EMS was the West European complement to 
Germany’s Eastern policy. 
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 Statement by Schmidt, Central Bank Council Meeting Minutes, 30 November 1978, BBk HA N2 269, p. 
18. 
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 Weinstock, “Grundsätzliche Überlegungen zur gegenwärtigen währungspolitischen Diskussion”, BAK B 
136/7355, 9 September 1971, p. 9. 
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it also increased the disruptive ability of a potential Franco-German monetary bloc in the 
long run (cf. Gavin 2004: 66).
92
 It was in part for this reason that the United States could 
not easily disentangle itself from its military engagement in Western Europe. For 
America’s military presence had not simply been aimed at staking out a sphere of 
influence against the Soviet Union. It had also been established to contain an emergent 
and potentially revisionist Germany (cf. Trachtenberg 1999). This ‘double containment’ 
meant that its military involvement simply could not be reduced even if the Soviet Union 
had agreed to formally recognize the integrity of America’s European zone of interest.  
Superpower rapprochement and the implied threats of a military disengagement of the 
United States from Europe, important as they had been for gaining West German 
monetary concessions in the 1960s, had led a minority group of CSU politicians to push 
for military cooperation with Gaullist France, arguing that the US could no longer be 
expected to offer a strategy of reunification or a strengthening of European defence 
(Geiger 2008). One policy paper at the height of this internal debate put it starkly: “The 
only security that remains to us in light of this Soviet-American cooperation in favour of 
the Russian status quo in Europe is the fact that France has cooperated on neither the 
Nuclear Test Ban treaty nor the burlesque insecurity game in Geneva [i.e. the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty]. France's respected frappe de force will therefore automatically 
become the security wing of German foreign policy”.93  
The dilemma for US policy makers, therefore, was that a troop withdrawal might 
strengthen those forces within West Germany that were frustrated with the country’s 
asymmetrical dependence on the US military (Gavin 2004: 135), and keen to accomplish 
a more balanced position either by collaborating with France or seeking accommodation 
with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. For these reasons, West Germany’s cold war 
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 The Kennedy administration urged Germany not to convert surplus dollars into US Treasury gold. 
Nevertheless, “there was always the possibility that West Germany could turn in dollars for gold if relations 
with the United States soured” (Gavin 2004: 66).  
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 “Gerhard Schröder oder die Sicherheit Deutschlands”, included in Kastl to Schröder, 14 September 1965, 
quoted in Granieri (2004: 210). 
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logicians were surprisingly confident about the American troop commitment as they 
pursued a path of greater independence. As one diplomatic cable from Washington 
summed up the situation in early 1972, “for the Nixon administration the existence of the 
alliance, the nuclear protection of Europe, the stationing of American troops and the 
political role that America can play in Europe to secure its Atlantic position are a 
complex from which not a single element can be pried out without endangering the 
whole.”94  
On the whole, Brandt’s Ostpolitik had been based on the firm belief that the US could 
hardly afford to reduce its military presence in Europe and West Germany (Lippert 2011: 
17).
95
 And in turn, as his overtures towards the East began to bear fruits, this made him 
less immediately dependent on the US in other matters (Lippert 2011: 95). This newly 
gained independence is exemplified by the fact that Brandt was unprepared to make 
substantial monetary concessions to the Americans during the offset negotiations of 1971 
and quite willing to risk its “continued military presence in Europe” (Lippert 2011: 94).96  
In one important sense, of course, the threat of an American troop withdrawal was real—
not, however, in terms of a bargaining chip that could be used at will, but rather as an 
isolationist scenario that both the Nixon administration and German policy makers sought 
to prevent—and that required a quid pro quo that did not guarantee continued German 
subordination to American monetary plans.  
The notion of a ‘strategic triangle’, whereby Germany depended on cooperation with 
both the US and France and thus sought to balance between the conflicting interests of its 
partners, underestimates the extent to which Germany was able to pursue a monetary 
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 “Bemerkungen zur amerikanischen Außenpolitik 1973”, 2 January 1972, AdsD HSA, folder 6062. 
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 Werner Lippert bases this argument on an interview with Egon Bahr, in which the personal advisor to 
Willy Brandt and architect of Ostpolitik recounts a conversation between Brandt and John McCloy. In 
response to an implicit threat to West German security, “Brandt apparently stated directly that he did not 
believe the US would withdraw its troops, no matter what the West German foreign policy was” (Lippert 
2011: 190, fn. 81).  
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 Brandt to Birrenbach, 22 July 1971, BAK B 136/6220, pp. 1-2, quoted in Lippert (2011: 94). 
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policy rather more independently and substantially different from either the American or 
French position (Kreile 2006: 157). Rather than simply balancing the two sides, West 
German state officials had formulated an independent strategy that, while guided by the 
dependence of the economy on exports and world market access, was remarkably free 
from direct American tutelage.  
 
Floating the Deutsche Mark 
The previous chapter has demonstrated that France was far from isolated in its attempt to 
increase pressure on the US and Britain to bring their financial house in order. This 
section suggests that once we drop the unhelpful distinction between a French contender 
and German anchor state, we can see more clearly that Germany, too, pursued similar 
ends with a different set of instruments.  
Anxious to avoid the charge of anti-Americanism, the rhetoric that underpinned de 
Gaulle’s attack on the dollar as an instrument of American dominance was hardly 
palatable to German state managers.
97
 How to respond to this overture in practical terms 
was a different matter, however.
98
  In fact, in 1965 German officials seriously considered 
joining de Gaulle in asking for an increase in the price of gold (Zimmermann 2002: 226). 
Even the possibility of joining France in converting dollar surpluses into gold—raised 
most prominently by the former president of the Bank Deutscher Länder Wilhelm 
Vocke—was discussed (cf. Eichengreen 2011: 53). The decision not to follow de 
Gaulle’s lead was based on rather pragmatic considerations rather than a sense of loyalty 
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 West German officials were uncertain how to interpret the press conference of de Gaulle, but that he had 
demanded a return to the classical gold standard was ruled out as unlikely. It was assumed that de Gaulle’s 
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towards the US. At the very least, Germany would need a transitional period because the 
ratio of its gold reserves was considered to be relatively low.
99
 Furthermore, even without 
an official proclamation to convert future dollar surpluses into gold, it was concluded, the 
Bundesbank would be able to convert part of its dollar reserves into assets denominated 
in DM or gold. In fact, as one document pointed out, the Bundesbank had done so 
previously. In 1964—despite a commitment not to convert dollars into US Treasury 
gold—it had been able to reduce its dollar reserves from 12.6 to 8.6 billion DM (see also 
similar figures in Loriaux 1991: 185). An official commitment to use gold for 
international settlements, as demanded by de Gaulle, would only make it more difficult to 
use previously accumulated dollars in order to settle deficits.
100
  
In light of these sober calculations, the decision to forego a confrontational stance is an 
indication not so much of a lack of solidarity with France or any particular wartime ‘debt’ 
to the United States than the evident limits of this strategic move. While the persistent 
pressure, though not the anti-American overtones, of France on the United States was 
appreciated, it was understood that it could not be generalized. As early as 1965, German 
officials had concluded that any concerted attempt to convert dollars into gold would 
prompt the US to suspend convertibility.
101
 Because dollar holdings still accounted for 
40% of official Bundesbank reserves in 1965, a US gold embargo would put the Federal 
Republic in an unfavourable position.
102
  
It was with these same reservations in mind that the possibility of an intensified and 
coordinated conversion policy of EEC member states was rejected. To support or 
advance such an initiative, it was feared, would burden the offset negotiations with the 
United States. Worst of all, however, it was considered ineffective. Because it would 
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prompt the US to close the gold window, it was dismissed as “not an appropriate means 
to force the US to improve its balance of payments”. The overall assessment of the 
monetary situation was, nevertheless, very similar to that of its European allies. “The 
fundamental problem”, as one policy document spelled it out most clearly, “consists in 
the fact that in the current monetary system the US assumes a position which allows it to 
force the rest of the world to give almost unlimited credit to finance its balance-of-
payments deficit.”103 While the United States enjoyed the benefits of this position, the 
responsibility for maintaining stable exchange rates was relegated to the Europeans and 
Japanese.  
Over the course of the early 1970s, West German policy makers reluctantly, but 
repeatedly, resorted to floating in order to extricate themselves from this situation. The 
notion that the US unilaterally set out to demolish Bretton Woods thus ignores the fact 
that Germany had moved twice to float the DM before the US decided to ‘free’ the dollar 
from gold in August 1971 (Gray 2007: 296; Panitch and Gindin 2012: 388, fn. 49). In late 
September 1969, German policy makers pioneered a temporary float in lieu of an internal 
agreement to revalue the DM (Gray 2007: 302-3). In May 1971, the rationale was to 
redirect the dollar flows into the DM (Gray 2010: 161). Thus when Germany, in March 
1973, forced its European partners into a joint float by threatening to go it alone (Johnson 
1998: 83; Gray 2007: 321), its prior recourse to floating had already destabilized the 
Bretton Woods architecture. 
Lest these actions be interpreted as a form of ‘anticipatory obedience’, it should be noted 
the United States did not welcome the German decisions to float the DM. The brief 
experiment of floating in 1969 “was, after all, a unilateral move that bore little in 
common with American plans for gradual reform” (Gray 2007: 303, fn. 30).104 The May 
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1971 decision for an open-ended float also caused concern among American officials, 
who believed Germany had left the fixed-exchange-rate regime (cf. Volcker and Gyohten 
1992: 74, cited in Zimmermann 2008: 168, fn. 57), and who warned their German 
counterparts that the recent currency crisis was “no reason to jettison the Bretton Woods 
system”105. As late as March 1972, the US pressured Germany to resist floating and 
encouraged the introduction of capital controls (Schmidt 1996: 174; Moravcsik 1998: 
250-251; Hetzel 2002: 41-42, fn. 19). And even in March 1973, the US administration 
still had political reservations about the German initiative of a common European float 
(Trachtenberg 2011: 20-23). 
To be sure, in the wake of the Nixon shock, when it seemed clear that monetary 
concessions would have to be made, West German policy makers were keen to convince 
their American partners that by floating the DM Germany had already made a significant 
advance contribution. Yet an earlier report had concluded pessimistically that the entire 
West German monetary policy—from the non-conversion pledge to DM revaluation and 
floating—could hardly be sold to the Americans as an act of goodwill, as it was evident 
that “it promises to be to our own trade and monetary advantage”.106 
Moreover, in the eyes of some of its early advocates, the expedient effect of floating 
would not only be to free the Bundesbank from the inflationary effects of having to 
defend the parity of DM, but to expose other countries to the speculative pressures that 
Germany had so far faced alone. In this way, going solo would force other EEC members 
and France in particular into common action and build the critical mass necessary for 
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monetary reform.
107
 And it might demonstrate to the Americans, others hoped, just how 
frail the dollar had become.
108
 “It is a somewhat nasty technique”, the vice-president of 
the Bundesbank Otmar Emminger admitted on the eve of the DM float in May 1971. 
Even central bank governor Karl Klasen, who rejected floating and advocated capital 
controls, concurred that “we will not get out of this predicament unless the others are 
forced to do something, too”.109 And indeed, by floating the DM in May 1971, Germany 
had moved itself “out of the shooting-line” while relegating the speculative pressures into 
the franc and yen (Gray 2010: 161). 
The point here, of course, is not to make the opposite claim: that Germany, rather than an 
acquiescent cold war client, was really an unruly rival making a bid for regional 
hegemony. This position, most strongly articulated by Erik Hoffmeyer (1993: 82), the 
former governor of the Danish national bank (1965-1994), holds that “the decisive 
change in the international monetary system after 1971 was the outcome of a German 
desire to unwind US influence and regain their own political independence” (cf. 
Zimmermann 2008: 156-157). While Hoffmeyer rightly assesses the weight of 
Germany’s monetary decisions, he misinterprets the overall objective. In the eyes of 
German policy makers, the root cause of monetary turmoil was not dollar seigniorage as 
such but the expansionary purpose to which this privilege was put.
110
 It was without 
question that “[t]he dollar will retain its importance as an intervention currency; but”, one 
policy memorandum noted, “it will be important to abolish, as far as possible, the special 
advantages that the US has derived from this role of the dollar, and the dangers that result 
for the other countries (expansion of international liquidity).”111 Rather than challenge 
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America’s monetary power, Germany sought to ensure that it would be used responsibly, 
while protecting itself from the inflationary dollar flight from the US in the meantime. 
Having discarded the idea that German monetary strategy was guided by its subservient 
relationship with the US hegemon, how else can the German decision to float the DM be 
explained? Returning to the threefold interpretation introduced in Chapter 2, the 
remainder of this chapter asks whether private economic interests prevailed on German 
state managers, or whether neoliberal ideas influenced their decision to float.  
It should be made clear at the outset that the adoption of floating exchange rates in the 
early 1970s removed only one of the pillars of the embedded liberal order of Bretton 
Woods. Many advanced industrialized states remained committed to macroeconomic 
expansion and welfare state protection at least until the failure of Mitterand’s 
‘Keynesianism in one country’ in 1983. And most of them also retained capital controls 
until the 1980s and 1990s. It is important therefore to distinguish between the 
disintegration of the parity system between 1971 and 1973 and the deluge of financial 
deregulation of subsequent decades. There is no immediate causal link in the way that an 
economistic reading of the globalizing logic of markets would suggest (Abdelal 2007: 34-
35). But because exchange rate stability, macroeconomic discretion, and financial 
restriction were embodied in the monetary architecture of Bretton Woods, their fate was 
historically entwined (cf. Obstfeld and Taylor 2004: 29; Eichengreen 2008: 1).  
The architects of Bretton Woods had sanctioned the restrictive treatment of finance 
because they feared that speculative or disequilibrating capital flows might constrain the 
ability of states to pursue an independent and, more specifically, expansionary monetary 
strategy, cause exchange rate volatility and disrupt multilateral free trade. “Faced with a 
choice between creating a liberal order in finance and building a system of stable 
exchange rates and liberal trade, policymakers in the early post-war period generally 
agreed that free finance should be sacrificed” (Helleiner 1994: 5). The question of how 
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and why global finance was subsequently resurrected is therefore bound up with the 
question of how and why these original objectives and objections enshrined in Bretton 
Woods receded into the background. 
The support of the United States and the United Kingdom for the emerging Euromarkets 
encouraged speculative attacks on the par value system between 1967 and 1973 
(Helleiner 1994: 91, 100). In order to defend the fixed-exchange rate regime, Western 
Europe and Japan sought to negotiate cooperative capital controls. The failure to do so, 
according to Helleiner, “marked the collapse of the first principle established at Bretton 
Woods: that financial movements should be controlled in the interests of preserving a 
stable international exchange rate system” (Helleiner 1995: 324). Not only did the failed 
negotiations contribute to the collapse of the par value system; the rise of a floating ‘non-
system’ exacerbated further the volatile capital movements that states confronted in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s (Helleiner 1994: 121). 
 
The Social Base of German Monetary Strategy 
With these preliminary observations, the discussion moves from the systemic to the 
domestic level of analysis. The argument, at its most basic, is that the coalition of post-
war planners and corporate leaders that had initially supported the ‘embedded liberal 
compromise’ of restricting cross-border flows in the interest of stable exchange rates and 
multilateral free trade began to disintegrate in the 1960s (Helleiner 1994: 100). As 
American corporations internationalized their operations, they became increasingly wary 
of the financial restrictions sanctioned under the Bretton Woods framework (Hawley 
1987: 107; Helleiner 1994: 119). Faced with the prospects of tighter controls to defend 
the external value of the dollar, they warmed up to the idea of greater exchange rate 
flexibility.
112
 And lured by the new profit opportunities in foreign exchange markets, 
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moreover, some bankers embraced the academic argument in favour of floating as a way 
of reconciling a liberal trading with a liberal financial order (Aronson 1977: 142-149; 
Schmelzer 2010: 56, 174-175, 181). The question, then, is whether a similar constellation 
of social interests can be identified in Germany. 
As is well established in the specialized literature, Germany’s capitalist class had a vested 
interest in the maintenance of a fixed-exchange rate system (cf. Henning 1994). 
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the economically dominant and politically influential 
export sector had relied for its success on the advantages of an undervalued DM. Tied 
into a symbiotic relationship through interlocking directorates and cross-holdings, the 
large industrial corporations and the commercial banks that financed their international 
operations vigorously opposed even the modest revaluations of the DM in 1961 and 
1969. The argument, repeated ad nauseam by the peak business associations BDI 
(German Federation of Industries) and VDMA (German Engineering Federation), was 
that revaluation would deal a fatal blow to the international competitiveness of the West 
German economy.
113
  
By the end of the decade, however, the united front of industrial, financial and 
agricultural interests that had supported an undervalued home currency began to show 
some cracks. When the grand coalition government of Kiesinger refused to yield to 
international pressures for a stronger DM in November 1968 and instead opted for a four-
percent tax on exports (and a corresponding four-percent subsidy on imports) in order to 
diminish its balance-of-payments surplus, it came under surprising criticism from the 
very class forces whose interests it had sought to defend. Much to the chagrin of policy 
makers, who observed that “the attitude of business to the revaluation of the DM had 
visibly changed”, some business members of the advisory council pointed out that they 
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might have preferred a one-off revaluation to the more intrusive provisions of the 
Absicherungsgesetz.
114
 On the whole, however, the dominant export bloc remained firmly 
committed to the fixed exchange rate regime that secured its international 
competitiveness.  
Support for greater flexibility came instead from a diverse assortment of societal interests 
that, from 1969 onwards, began to look favourably upon a higher valued DM. Led by 
Economics Minister Karl Schiller and the economics profession, research institutes, and 
leading newspapers, a broad-based campaign emerged that advocated a higher valued 
DM as the external component of a programme of internal demand management that 
promised to redress the imbalance of Germany’s heavily export-reliant economy (Gray 
2007: 301). Revaluation was supported by left-wing social democrats and trade unionists, 
the organized interests of ‘inflation-wary’ small savers and home owners, and small and 
medium-sized enterprises in the construction, retailing and merchant sector that stood to 
benefit from the cheaper imports a more valuable DM would buy (Lankowski 1982a: 
280, 282-3; Johnson 1998: 10).  
In West Germany, then, the constellation of interests that came to support greater 
exchange rate flexibility was very different from the globally oriented and neoliberally 
minded forces that are normally associated with the push for reforms or the abandonment 
of the Bretton Woods regime. At the same time, the direct influence of this domestic 
coalition over monetary policy-making should not be exaggerated. The overall goal of 
reducing the export dependence of West German capitalism that had tied these diverse 
and incoherent interests into a temporary alliance was never accomplished (Lankowski 
1982a: 285). The significance of this alternative constituency consists not in directly 
shaping monetary policy but rather in loosening the stranglehold of the export industry 
that not only rejected revaluation but preferred limited capital controls to floating 
exchange rates.  
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In order to maintain the advantages of an undervalued currency, the export-oriented 
alliance of banking and industry had accepted the introduction of controls on capital 
inflows when the DM came under pressure in the early and late 1960s (Crotty and 
Epstein 1996: 124). To be sure, industrialists and bankers were far from enthusiastic 
about these restrictions. And yet shaken by the revaluation of October 1969 and the 
means by which it was brought about, they continued to support them as “the lesser 
evil”.115 Unsuccessful in their efforts to prevent the May 1971 float, the largest industrial 
corporations, represented in the Economics Ministry’s Foreign Trade Advisory Council, 
acceded to temporary capital controls in exchange for what they hoped would be a swift 
return to fixed, and preferably pre-floating, parities.
116
 While they sought to ensure that 
these controls would not become too rigid, they repeatedly favoured them over 
floating.
117
 
Even though they had, by mid-1971, come to grudgingly accept floating as a temporary 
measure, their opposition to a permanent float continued unabated (Kinderman 2008: 
860). Abhorring the prospects of a continuously appreciating home currency
118
, the 
German Federation of Industry—at the initiative of Otto A. Friedrich, Otto Wolff von 
Amerongen and Hans-Günther Sohl, the Who is Who of the German economic elite—
published a memorandum in four major newspapers in late 1971 in order to defend itself 
against the rival, domestically-oriented alliance and to call for the restoration of fixed 
exchange rates.
119
 
There is, of course, the theoretical possibility that an elite fraction of German capital—
with a globalist rather than national outlook, and a financial rather than productive 
orientation—was either supportive of or at least indifferent to an appreciating DM or 
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floating system. Holtfrerich (2008: 39), for instance, suggests that the exclusive focus of 
monetary policy on domestic price stability after the DM float of 1973 might be 
understood as a break of the alliance between Bundesbank and industry in favour of 
financial interests. And the work of Kinderman (2008: 854) establishes as a general 
principle that the most internationalized corporations, operating across multiple areas, 
find it easier to balance against currency fluctuations (cf. Helleiner 2005: 26). Perhaps, 
then, the largest German export corporations, with production facilities in several 
countries, and the international banks affiliated with them, were willing to dispose of the 
fixed-exchange-rate system?  
While divergent minority opinions undoubtedly existed within the financial and industrial 
community, the archival evidence suggests that they did not add up to a coherent and 
distinctive set of elite preferences. Thus, when the Hanseatic private banker Joachim 
Willink, in mid-August 1971, issued a remarkable plea for a prolonged, upward float of 
the DM supervised by the Bundesbank, he did so in explicit opposition to the position 
and interests of banking as well as industry.
120
 And when the president of the WestLB—
one of the most internationally active of Germany’s regionally owned Landesbanken—
acknowledged the German float as a tactical means of bringing about international 
monetary reform, he nevertheless rejected floating as a permanent solution.
121
  
The strongest proof against this hypothesis comes from within what may be one of the 
most exclusive capitalist circles in post-war Germany. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, 
the chief financial officers of most of the top 20 industrial corporations held regular 
meetings to which central bankers were occasionally invited.
122
 The meetings were 
characterized by a generous sharing of information and a frank exchange of opinions.
123
 
For all that we know about the substance of these meetings in the critical phase of 1971-
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1973, these corporate leaders were extremely concerned about the German experiment 
with floating and what they held to be very negative consequences for investment and 
employment.
124
 Accordingly, the transition towards a general float of European 
currencies against the dollar on 12 March 1973 at best won the retroactive acquiescence 
of these elite circles. Ernst Wolf Mommsen, tasked by Schmidt to consult with leading 
representatives of banks and industry and to organize informal get-togethers with the 
chancellor, reported that “there is now after all almost a consensus that the attained result 
[i.e. a joint European float] was optimal with regards to all other alternatives”.125  
Clearly then, dominant class forces did not take a purposive lead role in formulating 
German monetary strategy. There is little doubt that they would have militated against 
comprehensive exchange controls that would have completely sealed off the German 
economy from the inflationary influx of dollars; but because they also vigorously 
opposed floating until after the event, their incommensurable preferences did not 
immediately prejudice the choice for one or the other. In fact, such contradictory interests 
may require states to make independent and proactive decisions (Hawley 1987: 145). In 
as much as the decision to float the DM constitutes a decisive step in the unravelling of 
the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates, German capital was not its conscious 
author.  
Even so, the question remains why West German state planners were not only ahead of 
the German export industry but why they would choose to turn against its interests. The 
previous section has already considered and, on the whole, discounted the view that 
German state managers acted ‘on orders’ from the United States. A more plausible 
variant of this interpretation is that German policy makers may have chosen to shoulder 
the burden of adjustment in the interest of preserving Bretton Woods. Perhaps, then, 
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German state managers accepted an upward floating DM as necessary to correct global 
imbalances and move towards a more sustainable set of exchange rates—even if this 
meant hurting its export industry (cf. Gray 2007: 296).
126
    
In the wake of the Nixon shock, German state managers had ostensibly come to realize 
that the times when their manufacturers had registered record exports while the US 
balance of trade deteriorated were over. As one state official told representatives of the 
export industry, “every country had to sacrifice part of its competitiveness in favour of 
the US”.127 And the German chancellor concluded in his ‘political-economic’ exposé in 
April 1974 that “in the interest of the whole, then, the adjustments and sacrifices 
associated with appreciation had—and still have to !—be asked of individual 
branches”.128 
Internally, however, policy makers had come to the conclusion that the incessant 
complaints about the catastrophic consequences of a stronger DM had been greatly 
exaggerated.
129
 The lessons that state managers drew from the revaluation of 1962 and 
1969 floats were that despite the doom and gloom the German export industry had fared 
remarkably well.
130
 In the decisive years of 1971-1973 at least, it seemed that the 
competitive position of the German export industry overall had anything but suffered. In 
fact, state managers observed that German exporters had been able to pass on the costs of 
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a more valuable DM to their customers abroad.
131
 It is thus more likely that talking of 
‘concessions’ was above all meant to justify a prolonged float vis-à-vis the export 
sector.
132
 And yet, as the final section makes clear, to say that the West German state 
acted relatively autonomously from any particular class force is only half the truth. For its 
structural dependence was at the same time revealed on the terrain of accumulation. 
 
Floating Ideas: The Case of German Ordoliberalism 
Having established that the administrators of the West German state were pushed into 
floating neither by their American partners nor by an internationally oriented business 
community, the final question to consider is to what extent they may have been 
influenced by neoliberal ideas. Confounded by the intractable economic troubles of the 
1970s, the story goes, decision-making elites were both disillusioned with what turned 
out to be largely ineffective Keynesian prescriptions and presented with a forcefully 
articulated set of neoliberal policy alternatives (Hall 1993; Helleiner 1994: 15-17; Jones 
2012: 233). Gradually, policy makers turned their backs on the embedded liberal 
framework of thought that had prescribed an interventionist role for the state, the 
repression of finance and the vital importance of stable exchange rates. They converted to 
and converged upon a new economic paradigm that emphasized monetary restraint over 
expansionary policies (McNamara 1998), prioritized the free flow of capital (Helleiner 
1994), and advocated floating exchange rates (Schmelzer 2010). Characterized by leads 
and lags, this neoliberal shift occurred first in the United States, where it “foreshadowed a 
similar change that would take place throughout the advanced industrial world in the 
1970s and 1980s” (Helleiner 1994: 122).  
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The importance of neoliberal ideas in the shift to floating has been demonstrated most 
plausibly in the case of the United States (Odell 1982; Leeson 2003; Schmelzer 2010). 
But Germany seems to make a suitable candidate for the extension of such an ideas-based 
account. For whilst the German legacy of organized capitalism is widely held to be at 
odds with the Anglo-Saxon, laissez-faire liberalism of nineteenth-century coinage, the 
German ‘social market economy’ that was instituted after 1945 also diverged from the 
Keynesian policies and ideas that came to prevail in much of the advanced capitalist 
world (Allen 1989). The German model was instead influenced by a tradition of 
‘ordoliberalism’ that prescribed an active role for the state in continuously (re)creating 
market competition but rejected the redistributive, interventionist and planning aspects of 
Keynesianism (Ptak 2009: 112). This school of economic thought, most prominently 
associated with economics minister Ludwig Erhard who presided over the German 
Wirtschaftswunder, may be considered a ‘specific German variety of neoliberalism’ (Ptak 
2009: 126). Because of the miraculous success of German post-war reconstruction based 
on ordoliberal ideas of free markets guided by strong states, German policy makers only 
belatedly, and half-heartedly, began to develop Keynesian macroeconomic tools at the 
end of the 1960s (Allen 2005: 199-201). Perhaps, then, the legacy of ordoliberalism, and 
the correspondingly late and weak commitment to Keynesianism, might explain why the 
mounting monetary and economic problems of the early 1970s led German state 
managers to return to neoliberal solutions? If so, it might be possible to incorporate the 
German experiment with floating into a broad-based ideational explanation of how the 
embedded liberal order of Bretton Woods collapsed under the combined weight of 
neoliberal ideas. “In West Germany”, Helleiner (1994: 126) helps us to formulate this 
hypothesis, “the neoliberal approach was endorsed by prominent financial officials such 
as Otmar Emminger and Karl Otto Pöhl, as well as by the economically conservative 
Chancellor Helmut Schmidt”. Although the quote refers to their role in pushing Britain to 
accept the IMF austerity package in 1976 (examined in Chapter 5), their designation as 
neoliberal advocates carries some significance. Emminger and Schmidt, after all, were 
also the two leading protagonists in the run-up to the float (as vice-president of the 
127 
 
Bundesbank and finance minister). And neoliberal advocates, it has been noted above, 
not only rejected Keynesian demand management and the use of capital controls, but also 
favoured a floating regime (Helleiner 1994: 15).
133
  
It is indeed true that Bundesbank vice-president Otmar Emminger had early on adopted 
the neoliberal argument developed by Milton Friedman in favour of letting the forces of 
supply and demand determine the foreign value of the DM (Johnson 1998: 70). And yet 
up until the March 1973 float that ended Bretton Woods, his was a minority position in 
the Bundesbank’s Central Bank Council (Henning 1994: 183). Most of the Council’s 
members not only remained wedded to the fixed exchange-rate regime (Heisenberg 1999: 
29-33; Johnson 1998: 73), but between 1972 and 1973 sought to defend this system by 
imposing a wide range of limitations on the movement of capital that indicated ‘a 
significant erosion of [Germany’s] traditional commitment to international liberalization’ 
(Johnson 1998: 74; Henning 1994: 184). The faction that did favour a DM float was not 
guided by a neoliberal belief in the efficiency of free markets either. The primary concern 
of these council members was to stem the inflationary influx of dollars. The fight against 
inflation for them would also have to encompass regulatory controls that had little in 
common with the minimalist focus on the money supply that Friedman and other 
monetarist economists prescribed (Johnson 1998: 75). 
Outside the Bundesbank the most prominent advocate of revaluation and floating was 
finance minister Karl Schiller, a devout Keynesian rather than a neoliberal convert. When 
the Bundesbank recommended capital controls in May 1971, it was Schiller who 
convinced the cabinet to ignore the Bank’s advice and temporarily float the mark 
(Johnson 1998: 74). Even more significant is the fact that since 1969, Schiller had led a 
campaign in favour of a higher valued DM in an effort to shift the heavily export-
dependent German economy towards domestic production and consumption (Henning 
1994: 183; Gray 2007: 301). Schiller, and the SPD left and trade unions that supported 
him, saw greater DM flexibility as a step towards developing precisely those instruments 
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of internal demand management that had been lacking. Revaluation was a step towards 
more rather than less Keynesianism. Although Schiller resigned in June 1972 ostensibly 
in response to the cabinet decision to tighten controls rather than follow his advice to 
float, Schiller had fallen out of favour primarily because of his orthodox Keynesian 
standpoint that public deficit spending should be limited to times of economic downturn 
(Johnson 1998: 78). He was replaced by Helmut Schmidt, who in this respect proved to 
be much less ‘economically conservative’ and, until March 1973, continued to favour 
administrative measures over a free float (von Hagen 1999: 412; Johnson 1998: 79; 
Panitch and Gindin 2012: 145-6).  
There is, then, no straightforward connection between German monetary policy and any 
particular economic paradigm.
134
 To be sure, German policy makers had been guided by 
concerns for price stability and would prove increasingly willing to use monetary 
restraint and fiscal frugality to this end. But this form of economic orthodoxy, which was 
itself founded in concrete economic interests rather than the collective memory of 
hyperinflation (Holtfrerich 1999; 2008), was very different from a neoliberal belief in the 
superior price-finding mechanism of the market. Friedman himself recognized that 
governments had never bought his argument (cf. Jones 2012: 220). And Emminger 
(1986: 251), who could otherwise be relied upon to emphasize the significance of his 
intellectual contributions in particular
135
, discounted the importance of belief-systems 
when he argued that “[i]n reality the transition to floating was forced upon us by events, 
whatever rational considerations and expectations we had with regards to a float.” 
Emminger’s assessment of the situation is significant not only because it contradicts an 
ideas-based explanation, but also because it leads us back to where we started off. 
Paradoxically, the one interpretation left standing is the one that the second wave of IPE 
scholarship originally set out to argue against: an economistic reading that sees the 
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collapse of fixed exchange rate regimes as the product of globalizing market forces. The 
remainder of this chapter seeks to outline an alternative.  
The chapter thus far has considered the German experience of floating and, on the whole, 
has discarded the explanatory models on offer at the systemic, domestic and cognitive 
levels of analysis as being of limited applicability. In Germany, state managers pursued a 
monetary strategy largely free from American instructions, were lobbied by exporters and 
their financiers to maintain fixed exchange rates even at the cost of capital controls, and 
floated the DM out of pragmatic considerations rather than ideological conviction. 
Germany, of course, is more than an exception to the rule. Given that its recourse to 
floating repeatedly unsettled and steadily undermined the fixed exchange rate system, and 
that the collapse of par value regime further added to the disruptive capital flows that 
confronted states in the second half of the 1970s, the German case casts considerable 
doubt on existing attempts to ‘bring the state back in’.  
The principal shortcoming, I suggest, is that these interpretations unduly generalize from 
the dominant actor in the system. The point that the states of other advanced capitalist 
economies also possessed considerable agency has already been established in previous 
chapters. With the important exception of the hegemonic imposition thesis, most of the 
IPE literature recognizes that other states contributed to the erosion of the embedded 
liberal order of Bretton Woods and has sought to build a more encompassing account.  
The crux of the issue—and the key insight to be examined in the remainder of this 
dissertation—is that they may have followed the US, or indeed led the way, for reasons 
that had little to do with the particular power-political considerations, societal pressures, 
or economic ideas that are presumed to have influenced US policy makers. The fall of 
Bretton Woods, understood as a political project, cannot be attributed to a single state; 
but neither can it be derived from a single social group or economic paradigm that 
supposedly guided the thoughts and actions of policy makers towards the same outcome. 
The key to building a more comprehensive narrative lies in recognizing this diversity, and 
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in examining how these specific ‘structured choices’ fed back into a general dynamic of 
state-led globalization. 
 
State Capacity, Capital Accumulation, and Structured Choices 
The previous section has scrutinized existing attempts to tell the story of the fall of 
Bretton Woods as a process led by a multiplicity of states. It has established three points: 
that the international environment was shaped not by hegemonic decline or restoration 
but by capitalist crisis; that Germany’s dominant export lobby preferred limited capital 
controls over revaluation and floating; and that ideational factors, if anything, were of a 
pragmatic rather than paradigmatic nature. Having shown the existing political-economic 
interpretations to be deficient, the question that remains is how else the German decision 
to float can be explained.  In lieu of a more compelling explanation and in light of its 
significance, the German case is susceptible to an economistic reading that undermines 
the attempt to ‘bring the state back in’. Does this mean we need to fall back on the initial 
position that sees the end of Bretton Woods as predetermined by the immanent dynamics 
of globalizing markets? After all, the notion that the shift to floating was a technical 
inevitability rather than a political choice retains superficial plausibility. On the surface, it 
does indeed appear that German state managers failed to control and ultimately 
surrendered to international capital movements. The remainder of this chapter outlines an 
alternative to this economistic interpretation. To ‘bring the state back in’, I argue, 
requires a more nuanced analysis of ‘class’ as a category that transcends the formal 
separation of capitalist society into political and economic sphere. What is needed, in 
short, is an integrated political economy approach that shifts the analysis from the 
dichotomy of ‘states’ versus ‘markets’ to the social relations of capitalist state and class 
power. 
The long-standing and remarkably successful opposition of the German export bloc to 
DM revaluation indicates the capacity of dominant class forces in particular to lobby the 
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state in order to advance their interests. Their ultimate aim, of course, is not the 
formulation of policy but the accumulation of profit, and it is in pursuit of the latter that 
the capitalist class indirectly structures the terrain of policy choices (cf. Gill and Law 
1989). In this respect, the concept of ‘class’ provides the missing link between the 
structural forces of financial globalization on the one hand and the agency of the state on 
the other. It allows us to illuminate the agents that stand behind the ostensibly amorphous 
push and pull of market forces that are often cited as the structural determinants of state 
behaviour. 
A closer look at the nexus of state agency and capital accumulation reveals that the 
destabilizing influx of dollars that confronted German policy makers on the eve of 
Bretton Woods did not emerge from impersonal market pressures but a concrete set of 
actors. And rather than anonymous, foreign speculators, it was the largest West German 
businesses and their Hausbanken (house banks) themselves that accounted for the bulk of 
capital inflows. In this way, the dominant export bloc played a central role in defining the 
particular problem German monetary authorities confronted and the particular type of 
solution they eventually adopted. 
In an important sense, the success of the German export model was a proximate cause for 
the monetary troubles that pushed governing elites into the experiment of floating. The 
growing export surplus meant that large sums of foreign earnings were accumulated and 
repatriated (Lankowski 1982a: 276-277). As German export corporations expanded their 
operations, the costs of hedging against currency risk had to be borne by their agencies 
abroad rather than foreign importers.
136
 Access to cheaper foreign credit also made it 
possible for West German corporations to circumvent the countercyclical liquidity 
management of the Bundesbank (Kreile 1977: 794). Lastly, monetary uncertainty and a 
weakening dollar in particular also induced German export corporations to resort to 
advance sales of dollars (and multinationals to hold their assets with German 
subsidiaries) in order to hedge against and benefit from possible parity changes of the 
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mark to the dollar.
137
 Taken together, these movements amounted to an estimated one 
half to two thirds of all dollar inflows that repeatedly swamped the German foreign-
exchange operators and that undercut their ability to contain inflation and pursue an 
effective monetary policy.
138
  
West German monetary authorities knew full well that West German business had 
contributed significantly to the enormous demand for DM and the ensuing monetary 
volatility and inflationary pressures. But they also realized that they lacked the regulatory 
capacity to separate the ‘speculative’ from the ‘regular’ capital transactions that German 
corporations conducted.
139
 Short of an overly dirigiste and politically contested 
imposition of capital controls, regulatory action would depend on the support of the 
“decisive economic circles”.140 The Bundesbank thus strove to obtain a voluntary 
commitment from the leading banks and export corporations to contain inflows of ‘hot 
money’. In order to limit the expansion of credit, central bank officials asked German 
banks to consult with about 80 to 100 corporations in order to convince them to limit and 
pay back foreign loans.
141
 They also met directly with representatives of the ten leading 
industrial corporations, offering support in hedging against currency risk if they in turn 
limited their borrowing abroad—perhaps a most telling example not only of the inability 
to monitor capital flows but also of the fact that a small number of corporations and their 
banks were understood to be the main culprits. 
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West Germany’s banks, however, including some of the public-sector Landesbanken, 
were themselves engaged in facilitating foreign loans in contravention of the official 
monetary policy of the Bundesbank and sometimes in legal violation of the Foreign 
Trade Act.
142
 The attempt to limit unwanted capital movements by way of a gentlemen’s 
agreement was thus doomed from the start. Starting in March 1972, state managers 
resorted to an increasingly rigid system of restrictions on capital inflows that the German 
export bloc had sought to prevent.
143
 Central bank governor Karl Klasen summed up the 
situation in a letter to a former Deutsche Bank colleague: “We would surely not have 
needed [the Bardepot or cash deposit system], had those in whose interest we’ve tried to 
prevent revaluations not made such a countercyclical measure necessary by borrowing 
too heavily abroad.”144 The system of controls proved to be particularly damaging to 
small and medium-sized companies. Worse still, it continued to be circumvented. 
Realizing that the same banks and corporations that resisted a revaluation of the DM were 
largely responsible for the continued influx of dollars, monetary officials viewed floating 
as an increasingly attractive means of limiting the sources of ‘imported inflation’ 
(Lankowski 1982: 276-277).
145
  
Adhering to capital controls in order to maintain an undervalued DM would have been in 
the collective interest of the German export bloc. But its sway over German monetary 
policy had weakened, not least because of the rise of an alliance of social forces that 
vocally supported revaluation. This loss of influence only increased the pressure on 
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individual capitalists to break ranks and hedge against a possible revaluation of the DM. 
And this, in turn, had the unintended effect of exacerbating the volatile conditions that 
ultimately drove West German policy makers into the experiment of a DM float.  
In an important sense, therefore, the ‘structural power’ of capital had structured the 
choices of state managers. And yet, two important qualifications need to be added. 
Contrary to the way in which this power has been traditionally conceived, the decision to 
float the DM, paving the way for the continual revaluation of the DM, ran counter, rather 
than corresponded, to the interests of the dominant export-oriented elements of West 
Germany’s capitalist class. And secondly, because the problems were attributable to 
concrete actors, the solution that German monetary authorities decided upon was also 
directed at them. From this perspective, policy makers, in opting for a float, did much 
more than simply surrender in the face of an unstoppable influx of ‘hot money’ from 
abroad. 
In principle, the German central bank could print DMs indefinitely in order to buy up the 
dollars presented to it. As vice-president of the Bundesbank Emminger explained: “We 
called a halt to that particular game on March 2 and began ‘floating’, not because of any 
lack of funds—a central bank can create its own money without limit in order to buy up 
dollars—but because the inflationary effect of these dollar inflows on our monetary 
system had become intolerable”.146 
This fact alone, generally established but sometimes overlooked, demonstrates that far 
from a technical inevitability, the floating of the DM was a fundamentally political 
decision that formed part of a much more comprehensive strategy of domestic 
‘stabilization’.  
For if inflation was the principal target, so were the banks and corporations held 
responsible for these inflows. The West German state used floating in order to reassert its 
autonomy from and authority over the dominant export bloc. As efforts to negotiate a 
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compromise had failed, German authorities moved towards floating as part of a 
comprehensive solution that served to fundamentally restructure their relations with the 
commercial banks and the export industry (Johnson 1998: 85). Floating freed the 
Bundesbank from the obligation of having to take in unwanted foreign currencies and 
limited the access of German banks and businesses to Euromarkets (Johnson 1998: 85). It 
also created the precondition for the introduction of monetary growth targets that was to 
play a central role in the Bundesbank’s fight against inflation (Scharpf 1991). Although 
the technical soundness of the new measures ought not to be exaggerated, and although in 
practice the monetary authorities still had to rely on the cooperation of the banks to 
achieve their objectives (Johnson 1998: 87), monetarism augmented the regulatory 
powers of central bankers and supported their efforts to ‘regain command over the 
liquidity of the banks’.147  
Most importantly, the shift towards floating put an end to the export strategy of an 
undervalued DM that the large corporations as well as the leading commercial banks had 
relied upon for so long (Parboni 1981: 137). This, too, contributed decisively to the fight 
against inflation—if inflation is understood as a form of distributive struggle between 
capital and labour (e.g. Crouch 1978; Goldthorpe 1978; Devine 2007). From the 1950s 
onwards, German economic strategists, led by the President of the Bank Deutscher 
Länder Wilhelm Vocke, had pursued a form of ‘monetary mercantilism’ (Holtfrerich 
1999; 2008) that substituted for protectionism in an age where Germany stood to benefit 
from worldwide liberalization. The central idea was that restrictive monetary and fiscal 
measures would keep price and wage levels below those of Germany’s major 
competitors. With exchange rates among national currencies being fixed under Bretton 
Woods, and with the convertibility of currencies and movement of capital still restricted, 
these lower levels translated into a comparative advantage as German exports could be 
more competitively priced (Holtfrerich 2008: 35; Cesaratto and Stirati 2010: 69; 
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Wadbrook 1972: 61-63).
148
 With the breakdown of Bretton Woods terminating the 
advantages of an undervalued currency, the focus on price stability became all the more 
important, and the commitment of both capital and labour needed to be renewed.  
The extraordinary profits that the export industry derived from an undervalued DM had 
sparked an unparalleled series of wildcat strikes in September 1969 that set a dangerous 
precedent for future rounds of bargaining (Johnson 1998: 72). In the eyes of smaller 
firms, the large export corporations were more concerned about preventing future 
disruptions in production than confronting the unions.
149
 An appreciating DM, it was 
hoped, might put pressure back on exporters and stiffen their opposition to the 
supposedly ‘inflationary’ wage demands.150 For, being price-makers rather than passive 
price-takers, they had hitherto been able to translate these added costs into higher prices. 
In the context of an upward floating DM, however, exporters could no longer transfer 
these costs onto consumers without pricing their products out of the market.  
Preventing a spiral of price increases and wage demands required a state and central bank 
sufficiently independent from the export lobby in order to admonish both social partners, 
and floating was meant to create this distance. While trade unions were expected to 
moderate their wage demands (cf. Franzese and Hall 2000: 182), corporations, too, were 
continuously reminded to exercise restraint in their pricing policy. Years later still, when 
the stabilization efforts had already proven successful, Schmidt was to point out to the 
executive committee of the BDI that the pricing policy of corporations would be decisive 
for union discipline in the upcoming round of bargaining. “[N]o one”, Schmidt was 
advised to tell this confidential circle, “can have an interest in encouraging wild wage 
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movements à la summer 1969”.151 Under a floating system, exporters needed to heed 
such advice because a restrictive monetary policy threatened to accelerate the upward 
trend of the DM and render German exports less competitive (cf. Franzese and Hall 2000: 
183).  
The state’s success in limiting inflationary pressures rested not only on its renewed 
capacity of ‘moral suasion’, but also on the mutual benefits that both ‘social partners’ 
could derive from reciprocal price and wage restraint. To corporations, a stronger DM 
meant cheaper imports of primary products (Lankowski 1982a: 36). Above all, however, 
maintaining lower levels of inflation promised to shore up their international 
competitiveness now that the comparative advantage of an undervalued currency had 
been lost.
152
 And to the trade unions, internally divided into export-oriented winners and 
domestically oriented losers (Markovits 1982: 5), a booming export industry offered 
‘export rents’ and associated wage and employment gains in a time of economic crisis 
(Webber 1983: 71).
153
 
In this respect, as the next chapter shows, the shift towards a floating regime and the 
attendant turn towards monetarism in the course of 1973 and 1974 enabled the German 
state to stabilize the relationship between capital and labour in a moment of global 
economic turbulence (Beyer, Gaspar, Gerberding, and Issing 2008: 12). To a remarkable 
degree, West German state elites succeeded in preserving the ‘embedded liberal’ 
compromise domestically. Paradoxically, however, their ability to do so would mean the 
dissolution and indeed termination of the compromise elsewhere in the capitalist world in 
the decade to follow. For above all, the German strategy of ‘opting out of the great 
inflation’, as a recent policy paper puts it (Beyer, Gaspar, Gerberding, and Issing 2008), 
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not only required committing domestic groups to price/wage restraint, but also extending 
stability politics internationally. And this outward projection, we will see, would be a 
much less consensual and much more conflictual process. 
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Chapter 5 
The Defeat of Alternatives:  
German ‘Grand Strategy’ and the Rise of Neoliberalism 
 
The two foregoing chapters have analyzed the peculiarly ‘confrontation-driven’ 
fragmentation of Bretton Woods into a fiat money and floating exchange rate system. 
With the OPEC oil shock in October 1973, the crisis widened from monetary turmoil to 
economic ‘stagflation’—an ugly word that aptly describes the grim reality for working 
people whose livelihoods, barely sheltered for a generation from the calamities of 
capitalism, were unsettled by a peculiar and perplexing combination of mass 
unemployment and rapidly rising costs of living. Amidst growing social tensions over 
how to respond to this challenge, intra-core cooperation also reached new lows “as every 
country sought individual solutions to the economic challenges of the time” (Basosi 
2011: 8).  
We have asked before whether behind the facade of public pronouncements, the Nixon 
shock was really that shocking to those affected. The severance of the dollar/gold nexus, 
we have noted, had been seen coming for a long time. The ten-percent surcharge on 
exports included in the Nixon measures was a different matter, however (Meltzer 2009: 
771; Zimmermann 2010: 137). Not only did it impact the immediate export interests. 
West German state managers, for one, worried about the broader constellation of interests 
inside and outside of Congress that called for such actions. Political observers had long 
been concerned about the possibility of protectionist forces gaining influence under the 
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Nixon presidency.
154
 Seen in this light, the imposition of the surcharge appeared as a 
mercantilist act capable of escalating into a trade war.
155
 
The strong export orientation of the German economy, reaching back to the late 
nineteenth century and reinforced after 1945, rendered its political administrators 
particularly sensitive to the risks of economic and political disruptions. Integration into 
the multilateral trading and financial system constructed under American leadership had 
allowed Germany to chart a remarkable path of economic reconstruction and political 
rehabilitation. But with the long boom turning into a slump and class confrontation on the 
rise, it seemed that a critical turning point had been reached. In a confidential 
memorandum written in 1974
156
, the German chancellor Helmut Schmidt warned that the 
breakdown of the Bretton Woods monetary regime might only be the prologue to a drama 
that could prompt a relapse into economic nationalism and culminate in the collapse of 
the democratic structures of industrial societies. What is remarkable is that in this paper, 
not at all designed for public consumption, Schmidt was adamant that “this is not an 
apocalyptic vision but a real possibility of the world economy”.157 
It is in the context of this danger and opportunity that West German strategists would 
subsequently develop their grand designs—designs that, we will see, were not at all 
driven by a power-political quest for Germany’s pre-war international status (Schulz 
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2010: 280). Compared to the problem of how to cope with the existential threat of 
economic and political closure, the question of how best to advance and sell the ‘re-entry’ 
of Germany into the ranks of the great powers was of secondary importance. Indeed, 
Schmidt’s now famous ‘Marbella’ paper of 1976/1977, frequently cited in support of 
such realist interpretations (cf. Schwammel 1997)
158, defined Germany’s post-war 
ascendancy not in strictly power-political but above all in economic terms, and more 
precisely, situated it within the context of the world economic crisis of the 1970s.
159
 What 
was astonishing, and enviable in the eyes of foreign governments, was that Germany had 
been much better able to deal with the economic turbulences relative to the growing 
indebtedness and financial troubles of its European neighbours.
160
 It was this power 
differential, the paper argued, that was politically problematic, though at the same time 
“unavoidable because rooted in the economic interests of the Federal Republic.”161 
 
Capitalist Crisis and German Strategic Planning 
The relative success of the German state to manage the crisis had found its material 
manifestation in a continuously growing balance-of-payments surplus and an impeccable 
international credit standing. Over the course of the 1960s and the 1970s in particular, the 
German central bank had accumulated what by then amounted to the largest currency 
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reserves in the world (Gray 2007: 307-308), and the German state enjoyed privileged 
access to international money markets.
162
 With this growing actual and potential wealth 
on one side, and increasing social dislocations and economic instabilities on the other, the 
question arose as to what social and international purpose this arsenal might be put. 
Numerous ideas of how to use these resources for a range of progressive to retrograde 
objectives circulated within the state bureaucracy,
163
, and some of them found their way 
into the innermost circles of policy making—attesting to the fact that by the mid-1970s, 
German crisis management was at a crossroads.  
Overall, two very different sets of policy responses were seriously considered, hotly 
debated, and eventually dismissed: the first was reflective of a territorially bounded 
economic rationality, while the second was bound up with a more globally oriented and 
social-democratic solidarity. Analyzing why German policy makers ultimately decided 
against both of these two strategic possibilities at this critical juncture sheds new light on 
the structural limits of German foreign economic policy and the causes, character, and 
consequences of the course of action that was ultimately chosen.  
 
A Farewell to Economic Nationalism 
For the better part of a century, petroleum has been the vital source of energy of the 
capitalist world economy, rendering the Middle Eastern region in particular a decisive 
theatre of confrontation of rival imperialisms and giving rise to countless power-political 
ploys, intrigues and covert operations, and military interventions. The thesis that the US 
government conspired with the major oil companies to quadruple the price of oil in 
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October 1973 (cf. Engdahl 2004; Petersen 2009) thus deserves to be taken seriously—
even if, to date, it finds no conclusive support in the relevant government archives 
(Garavini and Petrini 2011:  219-221). The recent, and near exhaustive, release of US 
documents paints a more nuanced picture. According to one reviewer, the American state 
encouraged the oil majors to accept higher prices for oil out of concern that OPEC might 
turn to more radical measures of nationalization, and partly because the US was less 
dependent upon foreign imports than its European and Japanese partners (McFarland 
2012: 2). There clearly was an understanding that the US would be harmed less than its 
competitors, but there is no evidence of a plot to sabotage the industrial capacities (cf. 
Gowan 1999: 21). What the records do indicate is just how deeply the mutual suspicions 
among the allies ran. Far from being confined to conspiracy theories and sensationalist 
journalism, they extended to the very people in charge of policy.
164
 French circles had 
warned as early as April 1973 that the US might exploit its lesser dependence on foreign 
oil by precipitating an energy crisis (Garavini and Petrini 2011: 220, fn. 24). And in the 
wake of the oil shock, German geopoliticians observed with concern that behind the 
facade of Western solidarity, “the French as well as the British are currently involved in 
more than dubious dealings with Arab countries for the long-term safeguarding of their 
oil supply”—information which Schmidt noted to be of “great significance for foreign 
and European policy”.165 
Fuelled by the 1973 oil shock, the threat of similar producer cartels, and mutual distrust, 
one group of German policy proposals suggested that the state draw on its foreign 
exchange reserves to build up raw material stocks. Rather than simply holding gold or 
dollars, why not have the Bundesbank diversify into other, economically more vital, 
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resources?
166
 Alternatively, the German government could either itself acquire and store 
raw materials, or at least provide financial support to industry so that they could entertain 
their own reserves.
167
 With energy sources being the most critical of these resources, 
these proposals form part of a more comprehensive plan that included deals with the 
Soviet Union (Lippert 2011), bilateral supply contracts with Middle Eastern countries, as 
well as the creation of a national energy corporation (through the state-sponsored fusion 
of VEBA and Gelsenberg in 1974/1975) that some political elites hoped might be able to 
balance against the big multinationals (van der Pijl 2006: 121).
168
 
In these contingency preparations, one can detect the contours of a more economically 
self-reliant national strategy. Indeed, one memorandum traced the idea of raw material 
stockpiles to the proposals of the bankers Hjalmar Schacht and Rudolf Münemann in the 
1950s (whom the memo referred to sardonically as ‘financial geniuses’). As former 
President of the Reichsbank and Reich Minister of Economics under Hitler, Schacht of 
course provides the much more significant link to the autarky designs of German 
fascism.
169
 Although one can surmise that in case of an acute emergency, the state might 
have taken a more central role and similar plans might have been acted upon, Germany’s 
post-war dependence on a cooperative and free-trading world economy rendered such a 
unilateral course of action undesirable as well as unlikely (Deubner 1984: 506, 511, 532). 
The available evidence suggests that any more determined plans of national energy 
independence were seen as unviable in face of the monopolistic control of the Anglo-
American multinational giants. A direct confrontation, it was feared, might lead to a cut-
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off from supplies. Thus the member of parliament Rudolf Kaffka thought it necessary to 
advise his fellow social democrat Schmidt:  
“Before going to Saudi Arabia, [economics minister] Friedrichs should visit the United States in 
order to achieve an agreement with the big corporations. It is to be made clear there at any price 
that our efforts in Saudi Arabia are only about a supplementary supply. We have so far not had any 
shortfalls in supplies as in Italy and France because we have pursued a politics of moderation vis-
à-vis the big corporations. Hence it is to be made clear to them that we do not have the intention of 
building up a competition here, because the corporations are still strong and could cause us severe 
damage. Moreover, I am of the opinion that Yamani [the Saudi Arabian oil minister] is colluding 
very closely with the corporations.”170  
An independent energy policy was therefore ruled out from the start. The plans to build a 
national energy giant were formally buried by the controversial acquisition of the oil 
company Gelsenberg by Deutsche BP in 1979.
171
 Pushed through against the veto of the 
German cartel office by means of veiled threats of an investment stop
172
 as well as the 
personal intervention of Prime Minister Callaghan (Matthiesen 1987: 63),
173
 the deal 
symbolizes that a central aspect of economic sovereignty had been surrendered after 1945 
and irretrievably lost by the 1970s. America’s post-war planners had sought to re-
establish Germany as Europe’s engine of growth while precluding a reprise of militarism 
and autarky (Painter 2012: 30). The reorientation of German industry from self-
sufficiency to overseas supplies of cheap energy sources controlled by Anglo-American 
firms and their states restored German economic power while firmly integrating it into 
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global markets (Stokes 1988: 629-630). Alongside Japan, West Germany had become the 
advanced industrial country most reliant on imports of energy sources and other raw 
materials.
174
 From this perspective, the trend towards the conclusion of bilateral 
agreements therefore posed a particular danger that those capitalist economies that were 
themselves raw material exporters—principally the US, Canada, Australia, and South 
Africa—did not face. Lacking a raw material economy integrated with its industry, the 
Foreign Trade Advisory Council concluded, Germany could not embrace bilateralism 
without amplifying tendencies that were comparatively more unfavourable to its own 
economy.
175
 Careful not to add to existing tendencies towards economic bloc formation, 
German policy makers eschewed politically administered, self-help measures in favour of 
world market solutions.
176
 
The dismissal of these more isolationist contingency plans marks a definitive break with 
anything even remotely resembling the geopolitical designs of German fascism. In the 
1930s and 1940s, Germany had aggressively projected its power in order to carve out an 
exclusive and rival sphere of accumulation. But since then, German state managers had 
learnt to rely upon free trade and liberal multilateralism to secure the conditions of 
economic growth. To be sure, some reservations had been voiced by Germany’s post-
fascist elites about the viability of America’s liberal-globalist designs and the room for 
manoeuvre this afforded to Germany (Neebe 2004: 506). And yet German government 
officials and corporate leaders in the 1950s and the 1960s both benefited from the 
dynamics of a rapidly expanding global economy and could count on the incentives this 
generated for its main trading partners to open up their markets voluntarily. Under these 
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conditions, the exercise of political authority to secure export markets was unnecessary, 
and given Germany’s recent past and conditional sovereignty, likely to be controversial 
and counterproductive. Instead, as we have seen in Chapter 3, German state operators 
sought consciously to insulate global free trade—which Germany would dominate by 
virtue of its economic weight—from the power-political realities of the Cold War and the 
concessions that a defeated and occupied Germany would have to make (cf. Rudolph 
2004: 34; Neebe 2004: 509). 
It is only with the economic downturn of the 1970s that this strategy of ‘depoliticizing’ 
global market relations encountered its limits. And it is, here, too, that the notion of 
Germany as a ‘trading state’ (Rosecrance 1986; Schwarz 1994; Neebe 2004) reveals its 
limitations as a guide to its foreign economic policy. Rosecrance, it is important to recall, 
explicitly distinguished his thesis from the economic interdependence literature by 
highlighting the agency of state managers over the structural consequences of 
globalization: “One should not place too much emphasis upon the existence of 
interdependence per se... Interdependence only constrains national policy if leaders 
accept and agree to work within its limits” (1986: 141). Retaining this sense of political 
choice turns out to be critical. For the idea that the political rulers of post-war Germany, 
deprived of a real military option, had fully internalized economic exchange and 
cooperation as the road to prosperity and security (cf. Neebe 2004: 33-34) misses out on 
the strategic dilemma that this avenue was now being fundamentally threatened. As a 
result, these applications of Rosecrance’s ‘trading state’ hypothesis underestimate the 
true nature of Germany’s crisis response. Rather than simply resisting mercantilist 
temptations, German state managers sought actively to arrest such tendencies elsewhere 
(Kreile 1977: 782). 
In what has to be understood as a paradigmatic shift in its foreign economic policy, 
Germany now used its power to keep open rather than, as in the interwar crisis, close off 
international markets. This new approach was certainly in keeping with Germany’s post-
war commitment to a liberal international economic order; but it also adapted it to 
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adverse international circumstances. German policy makers concluded that upholding 
economic liberal principles in a moment of generalized recession required the 
development of a strategy that fused economic and political interest and influence and 
projected it internationally. “[I]n this dangerous catharsis of the world economy”, 
Schmidt’s political-economic paper had noted, “the strategy and foreign policy of states 
ought not to be limited to their classical fields”.177 Though qualitatively different from 
Germany’s role in the 1930s, the project of defending an integrated world market against 
centrifugal pressures contained a power-political dimension that transverses Rosecrance’s 
(1986: 16) ‘two worlds of international relations’ and contradicts his image of an 
increasing differentiation of a cooperative ‘trading’ from a conflictive ‘territorial’ mode 
of foreign policy. Confronted with economic destabilization, social contestation, and 
political disagreement between Western Europe, Japan and the United States, West 
German strategists developed far-reaching plans for translating the growing economic 
weight of West Germany into political influence.  
The principal aim of this ‘grand strategy’ was to defeat the protectionist pressures and 
mercantilist tendencies that emanated from other countries. Its main target, the next 
sections explain, was the political spectrum left of Germany’s social democratic 
government and its radically transformative proposals of how to deal with the capitalist 
crisis. And the unforeseen consequence of this strategy, which was not neoliberally 
motivated itself, was to tip the scales in favour of the ideologically driven counter-
offensive under Thatcher and Reagan at the turn of the decade.  
 
Germany’s Nein to Global Keynesianism 
The deceleration of the great cycle of post-war expansion dissolved the uneasy marriage 
of market economy and social democracy and defined the political problem of the crisis 
decade that one might have to give way to the other (Devine 2007; Streeck 2011). The 
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new political economy launched at the end of the 1970s shifted the balance vigorously 
towards the rule of private property and the privilege of purchasing power. But in the 
beginning of the decade, the governments of the centre countries faced the task of 
mediating between the interests of capital and a range of radical forces and reform 
proposals that sought to broaden the scope of social welfare and extend democratic 
control to the economic sphere (van der Pijl 2007: 109; Panitch and Gindin 2012: 143; 
Gill and Solty 2013: 57). 
German policy makers concluded that the centrifugal forces threatening the liberal world 
economy were associated above all with the interventionist economic programmes of the 
left;
178
 and they were far from alone in this assessment. Wage-push inflation had been 
identified by the OECD as a central problem affecting the industrial world in the 1960s 
already, and the broader issue of “too much democracy” (Gill and Solty 2013) was raised 
by dominant forces from across the advanced capitalist bloc since at least the middle of 
the 1970s. The elite deliberations of the Trilateral Commission, most significantly, 
warned that the demands of “strong industrial and labour lobbies” and other “new self-
assertive groups” rendered advanced capitalist societies “internally more turbulent and 
externally less responsive to each others’ needs” (Duchêne, Mushakoji, and Owen 1974: 
17; Crozier, Huntington, and Watanuki 1975: 116, 165). There was even an 
understanding that a new politics of austerity, imposing what one dissenter described as 
“a little more unemployment, a little less education, a little more deliberate discipline, 
and a little less freedom of expression” could offer a significant corrective if not a 
panacea (Crozier, Huntington, and Watanuki 1975: 194). And yet the global balance in 
the mid-1970s rendered a direct confrontation with the forces of social and economic 
democracy an enormous gamble that few among the ruling elites were willing to risk. 
The organized strength and political representation of the working classes and their 
domestic and international allies was reflected in the considerations of policy makers of 
what could and could not be done. In this situation of stalemate, we shall see, Germany’s 
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crisis managers came to play a decisive role in charting the way forward. On the one 
hand, the external vulnerability of Germany’s export-driven economy raised the costs of 
indecision. But more important still was that, unique among the major capitalist powers, a 
programme of monetary orthodoxy and reciprocal wage and price restraint might give a 
competitive edge to its dominant export sector and thus prove stabilizing rather than 
punitive. 
Anxious not to support left-wing forces and their alternative policies of investment 
steering, nationalization, and worker control, German foreign economic strategists in the 
mid- to late 1970s discarded plans to deploy Germany’s central bank reserves in a more 
outward-looking and solidaristic fashion. The initial proposal had been to turn a portion 
of the Bundesbank’s foreign exchange reserves into loans to Eastern bloc, European 
deficit and developing countries. This would provide a massive stimulus to global 
demand and pull the advanced industrialized countries out of recession.
179
 It was also a 
response to the explosive and uncertain international context of widespread redistributive 
demands from within and without the capitalist core. The calls for a New International 
Economic Order (NIEO), backed up by the OPEC oil embargo, had sown considerable 
disharmony within the Western camp and posed the threat of similar producer cartels 
(Cox 1983: 171; Krasner 1985: 92; Overbeek 2008: 183). In this respect, the proposal 
connected to social democratic plans for what the Austrian chancellor Bruno Kreisky had 
called a ‘Marshall Plan’ for the Third World, and held out the possibility of a far-reaching 
and progressive reorganization of the world economic order. Mobilizing the accumulated 
wealth in this way might have amounted to a genuinely hegemonic strategy—enabling 
both donor and recipient countries to (re)build the Keynesian class compromise by way 
of material concessions to subaltern forces. 
These ambitious plans to globalize the embedded liberal order with the German state at 
the helm, initially developed by the chancellor’s office and foreign ministry, were 
                                                 
179
 E.g. Irmler, “Vermerk: Gespräch Bundeskanzler Schmidt in Bonn am 16. Oktober 1975”, 20 October 
1975, BBk HA N2 K 319, strictly confidential, p. 2. 
151 
 
successfully opposed by the central bank and finance and economics ministries. The 
counterargument that swayed its proponents was that this scheme was bound to endanger 
Germany’s stabilization strategy. Most advanced capitalist states had tried to ‘paper over’ 
the societal fault lines that opened up in the wake of the economic recession with the help 
of the printing press. “For governments facing conflicting demands from workers and 
capital in a world of declining growth rates”, Wolfgang Streeck (2011: 12) recalls, “an 
accommodating monetary policy was a convenient ersatz method for avoiding zero-sum 
social conflict”. The by-product of this coping strategy, which postponed rather than 
resolved the clash of distributive claims, was escalating inflation as both capitalists and 
workers sought to raise their relative income shares (e.g. Devine 2007: 37). The particular 
solution that German policy makers had found in the wake of the DM float was unique in 
that it had tied monetary restraint to committing both social partners to mutually 
beneficial wage and price restraint. 
Germany’s monetarist turn in 1973/1974 had been able to contain the distributive 
struggle between capital and labour (Beyer, Gaspar, Gerberding, and Issing 2008: 12; 
Franzese and Hall 2000: 182-3) because relative price stability provided differential 
opportunities to its dominant export bloc. The ability to maintain lower inflation levels 
than its international trading rivals translated into competitive price advantages that offset 
an appreciating DM and guaranteed profitability as well as wage and employment gains 
amidst global economic turbulence (Webber 1983: 71).
180
 To a significant degree, 
Germany’s stabilization policy was able to preserve the productivist consensus between 
capital and labour inside Germany. Crucially, however, it depended for its continued 
success on constructing, extending, and defending a zone of stability against worldwide 
inflationary pressures that the more progressive proposals were feared to exacerbate.
181
 A 
conversion of the Bundesbank’s foreign exchange reserves into loans would lead to an 
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expansion of international liquidity. Although it was recognized that this would stimulate 
global demand and benefit German exports in particular, the inflationary dangers were 
considered to outweigh these advantages.
182
 German policy makers were concerned that 
the additional funds created through the extension of German credit to deficit countries 
would ultimately flow back into the German economy and raise price levels.
183
 
Overall, then, the particular anti-inflationary path that German policy makers had chosen, 
combined with the fact that Germany had fared better than its peers, created a powerful 
disincentive to sponsoring a global Keynesian project. Success, after all, was defined not 
in absolute but in relative terms: the remarkable ability, as Schmidt’s Marbella Paper had 
pointed out, to maintain lower inflation and unemployment rates, to sustain higher per 
capita income rates and even to afford larger military expenditures (relative to its GDP) 
than the rest of the capitalist world.
184
 From this differential point of view, German self-
interest trumped collective and progressive solutions. Without Germany’s support, the 
next chapter shows, the locomotive approach of coordinating a global economic stimulus 
was doomed from the start. Any concerted efforts to re-stabilize embedded liberalism on 
an international scale were subordinated to the narrow goal of German state elites of 
maintaining internal order.   
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Germany’s Grand Economic Strategy 
Our review of German crisis planning and the two poles of possible actions it evolved 
around has found that state managers, in the event, chose to pursue neither the minimal 
strategy of national self-reliance nor the maximal global response of reflation and 
redistribution.
185
 In the eyes of decision makers, both were held to set dangerous 
precedents: other countries might follow the German lead and gear their raw material 
procurement or lending policies to the purpose of export promotion
186
; and financial 
assistance to some countries would prompt further demands from others, leading to an 
enormous expansion of credit.
187
 In short, therefore, the limits to national independence 
were set by the fear of an escalating protectionism, while the limits to international 
solidarity were set by the fear of global inflation.  
Instead, a third and, no less momentous, strategy was given precedence. What remained 
of the progressive scheme was the basic idea that it was in the monetary and financial 
sphere and through multilateral institutions that Germany could best project its political 
power and economic interests. Echoing the Marbella paper’s famously cited assessment 
of the historical limits of West German foreign policy after 1945, one report noted that 
“[o]ur particular political circumstances and our interests continue to bar us from 
demonstrating our capacity, e.g. by delivering weapons, sending troops as international 
peace forces, accepting border guarantees, etc.”. “In point of fact,” the memo concluded, 
“the real instrument with which we can bring our strength, namely our economic and 
financial strength, to bear in our foreign policy lies in the sphere of financial assistance... 
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Only in terms of foreign exchange reserves are we stronger than most others, without 
foreign policy considerations proscribing the use of this means a priori.”188 
The social purpose to which Germany’s financial and monetary strength was henceforth 
to be put was radically different. In the midst of the 1970s crisis, German state managers 
followed these prescriptions in order to defy protectionism and imported inflation—first, 
vis-à-vis their European neighbours, and second, as Chapter 6 explains, vis-à-vis the 
United States. In order to maintain a free-trading world economy and to secure its 
competitive position within it, Germany set out to counter the interventionist and 
expansionary remedies of the European left. In a sense, the social-liberal government of 
Schmidt tried to extend internationally what had started in the early 1970s as an internal 
attempt to discipline militant labour, the insubordinate youth organization and the left 
wing of the SPD. To project power across politically bounded space rather than from the 
top down was of course a far more problematic undertaking. In various ways, and with 
varying degrees of success, German state managers mobilized their financial influence in 
order to shift the social balance of power in favour of those forces willing to follow 
German stabilization, and away from radical forces that were held to endanger access to 
this vital zone economically or politically (Lankowski 1982a: 344).
189
 Yet German policy 
makers, far from seeking to impose neoliberal change, sought merely to preserve the 
export model that had stabilized the social-democratic bargain at home.  
 
European Integration and the Defeat of Alternatives 
As the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates came apart, German state managers 
revived and actively promoted the monetary integration of Europe: first, in the so-called 
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‘currency snake’190 and, later, in the European Monetary System (EMS). The goal was 
not to move towards the long-term vision of a politically unified Europe, and certainly 
not to build up an exclusive, rival economic bloc, but to preserve this critical outlet area 
for its exports in the face of protectionist and inflationary pressures (Lankowski 1982a: 
344). Many scholars have argued that the long-term outcome of monetary integration was 
to endow the European project with a distinctive neoliberal dimension (e.g. Cafruny and 
Ryner 2003). The immediate concern of German state officials during the initially 
‘defensive’ phase of monetary coordination, however, was to maintain at least a healthy 
core of hard-currency countries with the capacity to follow the stringent macroeconomic 
course dictated by Bonn and Frankfurt.
191
 The successful operation of such a hard core 
would help insulate this currency bloc from global inflationary pressures as well as the 
more far-reaching demands for balance-of-payments support and financial aid of weaker-
currency EC countries.
192
 The argument that the monetary construction of the ‘currency 
snake’ proved a failure because so many European countries dropped out (cf. 
Kaltenthaler 1998: 45) neglects the fact that it was accepted by its German architects that 
those countries unwilling or unable to align their macroeconomic policies would have to 
remain outside until their politico-economic priorities had converged with those of 
Germany and its like-minded, smaller European partners.
193
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Maintaining their currencies within the snake was not without difficulties for the smaller 
European countries either, however.
194
 They, too, confronted the basic dilemma of 
whether to accommodate wage demands at the cost of profitability and price stability, or 
whether to exercise monetary and fiscal restraint at the expense of economic growth and 
full employment (Scharpf 1984: 259; Straumann 2010: 187-88). The decisive difference, 
however, was that unlike their larger EC partners, they were unable to choose their 
exchange-rate regime according to their domestic preferences and institutional 
arrangements. External factors such as EC membership, trade integration, and financial 
openness, new research shows, played a far more determining role than the institutionalist 
literature has previously recognized (Straumann 2010: 15-17). Uncertainty about the 
future shape of the world monetary order and the inability to exert much influence over 
its direction (exemplified in their exclusion from top-level monetary discussions of the 
major capitalist countries), coupled with the fear that their smaller economies would be 
particularly vulnerable to exchange-rate fluctuations, convinced them of the necessity of 
a fixed exchange-rate regime (Straumann 2010: 206, 210). As long as they pegged their 
currencies to the DM, countries could no longer freely choose between unemployment 
and inflation—in the case of the Benelux countries and Denmark, Germany chose for 
them when it shifted to monetarism in 1973/1974 (Straumann 2010: 223, 234, 239).
195
 
Rather than the relative strength of the labour movement determining the policy choice 
between inflation or unemployment, the ‘imported monetarism’ of the 1970s reshaped the 
domestic balance of forces to the detriment of the working class (Scharpf 2000: 33). 
German policy makers were keenly aware that the need to maintain currencies within set 
margins vis-à-vis an appreciating DM had a disciplinary effect on the credit, fiscal, and 
spending policy of their currency partners—forcing them onto parallel planes to the 
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German stability programme.
196
 The political-economic paper concluded that “[i]t is 
politically necessary not to have the snake appear as a currency block led by Bonn. In 
reality, however, we need to maintain our efforts to coordinate the general economic 
policies of the snake countries”.197 
This, then, is what German policy makers subsequently attempted to achieve on a larger 
scale. The insightful study of Carl Lankowski (1982b: 98) argues that the project of a 
European Monetary System that replaced the smaller currency snake from the late 1970s 
onwards should be seen as “a cover for demanding that the other EC governments adopt 
policies that would adjust their economic performance to that of West Germany; the West 
German government was actually asking for the initiation of austerity policies throughout 
Europe… Under these circumstances, the West German government was willing to 
support the external value of the currencies of its EC partners with its enormous foreign 
exchange and gold reserves.”198 Compared to Germany’s smaller economic satellites, 
however, the extension of monetary rigor to the larger EC countries depended to a far 
greater extent on internal shifts in political objectives and social power relations. Through 
financial (dis)incentives and institutional mechanisms such as the EMS and IMF, German 
policy makers certainly sought to extract and lock in similar commitments, but it was far 
from able to simply impose its preferred course of action. If and when German state 
managers came close to outlining the terms of the solution, it was due to an important 
convergence of American and German economic thinking in the second half of the 1970s.  
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The Limits of ‘Benign Neglect’ and the German-American Entente199 
The events surrounding the breakdown of the fixed-exchange rate regime between 1971 
and 1973 have been discussed earlier and need no recounting here. We have seen that it 
was partly due to an ill-conceived attempt to undermine a joint European float that the 
United States held on to a policy of benign neglect which ultimately frustrated efforts to 
negotiate a new monetary system.
200
 What is important at this point is that by early 1976, 
the limits of America’s laissez faire approach in the monetary sphere had become 
apparent in the face of economic turbulences that seemed capable of spinning out of 
control.   
The decision of the Bank of Italy to withdraw from foreign exchange markets at the start 
of the year had seen the lira/dollar exchange rate drop by 20% in three months.
201
 The 
British authorities, too, were believed to have forced a drop in the sterling exchange rate 
in early March. One memorandum observed that “[b]oth Italy and Britain, plagued by 
domestic inflation, are unlikely to achieve in coming months the domestic economic 
stability required to stabilize their exchange rates”.202 Japan, too, was suspected of 
practicing a ‘dirty float’ (Biven 2002: 108). And France, which had left the snake on 
March 15, was feared to join in the race of competitive devaluation. Evidently, the 
freedom to float had undermined whatever rules of the game had remained intact. “The 
principal danger in this situation involves the types of adjustment efforts that could be 
taken”, one memo warned.203 Rather than address the root causes of the problem, it 
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appeared as if countries would resort to beggar-thy-neighbour policies or protectionist 
measures. 
US policy makers realized that even if floating exchange rates might accurately reflect 
‘market fundamentals’, as its academic proponents had promised, by themselves, market 
forces would do little to encourage responsible economic policy (cf. Helleiner 1994: 15). 
On the contrary, as Schmidt had told William Simon (now Treasury Secretary) and Fed 
Chairman Arthur Burns, floating exchange rates might lessen the disciplinary pressure on 
countries to control domestic inflation.
204
 Worse still, in the absence of serious efforts to 
address underlying imbalances, gyrating exchange rates were bound to have profoundly 
destabilizing effects domestically and systemically. 
Clearly, the pressures of floating exchange rates and capital flows did not lead to 
economic discipline but to disintegration. Under these circumstances, the US came to 
accept what German economic strategists had argued early on: that to prevent the system 
from collapse, benign neglect was insufficient. Rather than relying on the mechanism of 
free markets, the exercise of political influence was necessary to encourage system-
conforming adjustments. American policy makers concluded that “[t]he United States, for 
the first time in years now has the capacity, particularly in cooperation with the West 
Germans, to do something about this.”205 The success of German state elites in managing 
the capitalist crisis by way of monetary and fiscal prudence, and their efforts to impose 
macroeconomic restraint via the currency snake, rendered Germany the most important 
ally in preventing a downward spiral of import controls and competitive devaluation 
(Ludlow 2012: 9).  
While most scholarly attention has focussed on the Nixon and Volcker shocks as the two 
decisive moments in the constitution of neoliberal globalization, it was during the much 
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neglected Ford administration that some of the most important programmatic and 
institutional changes took place. Under Ford, a new market-centred paradigm emerged 
that prioritized the fight against inflation through reducing the levels of taxation, public 
expenditure and state intervention (Moran 2011: 59, 61). At the international level, US 
policy makers began to develop a program of economic stabilization that specified 
conditions for financial assistance and to create an institutional mechanism for enforcing 
adjustments. The most lasting effect of this endeavour was to reinvigorate the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) that seemed moribund when the par value system of 
Bretton Woods collapsed. And the litmus test was to jointly use the new instrument to 
induce structural adjustment in Britain and (to a lesser extent) Italy (James 1996: 285). 
“US/FRG cooperation”, it was noted, “will be essential in any solution”.206 
That the roots of the problem and their possible solution contained a class dimension is 
brought out very clearly in the remarks by William Simon that “[d]eep divisions on the 
distribution of income have in Italy and the United Kingdom, for example, been obscured 
by efforts to manufacture solutions through policies which would assure rapid economic 
expansion”.207 The efforts to defer class struggle by Keynesian means, characteristic of 
the whole of the post-war era, and applicable to the United States itself, had issued in 
runaway inflation. Having lived beyond their means, the welfare states and working 
classes of Western capitalism now had to accept major concessions. 
And yet, no matter how astute this diagnosis, neither Germany nor the US were able or 
willing to prescribe a comprehensive solution to these ills. The German government 
struggled to keep at bay the radical elements of the European labour movement whose 
alternative economic programmes threatened the German export model and the domestic 
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social compact sustained by it. While hoping to contain these interventionist and 
expansionary policies, German policy makers were in no position to reverse the balance 
of forces. For such a class realignment to occur across the regions of advanced 
capitalism, and for a neoliberal programme to prevail, American policy makers needed 
first to apply internally the economic and political lessons they had drawn from the 
example of the European deficit countries (Panitch and Gindin 2012: 159). In short, 
whereas the German state still acted to defend its embedded liberal compact at home, the 
US had yet to prove to the world that a full-frontal attack on the organized power of 
labour was feasible. It was only after Carter’s final bid for a coordinated Keynesian 
reflation, and indeed under pressure from Germany, that this could be tried (Ludlow 
2012: 24). And when it did, the neoliberal experiment departed from the fiscal 
conservatism of balanced budgets that had guided the Ford administration. Its success 
came instead to rest on the enormous tax cuts and deficit spending of the Reagan 
administration (Moran 2011: 60; Prasad 2012: 352). 
At the midpoint of the decade, then, the capitalist world was still far away from this 
neoliberal resolution. The looming election of the Italian communists into power; the 
danger that British Labour might opt for the statist Alternative Economic Strategy, and 
the menacing alliance of the French socialists and communists—all these were scenarios 
that German (or US) state managers sought to influence but that they could not hope 
entirely to control. German policies and prescriptions, we shall see, narrowed the range of 
possible pathways out of the crisis; and in this respect Germany came to matter as much 
as for what it did than for what it didn’t do. The course chosen, however, was in the last 
instance determined by the social forces on the ground, the ideas that guided them, and 
the access to the power of the state they enjoyed. Though unlikely in retrospect, each of 
these three cases had the potential of recasting the European and international order on 
terms detrimental to liberal capitalism and more favourable to organized labour and 
social welfare. Their failure, in turn, laid the groundwork for and undermined the 
capabilities of progressive forces to resist the neoliberal counterrevolution of the late 
1970s and 1980s. And yet the fact that these alternatives never came to pass cannot itself 
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be attributed solely to the growing strength of neoliberalism as a state, class or 
ideological project.  
Italy was most vulnerable to external pressures; but it was geo-strategic concerns that 
guided the financial interventions of the US and Germany. And the Italian Communist 
Party, which was the main target of foreign interference but also the key auxiliary of an 
internationally negotiated politics of austerità, was guided by a peculiarly anti-capitalist 
rather than neoliberal critique of Keynesianism. British state managers were confronted 
with a full-fledged neoliberal project and constituency; but the Labour government 
departed from the post-war consensus selectively and sought Germany’s help in avoiding 
IMF austerity. The lack of political alternatives, rather than the force of the neoliberal 
argument or the pressure of the market, best explains its actions. The French state 
bureaucracy under Raymond Barre, lastly, sought to emulate the German model in the 
absence of domestic support for neoliberalism. Its trial run of rigueur, made possible by 
its exceptional degree of insulation from wider social interests, cannot be generalized into 
an ideas-based account of neoliberal change. 
 
Italy: Communist Austerity 
Italy was one of the countries hit hardest by the capitalist crisis and attendant social and 
political upheavals. Suffering from some of the highest unemployment and inflation rates 
in the OECD, a deteriorating current account, and mounting public debt, Italy became 
heavily dependent on international borrowing and a major test case for conditional 
financial assistance (Sassoon 1996: 588; Bernardini 2011: 330).  
The reliance on foreign credit alone meant that the path towards austerity capitalism 
would be influenced by external forces. But the situation was further complicated by the 
peculiar geopolitical position that Italy occupied by virtue of having the strongest 
communist movement in the cold war West. In the mid-1970s, the Italian Communist 
Party (PCI) seemed destined to take over the reins of power from the Christian 
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Democratic Party (DC) and its centrist coalition just as the crisis came to a head. The 
post-war objective of the United States and its NATO partners of keeping the 
Communists out of government and Italy firmly within the Alliance played an important 
role in shaping the economic ‘stabilization efforts’ of Italy’s creditors.208  
The German SPD leadership sought to prevent the emergence of a credible anti-capitalist 
and eurocommunist alternative to social democracy (Bernardini 2011: 321), and urged its 
socialist brother party and the ruling Christian-Democrats not to enter into the ‘historic 
compromise’ proposed by the PCI. The first German attempts in the summer of 1974 to 
offer bilateral financial support on the condition that the PCI would be kept out of 
government and that a restrictive credit policy would be maintained backfired (Bernardini 
2011: 325-27).
209
 Prime Minister Mariano Rumor was replaced by Aldo Moro shortly 
afterwards, and an inclusion of the PCI seemed unavoidable as the economic situation 
continued to deteriorate. In 1975, the Italian state tried to promote economic growth by 
expansionary fiscal and monetary measures but proved unable to stem the downward 
pressure on the lira and inflationary repercussions this entailed. Efforts to stabilize the lira 
depleted the resources of the Bank of Italy, which withdrew from foreign exchange 
markets between January and March 1976 (McNamara 1998: 133). The confluence of 
economic and political considerations is aptly described in a German memo quoted by 
Bernardini: “Italy is sick; an effective long-term therapy should be provided. Its Western 
partners have an important role to play. But coping with the present crisis is also a matter 
of urgency: for the first time in 30 years a fundamental change in the balance of forces 
has become possible.”210 
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The Americans likewise considered the situation in Italy to hold “significance for the 
future of the European Community, the Western economic system, and the Western 
political and security system”.211 German and American policy makers agreed that 
“unless they put their own house in order external financial assistance would be money 
down the drain”.212 In the first half of 1976, they settled on the IMF as the appropriate 
mechanism to supply these funds and enforce adjustments, and in secret meetings with 
Britain and France developed the economic and political conditions to be attached to a 
new financial package. Most central, once again, was “a cast iron pledge that the PCI 
would not be invited to join the Italian government” (Basosi 2011: 335; Ludlow 2012: 
19). The economic dimension of the programme followed the monetary and fiscal 
policies that had proven to be successful in Germany. But the backlash against German 
interference in 1974 had made clear that the impression of direct influence had to be 
avoided. Accordingly, the US side concluded that “[t]he best institutional arrangement 
for producing conditional financing is the IMF. It…cloaks the conditionality in a 
multinational mantle that dilutes opposition within a borrowing country to conditions 
imposed by the US or other outsiders”.213  
The newly formed minority government of the DC accepted the recommendations of the 
Quad, and welcomed the economic conditionality as a way of keeping the communists at 
bay. The international negotiations enabled the DC to short-circuit parliamentary debate 
and to compel the PCI to support a programme over which it ultimately had little 
influence (Bernardini 2011: 336). In this way, financial support not only presupposed but 
reinforced the exclusion of the PCI from government.  
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The peculiar puzzle of the Italian case is why a communist party would be willing to 
endorse austerity. Part of the explanation certainly has to do with the realities of social 
and international power. After three decades of political exclusion, the PCI confronted an 
extensive patronage system that was hostile to a communist takeover (Sassoon 1996: 
580-581, 592) and an apparatus of army, police and intelligence service that was 
suspected to be complicit in the wave of political violence that terrorized Italy since the 
late 1960s. The CIA-sponsored coup against the democratically elected socialist 
government of Salvador Allende in 1973 signalled that a victory at the polls might 
prompt a violent reaction (Brogi 2011: 322). The incessant warnings by the major 
capitalist powers against communist participation did nothing to assuage these fears. As a 
result, the PCI felt extremely vulnerable even as it gained electoral strength. It dismissed 
a united front of Communists and Socialists (Sassoon 1996: 572) against the ruling 
Christian Democrats as too antagonizing, and propounded a ‘historic compromise’ 
between all three major political traditions (Sassoon 1996: 576). The efforts of the PCI to 
prove itself a responsible partner in such a proposed alliance also extended to the 
economic crisis (Goodman 1992: 159; Bernardini 2011: 336). Without formally joining 
the government, the PCI supported a ‘national solidarity’ government in its efforts to 
control inflation by cutting public expenditures, raising taxes on consumption, and 
lowering wage costs (Sassoon 1996: 587-591).  
But ideology, rather than simply political pragmatism, also played an important role in 
shaping the PCI’s support for the monetary and fiscal restriction. However one might 
explain and evaluate the reasons for the PCI to support these measures, they certainly had 
nothing to do with the intellectual merits or even the practical successes of neoliberalism. 
While its support for these deflationary measures certainly indicates the widespread 
disillusionment with Keynesianism (Sassoon 1996: 592), the Communist Party and trade 
union leadership that empowered the DC to adopt austerità can hardly be suspected of 
having shared or contributed to an emerging neoliberal consensus. If one is to take ideas 
seriously rather than dismiss them as mere tropes that reflect material conditions, one 
would have to inquire how and why the PCI came to see itself as having to support this 
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programme. Some have suggested that the PCI was guided by the image of a catastrophic 
implosion of capitalist society that it saw itself as tasked to prevent in the immediate 
interests of the working class and in the service of the longer-term transformation of the 
productive apparatus of society. Others have identified a solidaristic conception of 
sharing the burden across the classes (Simonazzi and Vianello 1998: 109; Sassoon 1996: 
592-593, 589), or a certain aesthetic appeal of austerità as a departure from the mass 
consumer culture of embedded liberalism (Brogi 2011: 323).  Whatever the case, the shift 
that occurred in the late 1970s and early 1980s had little to do with any neoliberal 
rethinking. Italy would continue to chart an economic course between expansion and 
deflation. The truly significant event was the demolition of the prospects for a distinctly 
communist and potentially European-wide alternative to capitalism embodied by the PCI. 
For reasons very different from those that compelled the smaller EEC countries to remain 
within the orbit of German monetary policy, Italy was pulled in a similar direction (James 
1996: 286). Economic ‘stabilization’, to repeat, was imposed by the United States and 
Germany in exchange for financial aid and the pledge that the communists be kept out of 
power. This intrusion into the social balance of power was reflected in the strategic 
thinking of the PCI and its historical compromise, which included the need to prove its 
crisis-management credentials between 1976 and 1979. After the PCI had served its 
purpose of imposing austerity on the working class, the DC terminated the national 
solidarity government (Abse 2005: 255-256). The entry into the ERM, unacceptable for 
the PCI, was used by the DC as an excuse to do so (Simonazzi and Vianello 1998: 109). 
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Britain and the IMF
214
 
The main lesson emerging from Germany’s early blunders in Italy—that political and 
economic conditions ought to be imposed through a multilateral framework rather than 
unilaterally, and that they required a government willing to tie itself to the mast—was 
subsequently applied to Britain in 1976.
215
 The conditionality negotiations with the 
IMF—in practice dictated by the US and Germany, the largest contributors under the 
General Agreement to Borrow that supplied emergency funds via the IMF—should thus 
not be seen as the top-down displacement of Keynesianism (as argued, for instance, by 
Harmon 1997: 228-229). For a number of reasons, and in a number of ways, the British 
Labour had already departed from Keynesian economic orthodoxy between 1974 and 
1976 (Ludlam 1992)—without, however, having fully arrived at a neoliberal solution. 
The IMF negotiations are but one important step on a winding road, and their 
significance emerges only when we travel the full distance. Let us then first consider the 
(limited) extent to which it was neoliberal ideas or (more plausibly) globalizing financial 
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markets that shaped British macro-economic policy-making (for a synthetic account see 
Helleiner 1994: 125-130). 
The post-war Keynesian policy consensus, Hickson (2005: 222) notes, had been 
destabilized by the 1970s crisis and come under attack from forces on both left and right. 
Elected in 1974 on the campaign promise of bringing about “a fundamental and 
irreversible shift in the balance of power and wealth in favour of working people and 
their families” (quoted in Rogers 2013: 9), the Labour leadership had to contend with an 
ambitious ‘Alternative Economic Strategy’ put forth by the Labour left that emphasized 
the extension of public ownership, investment control, and industrial and workplace 
democracy (Hickson 2005: 50-53). In an era of multinational corporations and global 
financial flows, an effective, socialist macroeconomic strategy was held to require that 
Britain resort to interventionist and protectionist measures in order to restore a degree of 
national policy autonomy (Hickson 2005: 171).  
On the side of capital, the Labour government confronted not simply the opposition of 
conservatives, but a forcefully articulated critique of Keynesian demand management, an 
ostensibly superior interpretation of the causes of stagflation and a handy set of tools and 
techniques for addressing them (Jones 2012: 216). In contrast to Germany, where 
ordoliberal ideas played very little role in the economic policy discourse (Johnson 1998: 
56), in Britain we find think tanks, the business press, and the City of London that 
espoused the free-market fundamentalism of Hayek and Friedman (Hall 1993; Cockett 
1995; Dixon 2000; Hickson 2005: 186; Jones 2012). Yet what made neoliberalism so 
perniciously effective was not its orthodoxy but its flexibility: “Politicians of different 
stripes and priorities could pick and choose from a menu of neoliberal offerings” (Jones 
2012: 18) without, it should be added, having to buy the whole package. And pick and 
choose they most certainly did, as they navigated a difficult ideological terrain between 
calls for extending public authority over capital on the one hand and calls for freeing the 
market from an encroaching state on the other (Clarke 1987: 396-397). The Labour 
government (and Chancellor of the Exchequer Healey in particular) borrowed ‘crowding 
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out’ arguments which held that public and private sector competed for scarce resources 
(Hickson 2005: 213-215).
216
 It also combined supply-side reforms with an interventionist 
industrial policy (Hickson 2005: 216). Lastly, and largely for cosmetic reasons, they also 
announced monetary targets (Hickson 2005: 225).  
But to speak of an ideological conversion of the Labour government would be to go too 
far. There is no doubt that the Labour government had already incorporated significant 
aspects of neoliberalism into its economic strategy prior to the 1976 IMF crisis (Hickson 
2005: 223-4; 226; Jones 2012: 246-7; Ludlam 1992: 716-24; 727). Yet the very fact that 
policy makers chose some elements from neoliberalism but not others speaks to a 
significant degree of pragmatism that, as Rogers (2013: 4) has pointed out, does not sit 
well with the notion of a fundamental contestation of economic paradigms.
217
 British 
macroeconomic policy had evolved from the Keynesian belief that the state could deficit-
finance its way out of a recession, to the realization, epitomized in Callaghan’s speech to 
the Labour Party Congress on 28 September 1976, that in a moment of economic crisis 
the fight against inflation would have to take precedence over full employment (Hickson 
2005: 104).
218
 This adaptation of Keynesianism to a highly inflationary environment 
would involve a range of new policy measures such as ‘cash limits’ or monetary targets; 
but it still sought to achieve full employment in the long run (Hickson 2005: 212), and 
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was a far cry from the objective of Thatcher and Reagan to induce an economic recession 
for the sake of fighting inflation.
219
 Peter Jay, Callaghan’s son-in-law and advisor as well 
as a monetarist advocate, who had written the passage of Callaghan’s speech (Hickson 
2005: 104), rightly cautions that “the attempt to tell the story as though it were a kind of 
story of ideological evolution, revolution or counter-revolution or something, seems to 
me to do great violence to the actual detail and particularity of history which is much 
more messy than that” (quoted in Jones 2012: 247).  
The significance of what was happening in Britain, then, is not to be found in the realm 
of ideas, but, as we shall see shortly, in the arena of class struggle. For now, suffice it say 
that in the final analysis, Simon Clarke (1987: 404) notes, “[s]uch policies were dictated 
by circumstances, rather than out of conviction, imposed by the practical failure of 
Keynesian measures, not adopted as the result of the theoretical or political advance of 
monetarism”. The question, then, is what structural pressures policy makers confronted. 
A useful entry point to exploring these constraints is through the lens of the so-called 
‘unholy trinity’ (Cohen 1977; 2000) or ‘policy trilemma’ (Obstfeld and Taylor 2004), 
which identifies an irreconcilable tension and unavoidable trade-off between the policy 
objectives of fixed exchange rates, capital mobility, and monetary autonomy. State 
managers, in short, can only pursue two of these three goals at any one time without 
running into contradictions. The Bretton Woods monetary system had sanctioned 
restrictions on cross-border movements of capital in order to guarantee exchange-rate 
stability and to enable states to pursue macroeconomic expansion (Obstfeld and Taylor 
2004: 37-38; Schmelzer 2010: 48). But with deepening financial integration and the rise 
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realization of the policies that other countries ought to take. This also holds true for the US, which found it 
easier to dispense the wisdom of fiscal and monetary discipline in its dealings with other deficit countries 
rather than to apply these lessons at home (Panitch and Gindin 2012: 160). 
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of offshore euro-currency markets in the 1960s, capital controls were rendered 
increasingly ineffective, and governments with balance-of-payments deficits found that 
their attempts to boost economic growth prompted capital flight and currency speculation 
and crises (Cohen 2000: 251). To continue to defend the par value of their currencies, 
states would either have to abandon countercyclical measures or reinforce their 
administrative controls (Helleiner 1994: 10, 104). 
To British policy makers, the decision to float the pound in June 1972 seemed to offer a 
way out of this quandary. Ceasing to defend the parity of the pound promised to preserve 
macroeconomic autonomy and expansionary leeway without having to sacrifice financial 
or commercial openness.
220
 The naïve assumption was that a downward floating pound 
would automatically correct balance-of-payments imbalances. By improving the 
competitiveness of British exports and reducing the trade deficit, it was reasoned, a lower 
exchange rate would lessen the need to borrow abroad or attract short-term and 
potentially volatile sterling inflows. In this way, the two major and—from a centrist 
position—undesirable alternatives of either using import and exchange controls or of 
adopting deflationary measures might be avoided (Wass 2008: 57, 96, 146). “[I]f trade 
restrictions are to be ruled out…the choice presented by the forecast in its starkest terms 
seems to us to be the familiar one of devaluation and deflation” (Treasury paper, dated 21 
November 1975, quoted in Wass 2008: 147). 
Opposition to the latter course of action came from the Overseas Finance section of the 
Treasury and the Bank of England which proved particularly responsive to the concerns 
of overseas sterling holders and the financial interests of the City regarding the future 
value and international role of the pound (Wass 2008: 333). Short of an agreement on an 
active depreciation policy, it was decided to rely on downward market pressure and, at 
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most, to limit the countervailing interventions of the Bank of England. The resulting 
impasse, and the stubbornly stable exchange rate of the pound between 1974 and 1976, 
foreclosed the possibility of charting a middle course via depreciation.  
The choice faced by the Labour government was thus limited to the protectionist 
measures advocated by the Left as a means of achieving a balance-of-payments surplus, 
and the painful but more manageable course of deflation. From the executive point of 
view, deflationary measures such as incomes policy and most importantly, public 
expenditure reductions, appeared to be the only viable option. It is this route then that the 
Labour leadership embarked on with the budget cuts of 15 April 1975 and that 
culminated in the IMF agreement in December 1976 (Hickson 2005: 57).  
The Treasury got what it wanted when the Bank of England—whether by accident or by 
design—set off a fall in the exchange rate by selling sterling on 4 March 1976 and 
reducing interest rates on the following day. Wass insists this was ‘fortuitous’ (2008: 179; 
see also Hickson 2005: 74-78), but the German records suggest that the key actors 
thought otherwise. At a meeting of the G4 financial deputies on 23 March 1976, Derek 
Mitchell, head of the overseas section of the Treasury, argued that a devaluation of the 
pound had been necessary because of strong pressures of British industry and the Trades 
Union Congress. The alternative, he explained, would have been to adopt import 
controls.
221
 The US Undersecretary of the Treasury for Monetary Affairs Edwin Yeo 
protested that “the way in which the pound had been floated downward constituted a 
clear violation of the new IMF regulations that expressly prohibit an ‘aggressive 
floating’”. Speaking to Pöhl in private, Yeo left little doubt that Britain was pursuing a 
policy of competitive devaluation.
222
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Either way, the Treasury welcomed the decline and therefore did not see the need to take 
any active measures to support sterling until its near collapse of June 1976 (Wass 2008: 
346), when Britain was forced to rely on the foreign exchange support of the Bank for 
International Settlements (Helleiner 1994: 125). In this situation of an international loss 
of confidence, the middling course no longer worked. British policy makers realized even 
before accepting the stricter IMF conditionality that in order to restore market 
confidence, deflationary measures would be necessary.
223
 
And yet the external pressures should not be overemphasized either. First of all, as 
Rogers (2013; 2009a; 2009b) has shown on the basis of a thorough review of the 
government records, the crisis management of the British state was forward-looking 
rather than merely reactive. The British state did not simply act under external pressure 
but also shaped the ‘impression of crisis’ in order to legitimate its policy choices against 
the opposition and alternative proposals of the Labour left. The devaluation of the pound 
in particular was used by the Chancellor to convince his cabinet colleagues, the party 
base, and the trade unions of the necessity of harsh anti-inflationary measures such as the 
mandatory incomes policy and budget cuts (Rogers 2013: 14-15; 2009a: 635, 643-644; 
2009b: 979-982; Wass 2008: 347).  
Secondly, as in the German case of floating discussed in Chapter 3, it is important here 
again to disaggregate the disciplinary power of capital, and to look at the particular 
agents that made up ‘the markets’ and outlined the contours of the crisis for the British 
state. One of the problems certainly was that investors in the gilt-edged market in the 
summer of 1976 were “refusing to purchase public sector debt as it feared rising inflation 
and expected interest rates to rise in early-September” (Hickson 2005: 99). This 
undoubtedly entered the official mind as a problem of market confidence that needed to 
be addressed (Burk and Cairncross 1992: 52). These two problems continued until 
October, when the decision of Healey to tighten monetary policy (raising the minimum 
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lending rate by 2% to 15% and increasing the ratio of sterling deposits by 2%) stabilized 
the pound and boosted demand for gilts. From then on, the sterling rate was the only 
remaining concern (Hickson 2005: 116). And here it is important to point out that the 
sterling troubles of 1975 and 1976 were primarily caused by a group of four major 
official holders of sterling (among them Kuwait, Nigeria, and Saudi Arabia) (Wass 2008: 
133; 135; 336). As Wass (2008: 337) notes, “during the course of 1976 […] the main 
selling came from official holders, and non-official holders scarcely moved their holdings 
even during periods of intense uncertainty”. 
This new insight is extraordinarily important. Given that the predominant pressures on 
the pound at the height of the IMF crisis came from a small number of central banks 
rather than a myriad of unruly market operators, a negotiated resolution seems to have 
been feasible. British policy makers certainly believed as much, as they repeatedly asked 
for German financial assistance in offering a guarantee for sterling deposits.
224
 The 
considerable concessions they were willing to make in exchange for Germany’s support 
in setting up a ‘safety net’ for sterling balances goes to show that they still hoped to avoid 
the IMF rather than simply use it as a pretext for a course of austerity they had planned to 
pursue all along. In this crucial respect, neoliberal ideas had not yet triumphed. The 
problem, however, was that the German side refused to play along. Asked by a desperate 
Callaghan to at least offer an assurance that a safety net would be forthcoming after an 
IMF agreement had been reached, Schmidt replied that the US would not accept this.
225
 
But while Schmidt blamed the Americans, German policy makers were keen to avoid an 
agreement on sterling that might sideline the prospective role of the IMF as an 
enforcement mechanism (Hickson 2005: 124; for more on this see Burk and Cairncross 
1992: 66-67). 
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The successful conclusion of a sterling ‘safety net’ may have solved a large part of the 
confidence problem besetting British society and saved it from the strictures of IMF 
adjustment. This counterfactual is important to consider for two reasons. It implies that 
the structural power of financial markets did not fully force the hands of powerless policy 
makers. Austerity was not unavoidable but was adopted because the political alternatives 
had been rejected. And second, Germany precluded a less painful settlement and, once 
again swung the balance against the embedded liberal compromise of one of its 
neighbours. 
From the German point of view, the IMF negotiations with Britain would set a crucial 
international precedent.
226
 This certainly meant that the conditions ought not to be too 
generous, as this would prompt further calls from other countries for the provision of 
international liquidity.
227
 At the same time, the conditions ought not to be too harsh 
either. The German government thus took a more conciliatory stance than the hardliners 
in the US administration, whom Schmidt suspected to be influenced by the Tory 
opposition.
228
 The conditions, to be sure, ought to be stringent enough to enable the 
government to take unpopular measures, but not as draconian as to lead to its 
overthrow.
229
 As Callaghan was held to be the single most suitable candidate for pushing 
through the agenda against the majority of the Labour Party and the trade unions, West 
Germany cautioned the US not to push too hard.
230
 A breakdown of the negotiations 
might give support to the radical proposals of Tony Benn, who had had taken the position 
“that Britain should introduce overall import quotas for manufactures, enforce exchange 
                                                 
226
 Pöhl to Schmidt, 8 October 1976, personal-confidential, AdsD DHS 5. 
227
 Pöhl, “Betr.: Besprechung mit de la Rosière, Yeo, Mitchel und Pöhl am 19./20.7.1976 in Paris; hier: 
Eventuelle Kredithilfe für Italien”, 23 July 1976, AdsD DHS 5, p. 2. 
228
 See Jones (2012: 379, fn. 77), who quotes a telephone conversation between Schmidt and Callaghan on 
2 November 1976. 
229
 Pöhl to Schmidt, 8 October 1976, personal-confidential, AdsD DHS 5, pp. 1-2. 
230
 Pöhl to Schmidt, 18 October 1976, strictly confidential, personal-confidential, AdsD DHS 5, pp. 2, 4; 
Hiss, “Aufzeichnung des Telefongesprächs des Bundeskanzlers mit Präsident Ford am 24. November 1976, 
15.30 Uhr”, 24 November 1976, AdsD DHS 5; Pöhl, “Ergebnisvermerk: Betr.: Besprechung des Herrn 
Bundeskanzlers mit Under-Secretary Yeo, Weitere Teilnehmer: BM Dr. Apel, StS Pöhl”, 3 November 
1976, AdsD DHS 5. 
176 
 
controls, introduce a Capital Investments Committee to channel investment to priority 
areas, and take reserve powers to introduce planning agreements through the National 
Enterprise Board” (Rogers 2009b: 986). As economics minister Schlecht concluded 
afterwards, “had the conditions been excessive, Great Britain would have instituted direct 
import controls”.231 
The IMF negotiations, rather than a one-sided imposition, were a delicate balancing act 
for all parties involved. The British Labour government, having failed to bypass the IMF, 
needed it for two reasons. IMF approval would consecrate its existing economic strategy 
of fiscal cuts and monetary restraint which, short of an alternative ‘safety net’, was 
considered crucial in order to restore confidence in sterling (Clift and Tomlinson 2008: 
546, 566; Burk and Cairncross 1992: 225). Furthermore, IMF negotiations and conditions 
would also help overcome internal opposition to this course of action and help to 
externalize the blame for politically unpopular measures.
232
 From the perspective of the 
Fund and the two major creditors that sought to reconstruct it, “[t]he 1976 crisis was to be 
a major test case to see if the IMF still had a function that it could perform” (Hickson 
2005: 62). The differences between the US and German side in the negotiations was more 
of a matter of emphasis rather than a question of fundamentally different strategies. As 
Yeo put it, “The Germans will be SOBs, but with us one step ahead”.233 
Both sides clearly believed that the stakes were vital. The German concerns were 
mirrored by the assessment, relayed by the former Secretary of State William Rogers 
that: 
 “It was a choice between Britain remaining in the liberal financial system of the West as opposed 
to a radical change of course, because we were concerned about Tony Benn precipitating a policy 
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decision by Britain to turn its back on the IMF. I think if that had happened the whole system 
would have come apart. God knows what Italy might have done; then France might have taken a 
radical change in the same direction. It would not only have had consequences for the economic 
recovery, it would have had great political consequences. So we tended to see it in cosmic terms” 
(quoted in Burk and Cairncross 1992: 77). 
The difference in negotiating positions therefore did not change the close cooperation and 
cordial relations between US and German authorities. When William Simon left the 
Treasury with the outgoing Ford government, Emminger commended him for his “role in 
the biggest international financing operation ever…particularly as regards the economic 
policy conditions that have been attached to the IMF standby arrangement.”234 At the 
same time, it was not a neoliberal consensus that brought the two states together. The key 
point is that state operators did not need to share Simon’s free market fundamentalism to 
be concerned about a potential breakaway of Britain and the chain reaction this might 
lead to. For the US-German entente, the IMF crisis this was not about the imposition of a 
particular neoliberal solution than about preventing the protectionist scenario of currency 
devaluation and import controls.  
Inside Britain, too, the IMF crisis meant not the triumph of neoliberal ideology but the 
decisive break between the Labour leadership, its party base and the working class 
movement. It was this schism that the Letter of Intent symbolized and ‘locked in’; that 
erupted into the Winter of Discontent in 1978-1979; and that the rapprochement within 
the Party after the election of Thatcher would do little to mend. In terms of the balance of 
class power, indeed, Britain’s “people’s party…set the scene for Mrs Thatcher’s ‘there is 
no alternative’ slogan and policies” (Gill 1990: 100). 
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France and the EMS 
The year 1976, lastly, also marked a turning point of sorts for France, although the more 
fundamental rupture with embedded liberalism would only come with the abandonment 
of the Keynesian experiment of 1981-1983 (Sassoon 1996: 561). As the economist 
Raymond Barre replaced prime minister Jacques Chirac, the failed attempt at a 
Keynesian reflation gave way to a precocious form of neoliberalism that most 
comparative-historical analyses have neglected (Prasad 2006: 258-259). The ambitious 
Barre Plan sought to curb inflation through monetary, fiscal and wage restraint and to 
boost international competitiveness by extricating the state from industry and the market 
economy (Moss 2005: 131; Prasad 2006: 271, 272). The Barre programme, which 
included the removal of state subsidies, price and capital controls, proved so unpopular 
that it had to be abandoned (McNamara 1998: 156; Prasad 2006: 239, 272-3). But even as 
it was briefly interrupted by the election of Mitterrand and an equally unsuccessful 
attempt at Keynesianism in one country, the lasting impact of the Barre policies was to 
significantly roll back the traditionally interventionist role of the state (Duménil and Lévy 
2002: 37; Fourcade-Gourinchas and Babb 2002: 565). In France, then, “the full-fledged 
neoliberal transition resulted from deliberate choices by technocrats” (Fourcade-
Gourinchas and Babb 2002: 542). 
The situation in France was peculiar because it was free from either external diktat or an 
internal lobby (Fourcade-Gourinchas and Babb 2002: 567; Sassoon 1996: 547). To be 
sure, a politics of austerité was possible in principle because the French labour movement 
was weak and fragmented and its political representation split into a socialist and 
communist camp (McNamara 1998: 132). At the same time as there was little opposition, 
however, there was also practically no business support for the punitive Barre Plan either 
(Fourcade-Gourinchas and Babb 2002: 567).  
The reason why France adopted neoliberalism independent of and indeed against the 
prevailing societal preferences had to with the particular state-society relationship that 
had developed in post-war France. The French state, in pursuit of a project of national 
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modernization centred on rapid growth and the industrial transformation of its 
agricultural and artisanal economy (Prasad 2006: 236-237), had built up the 
organizational capacities and professional expertise necessary to impose neoliberalism 
from above (Prasad 2006: 276, 23; Fourcade-Gourinchas and Babb 2002: 562). As 
premier and economics and finance minister, Barre was placed at the helm of a 
centralized state bureaucracy insulated from particular societal interests, capable of 
imposing solutions by administrative fiat, and thus at liberty to “search for the most 
successful practices among neighboring states” (Prasad 2006: 276, 23). And given that in 
1976, the United Kingdom and the United States hardly embodied an attractive, let alone 
economically conservative, alternative, the French “imitation of other countries” (Prasad 
2006: 239) focussed on the German state in particular (Moss 2005: 131). Germany, after 
all, called for close attention not only because of the relative success of its crisis 
management at keeping down inflation and unemployment, but also because of the 
competitive challenge posed by its industry (McNamara 1998: 155). French policy 
makers focussed on Germany as the font of these ‘best practices’ in terms of monetary 
targeting and restriction, an anti-inflationary zeal, and a strong currency (McNamara 
1998: 156). But Germany also provided an important benchmark of economic 
performance that they sought to match. 
The French turn to freer markets under the Giscard/Barre government is thus best 
explained as a form of ‘policy emulation’ that McNamara has identified as one of the 
sources of an emerging neoliberal policy consensus in Europe (McNamara 1998: 130). 
But while McNamara sees emulation as a key element in a European-wide process of 
social learning inspired by the success of German crisis management (1998: 152; see also 
Mourlon-Druol 2012), the particular context that facilitated the adaptation of the German 
model in France was historically unique. The smaller European countries, we have seen, 
had little choice but to follow German monetarism (this is to some extent acknowledged 
by McNamara 1998: 157). And in Italy, German (and American) politico-economic 
influence was more intrusive, informed by geopolitical considerations, and entwined with 
a protracted class struggle (Abse 2005: 249). McNamara rightly rejects hegemonic 
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stability theory as a framework for understanding Germany’s role in the region. But by 
reducing German influence to “ideological persuasion and transnational learning” 
(McNamara 1998: 70), McNamara excludes this crucial power-political dimension of 
German monetary policy from her analysis.   
Even in France, in fact, the role of Germany went further than providing ideological 
support. Concerned about an electoral victory of the French left
235
, which had adopted a 
far-reaching Common Programme based on nationalization, welfare expansion and 
worker control in 1972 (Moss 2005:131), the German government had sought actively to 
support the Barre government (1976-1981) and its technocratic state bureaucracy in its 
efforts to imitate the German success (McNamara 1998: 69-71; Prasad 2006: 239).
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The move towards further European monetary integration needs to be seen in this 
interventionist context. There is no doubt that the European Monetary System (EMS) 
promised some important economic advantages. An extension of the more limited 
European currency ‘snake’ to France and Britain (and the de facto association of Austria 
and Switzerland) would “create a ‘zone of relative monetary stability’ for almost half of 
German exports”.237 This would meet the interests of small and medium-sized exporters 
that found it difficult to hedge against exchange-rate fluctuations.
238
 It would also 
promote the use of other reserve, transaction and investment currencies
239
 and spread the 
upward pressure on the DM.
240
 Above all, however, the construction of the EMS—
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Schmidt’s “grand strategy for integrating Europe” (Schmidt, quoted in Marsh 1992: 
233)—sought to prevent political and economic threats to the common market. 
The problem was that the disciplinary effects of France’s snake membership had worn 
off.
241
 Because France had been forced out twice before, the French unions calculated 
that the government would do so again if push came to shove.
242
 Entering a new 
monetary agreement was thus an important way for the Barre government to signal its 
determination to stay on an anti-inflationary course rather than resort to franc 
depreciation, and thus to get the unions to moderate their wage demands (Gruber 2000: 
177-178).  
The initiative to replace the snake with the EMS was an attempt by Germany to provide a 
revamped monetary mechanism that those forces interested in boosting economic 
competitiveness by driving down wage costs, cutting back government spending and 
containing inflation (Bundesbank Archives 1978a:8, 71; Putnam and Henning 1989: 
53)
243—exemplified by the Giscard/Barre government after 1976 and its middle-class 
supporters (managers of small firms)—could draw upon (cf. Parboni 1981:131; Gruber 
2000:177).
244
 One of the advantages was that the EMS would repoliticize changes in 
exchange rates that in a floating system would otherwise be left to foreign exchange 
markets and central bank interventions to determine. Making devaluation (and 
revaluation) a political decision that needed to be debated, announced and defended, it 
was hoped, would render governments more susceptible to social and political 
pressures—of lobby groups and media outlets (such as in Germany, where conservative 
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newspapers like the Frankfurter Allgemeine and Welt had repeatedly sided with the 
Bundesbank’s anti-inflationary course (Marsh 1992: 175)) as well as the influence of the 
German state and central bank.
245
  
This calculation would pay off in the case of Mitterrand and the socialist government, 
who “believed themselves to be constrained by France’s membership in the European 
Monetary System” (Sassoon 1996: 549). The last national Keynesian experiment 
foundered because of the heavy downward pressures on the franc in the high interest-rate 
environment created by Volcker’s monetarist turn. When the Mitterrand government 
proposed an alternative ‘European social space’ in 1981, “Bonn and Frankfurt, suspecting 
this to be a ploy to win German acquiescence to inflationary French policies, rejected the 
plan” (Henning 1994: 197, fn. 39; 1998: 560). The Bundesbank signalled that it was 
prepared to give bilateral assistance as an incentive for France to remain in the EMS. At 
the same time, it categorically refused to soften the terms of the EMS.
246
 In line with its 
position throughout the 1970s, the Bundesbank vice president held that “[w]hat we 
cannot accept is...access to the creation of central bank money from the outside”.247 
Moreover, the Bundesbank not only rejected a softening of the EMS framework. On the 
contrary, as Kloten noted, “the approach [Stoßrichtung] ought to be another. There ought 
to be an offensive tactic. We want a certain hardening” (quoted in Bundesbank Archiv, 
transcript of central bank council meeting, 4 March 1982, p. 11). Germany used the IMF 
surveillance process agreed upon at the G7 Versailles Summit in June 1982 in order to 
increase the pressure on France, which was the subject of severe criticism in the annual 
report of the IMF Managing Director Jacques de Larosière.
248
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Unwilling to drop out of the system, the government was forced to negotiate three 
devaluations in exchange for austerity measures that sealed the fate of left ‘Keynesianism 
in one country’ (cf. Moss 2005: 135; Moss 2000: 262).249 Even Italy, which the record 
proves felt compelled to join the EMS for fear of being left out (Gruber 2000: 183),
250
 
refrained from devaluing its currency once it had joined the EMS (Jones 2005: 244).  
The EMS, then, may be considered the institutional centrepiece of German efforts to tilt 
the European balance of social forces away from the left-wing and its radical programme. 
By ruling out a more progressive resolution of the crisis, German state managers had 
provided one part of the neoliberal ‘solution’: imposing, both domestically and in the 
areas under their financial jurisdiction, a programme of fiscal austerity and monetary 
stringency that prioritized the containment of inflation at the expense of the social-
democratic goal of maintaining full employment. In a moment of deadlock between 
capital and labour, the West German state had effectively chosen sides. The consequence 
was to closely circumscribe the room for manoeuvre of progressive forces and, as the 
next chapter demonstrates, to prepare the ground for the neoliberal backlash. 
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Chapter 6 
Disciplining the Hegemon:  
German Monetary Power and the Volcker Shock 
 
The previous chapter has discussed the development and deployment of a German 
‘stability’ strategy that aimed at guarding a liberal world order against the protectionist 
and inflationary threats associated with left-wing responses to the crisis. In many cases, 
this involved collusion among the main capitalist countries, and close cooperation 
especially between the United States and Germany. But eventually the efforts to insulate 
the German economy, its economic dependencies and major export markets from a 
‘world of inflation’ (Katzenstein 1982: 208) also brought the government into conflict 
with what was understood to be the major source of inflation—the United States with its 
laissez-faire attitude towards a declining dollar and a persistent balance-of-payments 
deficit.  
German policy makers had long understood that the international monetary order was 
anything but a politically neutral mechanism, and had set out to find ways in which the 
underlying asymmetry could be addressed. One such proposal, dating back to 1963, 
suggested that a portion of the foreign exchange reserves be removed from the sphere of 
central banks and instead be treated as a genuine government loan from surplus to deficit 
country.
251
 Doing so would make the political nature of having to finance the deficits of 
the US an explicit object of foreign policy and thus subject to negotiations and 
conditions. In a similar way, both the inward-looking and transformative schemes of the 
1970s discussed above contained provisions for reallocating currency reserves away from 
the United States.
252
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The fact that these were discussed at the highest levels of policy making is in itself 
significant.
253
 In order to commit the US to the monetary and fiscal discipline necessary 
for a more responsible ‘global management’, the chancellor insisted that the 
Bundesbank’s reserves were not to be considered “tied up in the US as a matter of 
course”.254 A bureaucratic tug-of-war between the government and central bank ensued, 
in which the latter refused any politically motivated reallocation or removal of its 
reserves outside its narrowly defined purview (though the Bundesbank conceded that, in 
practice and unofficially, political considerations had been taken into account in the past 
and might again be given precedence on a case-by-case basis).
255
 The problem was that a 
liquidation of US Treasury bills, though technically feasible, would likely be 
compensated and thus fail to impose effective constraints on the US budget and the 
expansion of US domestic demand.
256
 Like it or not, the critics of these schemes pointed 
out, a disinvestment was simply not an effective means of exerting pressure on the US. 
And in terms of economically sound investment, both sides understood that there simply 
was no alternative to the dollar as the most liquid and fungible asset.  
In this crucial sense, the grasp of pax Americana had indeed become too tight. Despite 
the disintegration of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates and the widely 
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denounced erratic and irresponsible behaviour of the United States throughout the 1970s, 
German authorities did not seek to contest the centrality of American monetary power but 
to harness it towards domestic and international ‘stabilization’ (Kreile 2006: 161). Under 
America’s post-war leadership, the parameters of core capitalist contestation had shifted 
profoundly and irrevocably. Crucially, however, divergent interests and conflicting 
objectives did not disappear entirely but took on a new form. The refusal of the 
Bundesbank did not emerge from a shared central bank consensus, nor did it rule out 
future confrontations. The actions of the US, although they do not add up to a ‘Faustian 
bid’ for global dominance, were too ambivalent for its allies to ‘renew their invitation’ 
unconditionally. Even from within the imperial embrace of the United States, West 
German policy makers chose to confront the United States and continued, after the 
election of Jimmy Carter, “the fight against an administration that had come into power 
believing that inflation could cure the world”.257 And while the Bundesbank rejected a 
disinvestment from the dollar as counterproductive, it was ready to be enlisted in these 
efforts in other ways. 
 
Derailing the Global Growth Locomotive 
The presidency of Jimmy Carter epitomizes the confusion, hesitation and errors of state 
managers as they stumbled from welfare to austerity capitalism. Carter and his Keynesian 
advisors had been elected into the White House on the promise of putting together an 
internationally coordinated economic programme that included pro-union labour 
legislation, job creation schemes and a fiscal stimulus (Biven 2002). Within two years, 
the progressive rhetoric of restoring the New Deal coalition with organized labour had 
vanished (Cowie 2010). When Carter left office at the end of 1980, he had instead 
initiated a process of deregulation that extended to the financial sector, adopted social 
spending cuts, and above all sanctioned what turned out to be an excessive policy of 
                                                 
257
 Statement by Schmidt, Central Bank Council Meeting Minutes, 30 November 1978, BBk HA N2 269, p. 
69. 
187 
 
monetary tightening known as the Volcker shock (Prasad 2006: 62; Basosi 2010: 14; 
Jones 2012: 216-217, 248-249). 
Those sympathetic to Carter have argued that the Keynesian prescriptions and labour 
aspirations faltered under adverse economic forces—inflation chief amongst them—that 
largely escaped the administration’s control (Biven 2002). A more sceptical assessment 
holds that Carter was quick to distance himself from the electoral manifesto, and that a 
re-launch of the New Deal reflected the nightmares of Wall Street rather than a serious 
project of the administration. Similar to the situation in Britain, the American owners of 
capital and their pundits, organized in an academic and policy network that reached back 
to the early post-war period and across the Atlantic (Blyth 2002; Jones 2012), had seized 
on the economic troubles and loss of direction that marked the end of the long boom. 
Capitalist class organizers had successfully mobilized against and defeated the labour law 
reform bill of 1978. And ideological entrepreneurs had inserted neoliberal ideas into the 
policy debate that state managers came to rely upon in their search for a viable exit 
strategy.  
Compared to the transformative schemes put forth by parts of the European Left, there 
was little that was particularly progressive about the programme of the incoming Carter 
administration. Amidst an increasingly unfavourable social balance of power and 
international economic environment, Carter would attempt one last push to overcome the 
domestic limitations of Keynesian demand management through a process of 
international policy coordination that was aimed, at most, at the conservation of the status 
quo. In this it was supported, most notably, by British policy makers, which had not yet 
fully embraced the logic of neoliberal austerity. For even though the Labour government 
had recognized the failure of an expansionary policy in their own country, they were keen 
to pass on the burden of an economic stimulus to the countries that enjoyed large trade 
surpluses and thus seemed in a more favourable position to pull the world economy out 
of the deepest recession since the end of the war (James 1996: 290; Baker 1999: 84). The 
main reason why the attempts to coordinate an international macroeconomic expansion at 
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the G7 summits in London and Bonn in 1977 and 1978 failed, and why a neoliberal 
alternative was subsequently tried, has to do with the intransigence of Germany—the 
single most important economy where monetarism, far from an ideology of class war, 
had proven effective in ameliorating distributive conflict and in sustaining the post-war 
consensus (Johnson 1998). 
The Carter administration came to power with a two-pronged international programme. 
On the one hand, it sought to realize the proposals developed by the influential Trilateral 
Commission—a private policy planning group established in 1973—to create a 
multilateral system of governance in which the US, Western Europe and Japan would 
jointly manage economic and political interdependence (Gill 1990). And on the other 
hand, the Carter administration sought to solicit international support for a Keynesian 
programme of demand management that had been developed by the OECD in 1975 and 
that was supported by many Trilateral Commission members (Biven 2002).  
The newly established G7 summits became the focal point of the efforts of the Carter 
administration both to multilateralize the making of foreign economic policy, and to 
organize an internationally coordinated macroeconomic expansion. As Carter drew on a 
core group of Trilateral Commissioners that staffed his administration for both economic 
advice and the institutionalization of the summits, the two endeavours have at times been 
mistaken for the one and the same. Yet the fact that high-level economic diplomacy 
became regularized at the same time as a final bid for a global Keynesian solution was 
made should not lead one to conflate the agenda and the architecture of the summits.  
The vision of trilateral management of interdependence developed by the Commission 
and embodied in the G7 both preceded and outlasted the short-lived experiment of an 
international stimulus package that the incoming Carter administration pursued at the 
1977 and 1978 summit meetings in London and Bonn. Once this so-called ‘locomotive 
strategy’, which would have required Germany and Japan to act as engines of global 
growth, had fallen by the wayside, the same institutional infrastructure came to play a 
central role in endorsing, reinforcing, implementing, and monitoring neoliberal policies 
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(Baker 2006: 25). The G7 framework of governance—while itself an embodiment of 
relations of power and exclusion—did not prejudice the policies that were tried and 
ultimately adopted.  
The significance of the G7 lies less in prescribing a particular solution to the political and 
economic challenges of the 1970s than in ensuring that the pathways out of the crisis of 
the 1970s would not be mutually exclusive and destructive. The ‘G7 nexus’ (Gill 1999) is 
both an organizational expression of the dynamics of integration that had conjoined the 
advanced capitalist economies after 1945, and a concerted effort, led by the US, to 
navigate the tensions between growing economic interdependence and an incomplete 
internationalization of political authority.
258
 In a moment of economic crisis and 
uncertainty, the purpose of the G7 was to cultivate mutual trust, a shared sense of 
responsibility, and a common worldview among the state personnel of the major 
capitalist countries (Putnam and Bayne 1984: 197-201; Baker 2006).
259
 This particular 
form of political socialization of the heads of state and government, paralleled by 
informal and intimate exchanges in a number of public and private policy planning 
forums, helped to identify and negotiate political differences and foster cooperation. 
Reflecting and reinforcing the unprecedented degree of economic integration of the 
advanced capitalist countries, the G7 helped to prevent a relapse into protectionism (cf. 
Putnam and Bayne 1987: 27; Gill 1999: 140).
260
 
The most influential account of economic summitry has been provided by Putnam and 
Henning (1989: 133, fn. 114), who conducted high-level interviews with almost all of the 
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key individuals involved in the London and Bonn summits. Their main argument, 
informed by a model of ‘two-level games’ (Putnam 1988), holds that the international 
negotiations allowed a small faction within the German government that favoured 
macroeconomic expansion—individuals in the economics ministry and chancellery and 
leadership in the trade unions and left wing of the SPD (Putnam and Henning 1989: 
107)—to link up with their Keynesian counterparts in the US and Japanese government, 
and to use the leverage of the negotiating process to overcome the opposition of FDP, 
Bundesbank, the majority of economic officials, as well as banking and industry (Putnam 
and Henning 1989: 107). Schmidt, in short, is said to have harnessed the external 
pressure from the US towards the adoption of a fiscal stimulus for which he would 
otherwise have had little domestic support (Putnam and Henning 1989: 67; Biven 2002: 
151). 
Paradoxically, even though the Bonn summit has since been “heralded as a paradigmatic 
case of international economic cooperation” (Bryant and Hodgkinson 1989: 2), most 
observers agree that the substantial outcome of the summit was a failure (Putnam and 
Henning 1989: 19). As Holtham (1989: 141) has demonstrated, there are two divergent 
and politically motivated interpretations as to why. Some suggest that trilateral 
macroeconomic coordination, though well-intended and a step in the right direction, was 
counteracted by events like the Iranian revolution and the second oil crisis that changed 
the global parameters in unexpected ways and rendered the stimulus ineffective (Holtham 
1989: 141; Henning 1996: 57). Had these external shocks and, from the problem-solving 
perspective of world economic management, ‘unfortunate events’ not occurred, this 
position implies, a global reflation might have proven successful. The prevailing view 
today is that the overall approach was not simply badly timed but inherently flawed 
(Henning 1996: 57). From this perspective, a hesitant Germany had been drawn into an 
ill-fated Keynesian experiment of demand management that negatively affected domestic 
price levels and Germany’s balance-of-payments position (cf. Giersch et al. 1992: 240-
243). Having learnt its lesson the hard way, German policy-makers supposedly resolved 
‘never again’ to depart from their anti-inflationary programme (cf. Allen 2005: 214). In 
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essence, this is not a debate about the historical record but an interpretative struggle 
between Keynesian and neoclassical economists that centres on different conceptions of 
appropriate macroeconomic policy. In the heat of the debate, the actual events of the 
Bonn summit and the larger context had been lost, and the triumph of the latter over the 
former created a lasting myth that, Holtham rightly feared, would be impossible to 
correct. 
Critical approaches have argued that German state managers refused to do very much to 
begin with (Parboni 1981: 125; Lankowski 1982b: 100; Parboni 1988: 48). The work by 
Gill (1999: 132) on the emerging G7 nexus points out that previous summit 
communiqués had already articulated an anti-inflationary perspective. Putnam and 
Henning (1989: 42) admit that this reflected the monetarist perspective of Germany, 
which was opposed to the expansionary plans that the British Prime Minister Callaghan 
had raised as early as 1975 (Biven 2002: 98). At the 1976 Puerto Rico summit, Schmidt 
insisted that “[o]ur priority must be to check price increases and to strengthen confidence 
among investors… If we have an inflationary environment there is less confidence. 
Increases in inflation increase risk, and make it seem prohibitively expensive to 
undertake large investments. Expansion requires that prices be held in check. And 
employment increases are not possible in the face of growing rates of inflation.” And he 
warned that “[i]f we again lapse into inflation, we could again find ourselves back at 
square one in less than two years”.261 In London in the following year, Schmidt and his 
summit ‘sherpa’ Karl Otto Pöhl reiterated the strong anti-inflationary stance, managing to 
insert into the final communiqué the phrase “inflation does not reduce unemployment. On 
the contrary, it is one of its major causes” (Putnam and Henning 1989: 42).  
On the whole, German policy makers had been extremely concerned about the 
inflationary effects of the stimulus package prepared by the incoming Carter 
administration and its attempt to enlist the surplus economies in this endeavour (Biven 
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2002: 99; Stein 2010: 160). Together with Japan, the German delegation refused 
American pressures at the London summit. The leaders of the two countries rejected 
binding growth targets and merely restated the going economic predictions even though it 
was already clear that these would not be met (Biven 2002: 112; Stein 2010: 161).  
It should also be noted that the Americans, rather than counting on Schmidt’s 
commitment, sought to apply pressures outside the bargaining table in order to get 
Germany to reflate. In order to increase the pressure on Germany and Japan, the US 
announced it was going to expand no matter what. If Germany and Japan chose not to 
follow suit, they would have to tolerate the appreciating DM and yen and associated loss 
in export competitiveness that would result from the American trade deficit. Throughout 
1977, America abstained from foreign exchange interventions in favour of a declining 
dollar in the hope that Germany and Japan would choose to stimulate their economies 
(Biven 2002: 108, citing Putnam and Henning 1989: 36-7). And indeed there is at least 
one documented occasion (one of the pre-summit meetings of the G5 deputies on 16 June 
1978) when the Americans intimated that the US would cause difficulty through its 
foreign exchange policy if their German counterparts were too obstinate.
262
 In addition, 
they threatened they would not attend the Bonn summit unless Germany committed to a 
stimulus, thus ruining a PR opportunity for Schmidt (Biven 2002: 146-147). 
Despite, or because, of these threats, the bargaining process that led up to the Bonn 
agreement was fraught with considerable tensions and shrouded in uncertainty. German 
policy makers entered the negotiations convinced that what was to be negotiated was a 
‘quid pro quo’ that sought to commit the US to an anti-inflationary monetary policy and 
an energy-saving programme
263
 and that assumed that Germany had already done its 
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part.
264
 Emminger summed up the view that “because of international obligations, 
something has to be done in order to increase the pressures on the others”.265  
At the Bonn summit, Germany rejected an explicit economic growth target but agreed to 
a considerable fiscal stimulus of “up to 1%” of its GDP (Stein 2010: 170). Although 
German policy makers honoured this commitment, the devil is in the detail. The stimulus 
overwhelmingly took the form of tax cuts that were meant to offset ‘bracket creep’: a 
process whereby inflation pushes tax payers into higher income brackets, increases the 
overall tax burden, and limits aggregate demand (Holtham 1989: 147-8). Such 
compensating measures, Holtham notes, had been repeatedly used in the past and had 
again been made necessary by the record tax revenues of 1977 (1989: 147-8). Germany’s 
summit commitment was therefore nothing out of the ordinary. In fact, one of the 
political participants at the time has concluded that “one can dispute whether…the 
German decision would not have been taken without the summit” (Tietmeyer 1988: 137, 
quoted in Truman 2004: 238, fn. 9). It may be fair to say that the summit determined the 
scope and timing of these measures, but, as Holtham concludes, this is “a far cry...from 
the claim that the German government reluctantly but altruistically agreed to something 
at the summit that was contrary to its interests” (Holtham 1989: 147). Cleary, then, 
Germany’s was not at all an exceptional experiment in macroeconomic demand 
management. Emminger, who opposed the fiscal stimulus from the outset, criticized the 
prevailing view that the German state “was pumping 1% of GDP into the economy” as 
giving the false impression of some deficit-financed job creation scheme (1986: 428).  
The claim by Putnam and Henning that Schmidt signalled informally that he preferred to 
be pushed in an expansionary direction, and used the negotiations to build a Keynesian 
coalition is questionable (cf. Putnam and Henning 1989: 36).
266
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uncertainty of German economic policy, he had toyed with reflationary proposals in 
1973-1974, but since 1976 had come down on the side of anti-inflation (Putnam and 
Henning 1989: 35; Biven 2002: 149-150). Although Schmidt asked Emminger for the 
Bundesbank’s support in implementing the German commitment on the final day of the 
summit (presumably by refraining from tightening monetary policy)
267
, he soon distanced 
himself from the Bonn agreement. Addressing the Bundesbankers four months after the 
summit and before the tax cuts came into effect, he dismissed as ‘nonsense’ the notion 
that Germany ought to act as a locomotive and noted that, just as the Americans hadn’t 
lived up to their commitments, Germany had only done half of what they were supposed 
to do.
268
  
Lastly, the fiscal measures implemented after Bonn were offset by the restrictive 
monetary stance taken by the Bundesbank at the end of 1978 and throughout 1979 
(Marsh 2009: 90; Truman 2004: 285-286; Holtham 1989: 151, 152). Encouraged to 
continue its stability course by the economics ministry, the Bundesbank had already 
committed to monetary restraint in mid-December 1978 when it decided to announce an 
ambitious monetary target of 6% to 9% which, it was clearly understood and explicitly 
stated at the time, would make restrictive measures inevitable.
269
  
Though primarily with a view to setting the tone for the new EMS rather than as an 
explicit countermeasure to the summit decision (cf. Holtham 1989: 152-3),
270
 Germany’s 
monetary tightening cancelled out whatever ‘stimulus’ the tax measures (which were 
really more of a ‘demand-neutral’ equalizer) provided. Taken together, “overall German 
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macroeconomic policy in 1979 was anti-inflationary” rather than expansionary (Holtham 
1989: 143, 159). The second oil shock was only an afterthought in this, and served 
primarily as a means of justifying the anti-inflationary stance of the Bundesbank 
internationally.
271
  
German policy makers, rather than being caught out by unforeseen economic 
developments (Kreile 2006: 165), had already turned their backs on the locomotive 
approach prior to the spike in oil prices. It was the operators of the Japanese rather than 
the German state, for whom “[t]he idea of an expansionary policy was not as inherently 
unacceptable” (Biven 2002: 102), who now found their macroeconomic leeway curtailed 
by a newly inflationary environment.
272
 The international outlook of German authorities, 
and the basic consensus between state and central bank, was the same as in 1973/1974.
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This was especially so as the Bundesbank observed that German business seemed 
prepared to use the oil shock as an excuse to raise prices.
274
 The implications for 
economic policy, the Central Bank Council concluded, was that the room for price 
increases needed to be narrowed down as much as possible. Only then could a 
devastating wage-price spiral be prevented. An expansion of domestic demand that 
Keynesian proponents asked for would only accelerate inflation, increase balance-of-
payments problems, and fuel social conflict across the advanced industrial world.
275
  
On the whole, therefore, there is scant evidence that the Carter administration had 
compelled German state managers into a failed Keynesian experiment (cf. Giersch et al. 
1992: 242; Kreile 2006: 165). In fact, as the next section demonstrates, the exact opposite 
was the case. Having resisted American calls for macro-economic expansion, German 
policy makers now pushed the US into a ‘successful’ neoliberal experiment.  
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Because the Bonn summit has been falsely depicted as an exemplar of international 
policy coordination, and because it has been conflated with trilateral precepts of global 
leadership, it has been misread by some as a concerted effort by ruling elites from the G7 
countries that, guided by a ‘productive-capital’ perspective, sought to boost industrial 
expansion and renew the ‘embedded liberal’ class compromise (cf. van der Pijl 1989b: 
64-65; Overbeek 1993: 115). From this perspective, the failure to restart global economic 
growth heralded the ascent of a rival ‘money-capital’ fraction that supported the 
neoliberal restructuring of the post-war world political economy.  
The above analysis suggests that a transgovernmental coalition eager to rescue the 
embedded liberal order never emerged in the first place as the state operators of at least 
one of the surplus economies
276
 critical to the success of the locomotive strategy had 
decided to defect. The reality is that German authorities had resolved to stay their anti-
inflationary course at the cost of derailing the global growth locomotive even before it 
could take off. Their reasons for doing so, however, was rooted in their attempts to 
sustain the domestic post-war settlement, even if this meant frustrating the efforts of 
others to accomplish the same.  
The Bonn summit, then, cannot be seen as a watershed in the international balance of 
power between those ruling class elements that “still favoured conciliation with the forces 
of reform” (Overbeek and van der Pijl 1993: 18) and those elements that advocated class 
confrontation. The distinction between the interests of a ‘productive capital’ fraction to 
preserve the embedded liberal compromise with labour, and the interests of a ‘money-
capital’ fraction to demolish it, turns out too rigid to account for these nuances—not least 
because the actions of the German state and capital fall in between. 
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In some respects, the contours of the shift from maintaining full employment towards a 
‘war on inflation’—reflected in the summit communiqués from 1976 onwards (Gill 1999: 
132)—had already been apparent in the German response to the global recession in 
1973/1974, the French efforts to mimic Modell Deutschland, the British attempts to 
stabilize sterling, and the American and German prescriptions for how foreign 
governments ought to deal with their economic and financial troubles. And on the other 
hand, Stephen Gill (1990: 227) has pointed out that the political and economic elites of 
the trilateral countries—even after the failure of a programme of global reflation—still 
shied away from risking an economic recession for the sake of disciplining labour.  
Overall, then, the change in the social balance of power and ruling class strategies 
towards neoliberalism was a more protracted and complex process (e.g. van der Pijl 
2012: xii) in which states and social forces uncommitted to an ideologically-driven 
counter-attack on the welfare state and organized labour had a crucial role to play in 
shaping the ultimate outcome. The question of whether a global reflation might have 
worked if only Germany had held up its end of the bargain cannot be answered 
conclusively. It is true the post-war model of Western capitalism had reached its limits. 
The challenge to the established international order, however, came initially from the 
global left: the trade union basis of the social-democratic and socialist parties, the non-
aligned national liberation movement of the third world, and the real existing anti-
capitalist modernity in Eastern Europe, China and the Soviet Union (van der Pijl 2006; 
Panitch and Gindin 2012: 143; Gill and Solty 2013: 58). Even if one were to contend that 
embedded liberalism was finished, it does not follow that the rise of neoliberalism was 
preordained (Schmidt 2011). By prioritizing internal stability, German state managers 
had not only precluded radical proposals that sought to overcome the crisis by 
transcending capitalism, but even centrist Keynesian attempts to extend the lifeline of the 
embedded liberal order. Far from inevitable, the movement towards neoliberalism 
depended for its power of persuasion and mobilization on this lack of prospects. 
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From Benign Neglect to the Volcker Shock 
Far more important than the package deal reached at the Bonn summit was the structural 
weakness of the dollar that forced the United States decided to reverse its policy of 
‘benign neglect’ in the course of 1978. American policy makers had remained indifferent 
to a declining exchange rate of the dollar after the termination of Bretton Woods. For 
most of 1977, US policy makers had hoped that an appreciating DM would get Germany 
to stimulate its economy (Putnam and Bayne 1984: 70-71). But in December 1977 and 
January 1978, US monetary officials grew increasingly concerned that a steadily 
weakening dollar might turn into a freefall (Parboni 1981: 130-31; Biven 2002: 119-120). 
US monetary officials thus began to intervene in foreign exchange markets in order to 
stabilize the dollar (Truman 2005: 353)—with little success. After the dollar declined by 
18% vis-à-vis the DM between August and October 1978 and a panic loomed, the US 
announced a dollar rescue package that included monetary tightening and the 
procurement of foreign currency to finance foreign exchange interventions (Biven 2002: 
169-170). 
German central bankers congratulated themselves for having followed the Swiss example 
of waiting out their American counterparts.
277
 The chancellor credited German 
intransigence at the Bonn summit for the American change of heart,
278
 while the head of 
the Bundesbank Otmar Emminger pointed to German restraint in foreign exchange 
interventions (Emminger 1986: 382, 384). Added to this, one of Germany’s central bank 
council members believed, was the threat that OPEC countries might raise the price of oil 
or cease to quote it in dollars altogether.
279
 The claim made in one CIA report that “[t]he 
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anti-inflation and dollar support programs adopted by the United States in the fall of 1978 
were the result in great part of allied pressure”280 was premature in that the real 
showdown was to come in the following year, but is much closer to the truth. For while 
supporting American interventions with a comprehensive dollar rescue programme in 
November 1978 (Bordo et al. 2010:19), Germany began to step up the pressure on the 
United States to finally commit to a serious anti-inflationary programme (Truman 2005: 
354).  
The drive toward European monetary union has to be placed in this context. A successful 
EMS, Schmidt had hoped, would add “very strong additional psychological pressure” on 
the United States to give up its policy of benign neglect.
281
 We do know now that it was 
met with much greater scepticism on the part of the Carter administration than its 
programme of trilateral management and public endorsement of European monetary 
integration would have one believe (Biven 2002: 168; Basosi 2010). German authorities 
in particular noted American concerns over a common European dollar policy.
282
 In fact, 
the Americans had complained earlier that “dollar interventions within the ‘snake’ are 
unnecessarily exacerbating the weakness of the dollar”—a criticism to which the 
Bundesbank objected.
283
 
But European monetary integration, Schmidt believed, was also to prepare Germany 
politically for what he held to be a looming stand-off with the United States.
284
 There 
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was, the chancellor professed in his December address to the Bundesbank’s central bank 
council, a definitive limit to German interventions in foreign exchange markets in support 
of the dollar. Making this clear to the Americans, and withstanding the pressures once the 
proverbial ‘end of the line’ had been reached, would require the political support of the 
European partners.
285
 And indeed the Bundesbank had begun to significantly scale back 
its foreign exchange interventions (Emminger 1986: 392). From a highpoint of 1:10 in 
November 1977, the monthly ratio of US to German dollar purchases declined to 5:1 in 
September 1979.
286
 Stabilizing the dollar exchange rate, German policy makers resolved, 
was now to be put on the shoulders of the US and to be achieved primarily by way of 
domestic economic measures.
287
 Within limits, the Bundesbank at times even sold dollars 
to prevent too strong a devaluation of the DM and to protect itself against inflation.
288
 
Germany’s support was crucial because the dollar troubles and wider economic 
turbulences of the 1970s had elevated the DM to the world’s alternative reserve currency 
and anchor of the European monetary system (Bordo et al. 2010: 12). This made the DM 
more important than any other hard currency. Accordingly, the US Federal Reserve 
focussed primarily on the dollar/DM exchange rate and intervened almost exclusively in 
German marks in order to stem the decline of the dollar (Bordo et al. 2010: 12). 
Germany’s reservations were noted with concern by American policy makers, who 
repeatedly called for more visible interventions and even accused the Bundesbank of 
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letting the dollar slide intentionally.
289
 What made matters worse was that the US, which 
hardly held any foreign currency prior to 1980, needed to borrow the marks that it used to 
buy up dollars in the market (Bordo et al. 2010: 12, 19, 21, 29). Yet the Bundesbank, its 
single most important off-market supplier, not only reduced its own interventions but also 
“grew increasingly reluctant to extend further credits without changes in U.S. 
macroeconomic policies” (Bordo et al. 2010: 19, 25, 30, 40).290  
The situation came to a head when a new dollar crisis emerged in the second half of 
1979. While US authorities intervened on a massive scale between June and September, 
the Bundesbank held off.
291
 The newly appointed Chairman of the Federal Reserve Paul 
Volcker was alarmed that “[i]f the market gets in its head that the dollar is really going 
down [against the DM], would we be able to stop it without spending a lot more money 
than we’re already spending?”.292 His worries were justified. When Volcker met with 
Schmidt in Hamburg on 29 September on his way to the IMF meeting in Belgrade, the 
dollar had fallen to its lowest level against the DM since its international rescue in 
November 1978 (Silber 2012: 166). At the same time, the DM balance of the Fed had 
dropped from $1,485 million at the end of August to $138 million at the end of 
September (and $72 million in October).
293
 In an internal memo quoted by David Marsh 
(2009: 89), Anthony Solomon noted that “we face… a situation that could quickly 
degenerate into a full-blown destructive crisis” and that “we are being bled to death and 
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will have to let go.”294 On October 4—two days before the Fed announced the sea-change 
in its monetary policy known as the Volcker shock—the German central bank governor 
Emminger concluded that “if the Americans continued to intervene in this vein as over 
the last days, they would be finished very quickly”.295 
The minutes of the high-level Hamburg meeting indicate that the lukewarm response of 
German authorities to the critical dollar weakness had culminated in a refusal to continue 
to intervene against underlying market forces. The German chancellor complained 
bitterly that currency interventions had had an inflationary effect, forcing the Bank to 
adopt a restrictive policy that had hurt the economy and drawn the criticism of the unions. 
Since he was facing the toughest election of his career, Schmidt dismissed any further 
dollar support measures as pointless and damaging. “The United States”, Schmidt is 
reported to have said, “could not demand from us that we ruin our economy for their 
sake”.296 Without a restoration of the political and economic fundamentals, Schmidt 
concluded, there could be no stabilization of the dollar.
297
  
Some have suggested that Volcker sought to use German criticism at Hamburg in order to 
overcome internal opposition to his monetarist plans (cf. Volcker and Gyohten 1992: 
168; Truman 2004: 286). Edwin Truman, who worked for the Federal Reserve Board in 
this period, speaks of a “pro forma effort by the U.S. Treasury officials to enlist 
additional German support” (2004: 286) and explains that it was important “to have done 
so in order to bring [Treasury and the Council of Economic Advisors] around to 
accepting the need for fundamental monetary policy action” (2005: 353). This reading 
suggests that a transgovernmental coalition emerged that was intent on circumventing the 
bureaucratic inertia that stood in the way of a radical change of course. While worthy of 
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further consideration beyond the scope of this dissertation, the issue with this 
interpretation, as it stands, is that it fails to account for the considerable tensions between 
German and US policy-making. The archival records confirm significant external 
economic and political pressures behind the formulation of the Volcker programme 
(Woolley 1984: 103-4). To reduce them to being “part of an international policy 
coordination process” (Truman 2005: 353) is suspect of intentionally glossing over these 
frictions. It is highly unlikely, for instance, that the heavy criticism Volcker himself came 
under at Hamburg when he asked for additional support measures to flank his anti-
inflationary programme was merely scripted.
298
 
The more plausible explanation, provided by one of his biographers, is that Volcker, too, 
only fully embraced the new policy in the week between the Hamburg meeting and his 
early departure from Belgrade (Silber 2012: 166). In this view, the Hamburg meeting did 
not simply endorse Volcker’s monetarist views but delimit the monetary options 
available to the Fed in a situation where market rumours and turmoil had “worked 
together to pound a fatal stake into the credibility of the FOMC as the country’s bulwark 
against inflation” (Lindsey, Orphanides, Rasche 2005: 210). The idea that Volcker let 
himself be pushed ignores that Hamburg was but the final step in a decision-making 
process that German opposition had helped to structure. Emminger’s admission to the 
Central Bank Council that “we have made a theoretical contribution [to Volcker’s 
programme of 6 October] by illuminating policy in Hamburg” is an uncharacteristic 
understatement.
299
 For rather than inspire Volcker, the Hamburg meeting substantially 
narrowed his scope of action. The imperative for US policy makers, moreover, was not to 
copy German monetarism, but to match its anti-inflationary achievements under 
conditions that were far more adverse and that seemed to require far more drastic 
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measures. To argue that both ‘monetarisms’ were guided by neoliberal ideas is to ignore 
their very different social functions (Johnson 1998). 
The real significance of the Hamburg meeting is amply reflected, though not fully 
revealed, in the transcripts of the emergency meeting of the Federal Open Market 
Committee (FOMC) on October 6—for Volcker stopped the tape recorder when relaying 
the position of his foreign correspondents on the dollar crisis (Stein 2010: 230).
300
 
Crucially, he concluded that an international dollar support programme similar to the 
November 1978 rescue package would not be forthcoming.
301
 This put the US in an 
enormously difficult situation, for it was just such a programme that market participants 
expected to be announced (Stein 2010: 230).
302
 Without an international component to 
flank domestic measures, monetary officials had to fear that even a large increase in the 
discount rate (a staggering 2% were on the table) might not be enough to reassure 
markets. The German refusal to rescue the dollar at Hamburg, probably in conjunction 
with broader European opposition at Belgrade (Greider 1987: 118; Stein 2010: 230), had 
removed the last remaining alternative to the radical change in operating techniques 
proposed by Volcker. 
Domestic inflation was of course the primary target of the Volcker shock. But the 
declining dollar had been its mirror image (Treaster 2004: 53). As Stephen Axilrod, 
tasked in mid-September to outline the new policy proposal, recalls, “it was...a 
deteriorating trend in markets generally that was continuing into late summer and early 
fall, especially in the foreign exchange market, that clearly signaled the need for a 
paradigm shift in domestic monetary policy” (Axilrod 2005: 238). The external value and 
internal value of the dollar were mutually reinforcing and inseparable (Treaster 2004: 
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68). This meant that the failure of the Fed to contain inflation and its inability to improve 
the deteriorating exchange rate were connected; and that is why Germany’s fading 
support for the latter, as Volcker realized, raised the stakes for the US to achieve the 
former (Bordo et al. 2010: 24-25). In principle, the central bank should be able to solve 
both issues by forcefully raising interest rates. But after a decade of inflation, the 
commitment of the Fed to do this had come to be seriously questioned both at home and 
abroad (Axilrod 2005: 238). The loss of faith in the Fed’s willingness to pursue an anti-
inflationary course was thus bound up with an erosion of confidence in the dollar as a 
secure investment which, in September 1979, turned into a veritable dollar flight 
(Lindsey, Orphanides and Rasche 2005: 198). It was under these conditions, ultimately, 
that the Federal Reserve adopted the new approach as a “comprehensive symbol” of its 
determination to tighten monetary policy regardless of the consequences (Panitch and 
Gindin 2012: 167).
303
 
The German welfare state and social market economy were soon to become one of the 
many casualties of the Volcker programme and its calculated disregard for the social and 
global ramifications of escalating interest rates and a deepening world recession. In an 
important sense, however, these negative repercussions need to be seen as the blowback 
of Germany’s strategy. German state elites, for much of the 1970s, had sought to impel 
the United States towards fiscal and monetary discipline, and from the Bonn summit 
onwards, had focussed on the DM/dollar exchange rate as the vehicle for bringing this 
pressure to bear on their American counterparts. By reducing foreign exchange 
interventions, restricting American access to DM, and, finally, rejecting an international 
dollar support programme, German policy makers had contributed significantly to the 
external pressures that drove the US into the Volcker experiment that raised interest rates 
to unprecedented levels in order to induce a recession and break the strength of organized 
labour.  
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The German state, then, was a critical force of neoliberal change against the will of its 
administrators, who had sought myopically to maintain an international environment 
conducive to preserving peace and prosperity within their society. And yet their successes 
at defending the domestic compact from the global forces of protectionism and inflation 
frustrated attempts to transform the Keynesian truce in the interest of the working class or 
at least refurbish it in the service of the existing state of affairs. By precluding potentially 
more progressive alternatives and committing the United States to monetary rigour, 
German state elites helped to inaugurate the neoliberal counterrevolution. 
To argue that Germany propelled the United States towards the Volcker shock is not to 
deny the importance of internal factors. Future research will need to broaden the analysis 
and consider, from the standpoint of US policy makers, how precisely these external 
pressures interacted with societal demands for an anti-inflationary programme. Some 
critical accounts, however, are in need of immediate revision. For what can be said with 
certainty is that the Volcker turn can no longer be seen as either a coup of international 
haute finance (cf. Greider 1987: 118; Duménil and Lévy 2004: 165; Harvey 2005: 45; 
Stein 2010: 227) or as the final step in a plan to reassert American power over and 
against the interests of its core country rivals and a disobedient periphery (Gowan 1999: 
40; Gowan 2001: 366). In probing the plausibility of these two interpretations, the 
remainder of this chapter and the next seek to outline prospective avenues of 
investigation. 
The first point that follows from the argument above is that the adoption and adaptation 
of monetarism by the Federal Reserve was pragmatic rather than ideologically driven. 
Volcker, after all, was never particularly enamoured with the parsimony of monetarist 
economics (McNally 2011: 33; Panitch and Gindin 2012: 167; Madrick 2011: 160) and, 
though certainly exposed to neoliberal ideas, was not part of this intellectual movement 
himself. Volcker had rejected monetarist proposals in the past, and the excessive tight 
money policy that the Fed followed under his leadership departed radically from the slow 
and steady rate of growth of the money supply that Friedman had prescribed (Neikirk 
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1987: 66-67; Treaster 2004: 149). His relationship with Friedman and other monetarists 
was less than amicable (Silber 2012: 150). While Volcker disapproved of the inflexible 
recommendations of the monetarists, Friedman and Meltzer harshly criticized the track 
record of the Fed (Neikirk 1987: 92). In the depths of the recession that was to follow, 
Friedman was keen to distance himself from a policy he had followed with a mixture of 
goodwill and scepticism (Silber 2012: 148-149). In a speech to the Mont Pelerin Society, 
he was adamant that “[i]n October 1979, the Federal Reserve in desperation adopted 
monetarist rhetoric. It did not then and has not since adopted a monetarist policy” 
(Friedman 1983: 1). Both the alteration of monetarism adopted by Volcker in 1979 and 
its denunciation by Friedman three years later are perfect examples of the plasticity of 
ideas in the face of changing economic and political circumstances and considerations. 
To fully understand the significance of ideas, they have to be seen in a larger social 
context.
304
  
Volcker’s former job at Chase Manhattan and the New York Fed certainly exposed him 
to the strongly anti-inflationary views that prevailed in the international banking 
community in the late 1970s. At the same time, his active membership as North 
American Director in the Trilateral Commission also means that he was familiar with the 
concerns of those international elites that, in 1979 still, feared the political costs of curing 
wage-push inflation and labour insubordination through a prolonged recession (Gill 1990: 
227).
305
 The reasons why Volcker chose to do precisely that, I argue, cannot be reduced 
to the persuasive power of ideas, nor can it be explained in terms of his allegiance to the 
financial rather than the productive interests of society. 
The fight against inflation, after all, was not advocated by high finance alone, but 
supported by a broad coalition of industry, the trade union leadership, middle-class tax 
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payers, property holders, and small savers (Panitch and Gindin 2012: 170). Moreover, the 
Volcker programme involved a painful adjustment process not only for uncompetitive 
industries, but also for globalizing finance. Stein notes that “[h]igh and volatile interest 
rates caused the biggest collapse of financial institutions since the Great Depression, as 
more than a thousand thrifts with assets over $500 billion failed” (Stein 2010: 265). Even 
some of the largest US banks were pushed to the brink of bankruptcy by the record 
interest rates and the default of developing countries on their loans (Stein 2010: 266). The 
international debt crisis not only threatened the stability of the global financial system but 
also undermined the dominant position that multinational banks had acquired as the 
intermediaries of petrodollar loans to the third world. The new regulatory regime adopted 
under Reagan promoted the rise of nonbank financial firms that increasingly rivalled the 
transnational commercial banks (Sassen 2008: 157; 1991: 66, 71). The fact that new 
financial actors emerged from the fallout of the Volcker shock and benefitted from the 
subsequent liberalization drive casts further doubt on the story of a ‘financial coup’ (cf. 
Duménil and Lévy 2004; Stein 2010: 227). Because they involved serious shocks and 
invited new competition, it is unlikely that these policies emanated from the established 
financial circles, even if these reforms subsequently allowed rentier interests to encroach 
upon political institutions and capture increasing shares of national wealth (Epstein and 
Jayadev 2005). Instead, the Volcker shock and ensuing world recession, as Gill (1990: 
213, 217) points out, had the unintended effect of deepening the structural power of 
internationally mobile capital. And in this respect, Volcker’s programme needs to be seen 
as but one episode in a larger process of post-war financial globalization in which 
American capitalism and its state had assumed a central position that, built upon the 
latter’s role in managing contradictions and conflicting interests, can even less plausibly 
be portrayed in instrumentalist terms (Krippner 2011: 13; Panitch and Gindin 2012: 7).  
Nor can it be understood in terms of hegemonic restorations. Some scholars have sought 
to bring the domestic and international contexts together by tying the interests of finance 
to the reassertion of American supremacy (Duménil and Lévy 2004: 210; Gowan 1999: 
68-69) establishes an explicit, if empirically undeveloped, link between the influence of 
209 
 
finance and the reassertion of American supremacy. In his account of the monetarist turn, 
for instance, Arrighi (1994: 323) argues that the US entered into an alliance with private 
finance as it sought “by all available means the latter’s assistance in regaining the upper 
hand in the global power struggle”. 
The problem is that these explanations grossly overestimate the predatory nature of 
America’s shift from post-war inflation to the new austerity. Long-term interest rates had 
been rising since the mid-1970s, and at the time Volcker took office an economic 
downturn already loomed on the horizon. It is more accurate to say that the Fed amplified 
and prolonged an approaching crisis rather than engineer a world economic recession. 
The problem, as summarized by the agents of the German export bloc, was that inflation 
would continue if the recession was too mild and too short.
306
 And the possible solution, 
Stein has argued, was just as widely shared. “Everybody knew that you could get rid of 
inflation by producing a steep recession. What was different after 1979 was that the 
people in power were willing to accept the costs” (Stein 2010: 267). Rather than being 
the final in a series of ingenious moves on the geostrategic chessboard, the Volcker shock 
applied a well-known recipe.  
Moreover, the monetary programme of the Fed, rather than unilaterally imposed, sought 
to enlist the cooperation of the major central banks and the multinational financial 
institutions under their authority.
307
 To fully enforce the special marginal reserve 
requirements that flanked his anti-inflationary strategy, Volcker had to rely on the 
goodwill of American banks not to circumvent the new rules (Helleiner 1994: 136). And 
to prevent US corporations from avoiding these restraints by borrowing offshore, Volcker 
asked Emminger and other central bankers “by whatever means you consider appropriate 
to urge the principal banks in your country, whether or not they have branches and 
agencies in the United States, to support our program while these temporary measures are 
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in effect”. As he explained, “it is an important condition for the success of our program 
that banks, foreign as well as domestic, avoid taking advantage of possible special 
opportunities that almost inevitably tend to develop under the circumstances”.308 Whether 
or not this appeal bore fruit, and whether the informal influence of other central banks 
over market operators reached further than the limited success of the US (Greider 1987: 
143-145) is a different question. The key point, however, is that the Fed’s programme 
was designed as a multilateral undertaking from the start.  
Most importantly, international central bankers encouraged the Federal Reserve to see the 
restrictive monetary policy through to its end—even as the prospects of a global 
economic crisis grew ever larger. The German central bank, in late May 1980, rejected an 
American proposal to jointly lower interest rates. Markets would read this as the end of 
the anti-inflationary programme and downward pressure on the dollar would recur, Pöhl 
warned.
309
 And the Swiss central bank governor—at an annual international banker’s 
meeting that unanimously called on the US to maintain its restrictive monetary policy—
“went as far as to call a recession necessary in order to break the mentality of 
inflation”.310  
Overall, then, the notion that the Volcker shock and Reagan revolution enabled the 
United States to reassert its dominance misses the fact that American leadership did not 
need to be enforced internationally in this way. To a large extent, it was already being 
demanded by the main capitalist states and their leading classes for much of the 1970s. 
America’s partners were quite willing to ‘renew their invitation’. What they required in 
return was that the US submit to the same sort of economic discipline it had begun to 
impose on other countries in cooperation with Germany and through the IMF. The 
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German state, thanks to the central role of the DM and Bundesbank, was the purveyor of 
this message. 
 
The chapter has argued that the US abandoned Keynesian demand management in favour 
of monetary conservatism under the political and exchange-rate pressures of Germany in 
particular. To get serious on inflation, we have noted, was not enough, however (Harvey 
2005: 23-4). In order to restore international competitiveness, and, incidentally, offer a 
general rather than particularistic way out of the global crisis, the income share of 
workers also had to be reduced. And to do that, it was understood, the source of their 
organized strength needed to be targeted. In this respect, the Volcker shock did not 
simply replicate, in hothouse fashion, Germany’s turn to ‘monetarism’, but endowed it 
with a distinctive dimension of top-down class warfare that would become characteristic 
for the neoliberalisms constructed simultaneously in the US and UK (Panitch and Gindin 
2012: 171).  
The reasons why the Volcker’s Fed, and the Reagan administration ultimately chose to go 
on the offensive, I propose, may have to do with the fact that its emulation of Germany’s 
low-inflation regime took place in an entirely different international economic and socio-
political context. In Germany, the fight against inflation had served to maintain the 
comparative advantage of the export economy and thus commanded the support of 
dominant capital as well as the associated trade unions. Yet this competitive element at 
the heart of Germany’s crisis management meant that it could not be replicated with 
similar results. In Germany, as Emminger put it, the support of all social groups and the 
majority of the population was the conditio sine qua non of an effective stabilization 
policy.
311
 But in the US, the situation was the opposite. Because the anti-inflationary 
program was intended to restore rather than, as in the German case, maintain price 
stability, business confidence, and international competitiveness, its success depended not 
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on sustaining the social consensus but on terminating the post-war contract with 
labour.
312
  
Hence the United States, with Volcker, and the United Kingdom, under Thatcher, would 
pursue a monetary policy with the intent to break the back not simply of inflation, but of 
organized labour (Panitch and Gindin 2008: 31). Because the Fed proceeded by trial and 
error (Newstadt 2008:99), the true nature of this shift escaped German policy-makers 
even months after Volcker had announced his anti-inflationary plan of action. Serious 
doubts about whether the government would stay course in the year that Carter stood for 
re-election persisted well into 1980, and German authorities were cautious to criticize 
policies that they had been pushing onto the US for years.
313
 It is only with the Reagan 
administration that German officials realized that the objective was, in fact, to induce a 
recession and to terminate the post-war compromise between capital and labour. 
314
  
Recognizing the enormous stakes of the “grand experiment” the US had embarked on, 
Germany’s crisis managers remained deeply sceptical. Reagan, they believed, was trying 
to do the impossible, and the chances of success, they estimated, were smaller than 
50%.
315
 
In any case, it was understood that the American “all-or-nothing” strategy could not and 
would not be tried in Germany. Schmidt’s political-economic paper had declared that 
“[w]e will not go as far as to cause a ‘stability crisis’ of employment for the sake of price 
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stability”.316 This position was reiterated in 1981 when the Keynesian minority speaker of 
the central bank committee and ‘social conscience’ of the Bundesbank (Marsh 1992: 67) 
Nemitz pointed out that they could not use the recession as an instrument of economic 
policy in the way that the Americans did.
317
 And he was not alone. Following the 
American lead, Emminger’s successor Karl Otto Pöhl argued, would amount to 
“throwing down the gauntlet in front of large groups of society”.318 Small and medium 
enterprises were bound to suffer, some concluded
319
, and the number of bankruptcies 
would increase, others predicted.
320
 The economic advantages were of course seen as 
well. A high-interest rate regime would accelerate the structural adjustment process, 
benefitting profit-making, solvent enterprises, while pushing uncompetitive firms out of 
the market.
321
 And yet the socially explosive dangers of maintaining high interest rates 
while simultaneously removing the social safety net and unemployment insurance were 
equally apparent. In this respect, the market fundamentalism that characterized the 
Thatcher-Reagan counterrevolution did not make any significant inroads into the 
Bundesbank in the early 1980s.
322
 On the whole, the crucial difference between the US 
and Germany remained that, as the German G5 deputy Schulmann and personal aide to 
Helmut Schmidt concluded, “for us, after all, the preservation of the social consensus is a 
key factor of our economic policy”.323  
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The German state, of course, was anything but an impartial arbitrator between capital and 
labour. The supposedly inflationary wage increases were, in essence, understood to be the 
“cardinal problem” of the entire world of industrial societies.324 The share of working 
people in the wealth of society was deemed to be prohibitively large. And yet since the 
early 1970s, the managers of the German state and the owners of capital had been put on 
the defensive by the radical demands (including expanded social security, an extended 
codetermination, and investment controls) of the trade union base, the Young Socialists 
and the SPD Left (Webber 1983: 66-67). Under these conditions, the Bundesbank 
President Klasen had concluded in 1971, a ‘modified appeasement’ of trade union 
demands would be unavoidable. Only in the long term, he wrote to Otto Andreas 
Friedrich—president of the BDA (Federation of German Employers’ Associations) and 
logistician of Hitler’s rearmament effort—might it be possible to forge a common sense 
of austerity that instilled in ‘the man on the street’ the idea that one cannot consume more 
than one produces, and that could drive a wedge between the masses and their 
functionaries.
325
 Even as employers had been able to resist the most ambitious reforms, 
and as confrontation under Brandt gave way to a more cooperative tripartite crisis 
management under Schmidt (Webber 1983), neither the German state nor its capitalist 
class dared to take on the unions directly.
326
 As the IMF recognized in its 1978 Article IV 
consultations with Germany, any improvement in the profit situation of enterprises 
required “a reduction in the rate of rise of real wages (and in some cases...a reduction in 
real wages). ... Most countries, however,—and Germany seems to be no exception—find 
it difficult to induce a behaviour of wages which will, by itself, allow an improvement in 
profits and then in turn investment and employment”.327 While its low-inflation regime 
gave differential opportunities to dominant export interests, Germany could not provide a 
solution to the systemic loss of profitability. Only the United States, with Volcker, and 
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the United Kingdom, under Thatcher, would be prepared to go further, and chart a 
general path out of the crisis of post-war capitalism. 
The international repercussions of the Volcker shock—the outcome of incessant pressure 
on the US to commit to an anti-inflationary programme—would ultimately pull German 
policy makers in the same direction. For at the heart of Germany’s exit strategy lay a 
critical contradiction. The relative success of its crisis management was premised not 
only on building and extending a zone of stability in a world of inflation, but most 
importantly on maintaining lower rates of inflation than its international competitors. In 
the aftermath of the first oil shock, Germany had benefitted from a relatively more 
restrictive credit policy. But similar successes could not be expected if all countries 
pursued a restrictive course.
328
 As one American critic pointedly put the question, “what 
would have happened if all countries had pursued policies similar to those of Germany in 
1973-74? Wasn’t your success at least in part a result of the fact that other countries went 
‘the expansionist way’?”329 This meant that the German model could not be generalized 
without undermining the key to the success of Germany’s growth strategy. It could 
command the consensus of the dominant export interests and the incorporated trade 
unions because, and as long as, it maintained this crucial comparative advantage in price 
stability. The anti-inflationary crusade that Germany had embarked upon therefore turned 
out to be not only irreproducible but self-defeating. For as soon as other state elites 
mustered the political will to apply the lessons of monetary restraint and fiscal prudence, 
the limitations and indeed fragility of the German model became apparent. Germany’s 
anti-inflationary path out of the crisis had had the side-effect of turning the DM into the 
world’s second reserve currency, notwithstanding the efforts of its monetary technicians 
to limit or at least manage its international attractiveness. With the US, Britain and Japan 
registering similar successes at coping with stagflation, this position of the DM was 
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thrown into question and became a liability.
330
 German monetary authorities now found 
themselves bound to follow the US and UK interest rate hikes in order to maintain the 
confidence of investors in the DM as a hard currency and to stem capital outflows even at 
the expense of the domestic economy.
331
  
When German interest rates reached a post-war record in May 1980 and the economy 
went into recession, the Schmidt government briefly opened up to the French plea for 
collectively bringing down interest rates (Marsh 2009: 91). The opposition of the 
Bundesbank and the election of a Socialist government ensured that Schmidt would 
remain isolated until his government was overturned. Ironically, “Helmut Schmidt, a 
prime instigator of the American credit squeeze, finished up as yet another victim” 
(Marsh 2009: 91). Whereas in the US and the UK the interest rate hike formed part of a 
larger project designed to defeat and roll back organized labour and dismantle welfare 
state regulation, in Germany high interest rates were adopted only under external 
pressure, implemented only with hesitation, and compensated for. The coming-into-
power of Kohl in 1982 was, in this respect, a mere changing of the guard. The neoliberal 
turn of West German society he had promised would not come to pass for another decade 
and a half (Prasad 2006: 163); but under Schmidt’s social-liberal government, as this 
dissertation has shown, Germany had contributed decisively to its global emergence. 
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Chapter 7 
Reagan’s Revolution:  
Neoliberal Globalization and American Power 
 
 
The key argument of this dissertation has been that Germany had helped to shape the 
global balance of power and intellectual climate that allowed for neoliberalism to be 
successfully tried in the US and the UK. To highlight the role of Germany in preparing 
the counterrevolution that took place under Reagan and Thatcher is not at all to diminish 
the significance, but rather to sharpen the understanding, of what was ‘achieved’ during 
their incumbency. For the truly radical nature of what was done to working people under 
the aegis of Reagan and Thatcher only becomes apparent if we do not assume that the 
1970s were simply a period of continuous ideological preparation, capitalist class 
mobilization, or systematic hegemonic reconstruction. 
There is no doubt that in this period of economic uncertainty, neoliberal ideas gained 
prominence and ruling elites organized domestically and internationally to defend 
capitalism against popular-democratic forces. What allowed the counterrevolution to take 
place, however, was not simply the strength and coherence on the part of capital, but also 
the weakness and isolation on the part of labour and its advocates (Jones 2012: 271). As 
previous chapters have shown, German state managers had contributed enormously to 
this disorganization of progressive forces, without being themselves committed to 
neoliberal ideas or the restoration of capitalist class domination. It was enough for 
Germany to remain in the centre for the pendulum to swing violently to the right. The 
fact that the main alternatives, with the exception of Mitterrand’s ill-fated Keynesian 
course solitaire, had already been ruled out explains why Reagan and Thatcher were able 
to pursue so radical an agenda with only a modicum of consent. In this sense, this chapter 
argues, the neoliberal social and international order that emerged in the 1980s and 1990s 
is best described as ‘post-hegemonic’. 
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Twin Revolutions: Reagan and Thatcher 
The pragmatic adoption of neoliberal ideas and policies by centre-left governments 
averse to free market ideology and supportive of the social compact had depleted the 
political imaginary and foreclosed alternatives of action. In this way, societies had been 
rendered susceptible to the neoliberal restructuring that was to ensue in the 1980s. Yet the 
rise of neoliberalism was neither complete nor inevitable when Thatcher and Reagan 
assumed office in May 1979 and January 1981 (Jones 2012: 253-4). The ideological 
triumph of ‘the market’, and its implantation in the social fabric and individual psyche, 
presupposed the political defeat of organized labour that had been the font for popular-
democratic challenges to capitalism for over a century (Sassoon 1996; Gill and Solty 
2013). In this crucial respect, the victory of neoliberalism was both ‘late and lucky’. It 
could be declared only after the British miner’s strike had been crushed in 1984/1985 and 
the owners of capital had been enabled and encouraged to take the offensive. Until that 
point, even a neoliberally minded Thatcher and Reagan government could not follow “an 
ideologically consistent agenda” but had to rely on a combination of fortunate 
circumstances and popular measures to stay in power (Bulpitt 1986: 34; Jones 2012: 
271). Paramount among these, the chapter argues, was the peculiar and unplanned policy 
mix of high interest rates and deficit spending that funnelled global capital into the US 
and funded the fiscal measures that enabled the Reagan administration to bring the attack 
on labour and the welfare state to a ‘successful’ conclusion.  
The neoliberalisms constructed in the United States and the United Kingdom ran parallel 
and mutually reinforced each other. Both Reagan and Thatcher were elected primarily 
because the left-of-centre governments that preceded them had gambled away their 
political credibility as they sought, unsuccessfully, to apply many of the economic ideas 
championed by the right without alienating their traditional base (Stein 2010: 262-3; 
Prasad 2006: 100; Jones 2012: 253, 263). But in lieu of a strong electoral mandate for 
neoliberalism, the free-market zeal of Reagan and Thatcher was not enough. Both newly 
elected governments were initially concerned to consolidate their hold on power. This 
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meant that neither Thatcher nor Reagan could simply translate their utopian vision of 
market society into policy. Instead, they needed first and foremost to organize sufficient 
political support for their neoliberal ideas (Bulpitt 1986; Jones 2012: 271). Thus while the 
long-term goal of reining in government largesse and trade union power was the same, 
the tactics differed according to the obstacles they confronted and the opportunities that 
presented themselves along the way.  
In the United States, the Reagan administration could seize upon a deregulation drive that 
had originated as a social movement against the collusion of state and big business and 
that the social forces of capital and conservatives had been able to steer it into an anti-
statist direction (Prasad 2006). The Reagan administration put the emphasis on 
reorganizing state capacities from regulating the economy in the interest of social 
protection to fostering financial and economic competition and liberalization (Prasad 
2006: 43-44, 63). Moreover, the enormous income tax cuts, combined with massive 
military expenditures, produced record deficits that served as an excuse for gutting 
welfare programmes and social regulation. This single most significant element of 
Reagan’s neoliberalism, Prasad has argued, was opposed by organized business which 
had lobbied for corporate tax cuts instead and worried about the looming deficit (Prasad 
2006: 48-49; Stein 2010: 264-265). 
Prasad’s (2012: 353) conclusion that the “[t]he origins of neoliberalism are not to be 
found in the disproportionate influence of business interests” is overstated in as far as it 
misses the ideational and structural dimensions of capitalist power (Gill and Law 1989). 
American business had been crucial in creating the conditions and defining the substance 
of this broader neoliberal experiment. Far more forcefully still than its European and 
Japanese counterparts—or even the situation in Britain, where it was a fraction of the 
Conservative Party rather than ideological entrepreneurs (Prasad 2006: 151)—American 
business offered a diagnosis of the economic and political malaise built upon neoliberal 
precepts. Since the late 1960s, business had come under attack from an array of societal 
interests that threatened to undermine the profitability and the legitimacy of American 
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corporate capitalism (Smith 2000: 172; Panitch and Gindin 2012: 163). In the mid-1970s, 
the American capitalist class began to organize a collective response. Deepening ties with 
the capitalist elites of other countries, founding and funding numerous business lobby 
groups and conservative think tanks, American business managed to change the public 
discourse in a pro-business, anti-government and anti-union direction (Gill 1990; Smith 
2000; Blyth 2002: 155). Through like-minded policy groups, research institutes and think 
tanks, the business financial press, higher academia and the economics profession, 
capitalist class actors had been able to influence the terms of debate, define the character 
of the problem and delineate the range of available solutions (Blyth 2002; Mudge 2008: 
707).  
But Prasad’s careful archival research serves as a reminder that the imperative of 
broadening the appeal of neoliberalism did not always coincide neatly with the interests 
of the owners of capital. The US did not simply enact neoliberal policies at the behest of 
Wall Street but also with a view to the popular appeal of these reforms. The extraordinary 
departure from the conservative principles of balanced budgets by a Republican 
administration was considered necessary in order to maintain popular support among the 
top-income, but also middle and working class voters. The significance of the neoliberal 
turn was not its instrumental role in restoring ruling class power, courtesy of a process of 
financialization, but to build popular support for neoliberalism even as the socio-
economic gains of the New Deal were being systematically undermined. The tax cuts, 
Prasad had argued, were implemented not because they conformed to business interests 
but because they appealed to voters that had been pushed into higher tax brackets by 
inflation (Prasad 2006: 61). 
The defeat of inflation and organized labour were used synonymously. The triumph over 
inflation was measured in terms of the concessionary wage agreements that unions were 
now being forced to negotiate.
332
 This is apparent in Volcker’s assessment that “the most 
important single action of the administration in helping the anti-inflation fight was 
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defeating the air controller’s strike” (Volcker 1994: 162, quoted in Stein 2010: 267) 
which, as Volcker more recently noted, did “even more to break the morale of labor” than 
the “breaking of the pattern of wage push in the auto industry” (Volcker, quoted in 
Panitch and Gindin 2012: 171-172).  
In addition to relying on the disciplining force of structural unemployment, the American 
state also directly confronted the unions (Blyth 2002: 182). Reagan’s dismissal of 11,400 
striking air traffic controllers and their replacement by military personnel in 1981 sent a 
powerful signal that a frontal attack on labour was not only desirable but feasible. 
Businesses not only felt confident to take harsher measures against unions; they were 
empowered to do so by Reagan’s subversion of the National Labor Relations Board 
(NLRB) (Stein 2010: 267; Blyth 2002: 182-183). Moreover, “the London Times 
celebrated Mr Reagan’s Short Way with Strike and expressed the hope that Conservative 
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher would follow Reagan’s example” (McCartin 2011: 
330). And indeed one Downing Street official confirmed that the crushing of PATCO 
strengthened the Thatcher government in its resolve to weaken the unions and confront 
the miners (Jones 2012: 267). 
The associational strength and adversarial position of the trade unions in Britain, as 
opposed to their incorporation into the nexus of state and capital in Germany, made them 
the principal target of Thatcher’s neoliberal programme. The plans for legally curtailing 
the power of trade unions had been developed in 1977, and the frustrations of voters with 
organized labour in the wake of the Winter of Discontent explains Thatcher’s electoral 
success (Bulpitt 1986: 34; Prasad 2006: 100, 106). But it was not until the miner’s strike 
of 1984 that the Thatcher government would launch a carefully orchestrated, full frontal 
attack on the unions (Jones 2012: 256-7; Evans 2013: 39). In the meantime, the Thatcher 
government followed a more cautious course of action that built on those elements of 
neoliberalism that promised the broadest electoral appeal and offered the least opposition, 
including from within the conservative party (Bulpitt 1986). 
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Unlike the failed incomes policy, monetarism promised to curb inflation without relying 
on the goodwill of the unions (Bulpitt 1986: 34-35; Prasad 2006: 107, 142). Catering to 
the traditional fiscal conservatism of the Treasury and the Bank of England, monetarism 
was redefined to include and tightly control public spending (Prasad 2006: 109, 118). 
And because of the electoral promise of income tax cuts and a balanced budget, an 
increase in the less visible sales tax was chosen as the politically most expedient way of 
combating inflation by inducing a recession and increasing unemployment (Prasad 2006: 
118). The Thatcher government also embarked on an extensive privatization programme 
after earlier steps in this direction had proven to be more widely popular than initially 
anticipated (Prasad 2006: 122-123; 135; Evans 2013: 35). And the crucial element in 
Thatcher’s efforts to ‘popularize’ neoliberalism was the sale of council houses which held 
out the possibility for former tenants to become home owners (and conservative voters) 
and was supported by an overwhelming majority of voters (Hay 1992; Prasad 2006: 141; 
Evans 2013: 35). 
The real ‘accomplishment’, in the case of both Thatcher and Reagan, was not to follow a 
fully developed ideological road map but to manoeuvre the political terrain so as to 
sustain an attack on the welfare state and organized labour under economic and political 
circumstances that were far less propitious than might appear in hindsight. Neoliberal 
ideology can help explain why Thatcher and Reagan were willing to risk this 
confrontation, but it is only after the event—as “the American political establishment 
discovered that deficits and increasing poverty did not make the president unelectable” 
and “British politicians learned that three times as many unemployed as in previous 
administrations did not make the government unelectable” (Prasad 2006: 98)—that its 
lessons were more widely accepted and applied.  
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Fuelling the Neoliberal Revolution 
To repeat: the election of Reagan indicated general dissatisfaction with Carter’s 
economic policy rather than a political shift to the right (Stein 2010: 262-3), and although 
Reagan carefully crafted his neoliberal reforms upon voter’s preferences regarding tax 
cuts and deregulation, his approval ratings had dropped to 35% in 1982 (Stein 2010: 
267). Yet what made his experiment workable were the massive inflows of foreign 
capital that were attracted by record high interest rates (Helleiner 1994: 148; Stein 2010: 
268-269).  
Crucially, according to Krippner, this was “an inadvertent discovery rather than the 
culmination of a carefully executed plan to draw the world’s savings to U.S. financial 
markets” (Krippner 2011: 87, 92). Initially, the Federal Reserve had sought to limit the 
inflow of foreign funds as they threatened to frustrate its efforts to tighten the money 
supply (Helleiner 1994: 135-139). It was only because capital was absorbed by a newly 
deregulated, highly profitable, and rapidly expanding financial sector that its inflationary 
impact was lessened (Konings 2007: 55). And it is only in retrospect, as Martin Konings 
points out, that “the Fed found, to its surprise, that the ongoing expansion of money and 
credit no longer resulted in high rates of inflation” (2007: 54). 
The FOMC minutes make clear that even though the Federal Reserve was concerned 
about attracting foreign capital, it felt compelled to maintain high interest rates in order to 
countervail the extremely loose fiscal policy of the Reagan administration (Stein 2010: 
266). What Volcker had feared from the outset would be an “inevitable collision” 
between Reagan’s fiscal laxity and the Fed’s monetary restraints turned out to be a boon 
(Silber 2012: 206). The opposition between Volcker’s monetarism and Reagan’s much 
maligned ‘voodoo economics’ produced the peculiar policy mix of monetary stringency 
and fiscal stimulus that created and sustained the attractive investment climate of a high 
dollar and high interest rate (Krippner 2011: 96). 
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The Reagan administration, too, remained sceptical and only belatedly recognized the 
potential advantages of foreign capital investment (Niskanen, interviewed in Krippner 
2011: 95). The massive inflow of funds not only helped to offset the trade and current 
account deficits; the Reagan administration also learnt that it could afford to run federal 
deficits because foreign investors—now private rather than central bank agents, and 
Japanese investors at the forefront (Murphy 1996: 129-134, 144-145; Brenner 2006: 
189)—seemed to have developed an insatiable appetite for US Treasuries (Krippner 
2011: 87). 
On a much larger scale than Thatcher, who had used the North Sea oil revenue to finance 
its income tax reductions, the US government was able to finance both its massive tax 
cuts and military expenditures through the sale of Treasury bonds. While the Volcker 
shock radically disinflated the world economy between 1979 and 1982, the subsequent 
fiscal and military expansion, as well as financial deregulation, helped the US economy 
stage a more vibrant recovery than its core capitalist rivals (Gill 1989: 33).  
Global capital inflows, in short, both enabled and subsequently rewarded the neoliberal 
counter-revolution, providing a critical measure of electoral support and economic 
dynamism even as organized labour and the welfare state were being directly attacked 
and systematically undermined. The result of this experiment was to strengthen 
immeasurably, but rather inadvertently, the unilateral capacity of the United States. But 
rather than simply provide a new lease on life for a declining hegemon, it gave rise to a 
historically novel form of capitalism that involved three unexpected transformations: 
despite the predictions of hegemonic decline and geopolitical fragmentation, the role of 
the US became more central and the system of global governance more tightly integrated. 
Despite the social and international challenges to global capitalism that dominated in the 
first half of the 1970s, the rule of transnational capital was ultimately strengthened at the 
expense of organized labour. And despite popular-democratic aspirations for post-
Keynesian and socialist modes of life, neoliberal ideas have today become deeply 
ingrained in the mentality of individuals. 
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Back to the Future 
The global financial meltdown of 2008 and ensuing world economic recession have 
exposed a debilitating division of labour in which the failure of economics to anticipate 
the crisis is exacerbated by the difficulties of political science to assess its social 
significance. Devised to bridge this disciplinary divide, the field of International Political 
Economy (IPE) would seem to be well placed for an intellectual renaissance. Four 
decades after its inception as an Anglo-American subfield of International Relations (IR), 
an integrated analysis of the pursuit of ‘power and plenty’ would seem to be more 
pressing than ever. Amidst divergent national and global responses and conflicting 
interests over macroeconomic imbalances, currency realignments and the competitive 
reregulation of financial sectors, one of the foundational concerns of IPE has acquired a 
renewed sense of urgency: how far, and under what conditions, can the advanced 
capitalist countries manage global instabilities, negotiate political differences, and sustain 
a liberal international economic order?  
Yet judging by the recent debate over the ‘state of the discipline’ that Benjamin Cohen’s 
intellectual history of the field has prompted, IPE is a far cry from realizing this potential 
(Cohen 2008; Phillips and Weaver 2011). According to Cohen, what began forty years 
ago as an open-minded and inter-disciplinary exchange has fragmented into two separate 
camps: an ‘American school’ of IPE that privileges methodological individualism and 
quantitative methods; and a ‘British school’ that favours interpretive methods and holistic 
theorisations (for an overview of the various interpretations, see Weaver 2011: 144). 
Whereas Cohen (2008: 175-178) employed this categorization in the hope of overcoming 
this schism and combining the forces of rigour and reflexivity, parsimony and pluralism, 
some of the rejoinders have struck a much sourer note. Obsession with formal modelling, 
some contend, has left ‘American’ IPE unable and unwilling to ask fundamentally 
political questions about structural power and social change (Keohane 2011: 39; Kirshner 
2011; McNamara 2011). Meanwhile, others have argued that the penchant for abstract 
theorising and political posturing of ‘British’ IPE has come at the expense of empirically 
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grounded and open-ended research (Underhill 2011: 153; Blyth 2011: 138; Cameron and 
Palan 2009; Farrell and Finnemore 2011: 64). 
Paradoxically, the debate over the legacy of IPE—framed in terms of the causes, 
consequences, value and validity of an alleged US/UK cleavage—has itself become 
symptomatic of some of the major shortcomings of the field. There is a clear danger that 
what started out as a useful review of the intellectual lineage of IPE may turn into a self-
indulgent and scholastic introspective that detracts from the substantive concerns that it 
ought to help us better understand (Phillips and Weaver 2011: 1; Katzenstein 2011: 105; 
Lake 2011: 45; Weaver, 2011: 142; Helleiner 2011: 178). Moreover, a number of critical 
scholars have cautioned that the demarcation of two schools of IPE has effectively 
narrowed the terms of engagement to a rationalist and constructivist variety of 
institutionalism (van Apeldoorn, Bruff and Ryner 2011: 216), and that critical IPE 
perspectives have been too readily dismissed or ignored (Cox 2011; Murphy 2011; 
Hveem 2011). If anything, the debate would seem to be a reminder that the history of IPE 
has also been one of academic gate-keeping and exclusion—a fact that the image of two 
schools drifting apart not only adds to, but obscures rather than illuminates. 
Are critical scholars then to follow Cammack’s scathing criticism and its conclusion that 
it is best to ‘bury IPE’ (Cammack 2007: 18), as it never offered room for a radical 
analysis of the global political economy to begin with? The problem, of course, is that 
even if we were to jettison IPE, some of “the big, important, real world puzzles” 
(McNamara 2011: 65) will remain (Germain 2011: 84). Paramount among them, this 
dissertation has argued, is the question of how far global capitalism can, in fact, be 
collectively managed. It is this concern that, at the end of capitalism’s golden age, 
brought scholars of different theoretical persuasions together, that both narrowly 
positivist and overly theoretical approaches have lost sight of, and that the contemporary 
crisis of global capitalism has brought back to the fore. And it is a problématique, 
moreover, that is theoretically and politically important not only for those who wish to 
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facilitate inter-capitalist cooperation, but also for those seeking to support anti-capitalist 
resistance. 
This dissertation has argued that an answer to this problem needs to be found on the 
grounds of history rather than deduced from any abstract laws of motion—whether the 
latter are conceptualized as eternal swings between international anarchy and hierarchy or 
a globalizing logic of markets. Critical scholarship is best equipped to do so because it is 
sensitive to the historically variant and socially constructed nature of international 
systems, and because it zeroes in on social contradictions and contestation as key 
dynamics of qualitative world order change. This dissertation has argued that the 
globalizing outcomes of the crisis of the 1970s were, in a closely delineated and yet 
crucial sense, driven by ‘conflict’ not only within but also between the advanced capitalist 
countries. In this respect, it challenges the two prevailing post hoc rationalizations within 
IPE that assume that inter-state conflicts in the 1970s did not matter either—as realists 
have argued—because they were temporarily submerged by cold war bipolarity or—as 
liberals imply—because they had been sublated by an incipient globalization. 
There is no doubt that the reconstitution of the economic basis, social balance of power 
and state forms of Western Europe and Japan under the active and purposive leadership 
of the United States had created a qualitatively new capitalist order that broke with the 
old forms of inter-imperialist rivalries. The break-up of the capitalist world into hostile 
trading and monetary blocs similar the 1930s, while predicted by a number of realists and 
Marxists and on the minds of some political elites and foreign policy intellectuals in the 
1970s, was never actually in the cards. The United States was not in decline to begin 
with, and to attribute (counter-)hegemonic interests to America’s allies turns out to be 
misleading. And yet the reverse assumption that any tensions among the major capitalist 
powers were superficial and inconsequential is to miss out on the new dynamics of 
economic and political competition that, while rooted firmly within the existing 
structures of American hegemony, contributed to how the crisis of the 1970s ultimately 
played out. In the context of the seventies’ crisis, this confrontation between the main 
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capitalist countries and their American primus inter pares involved questions of how best 
to deal with the vexing issues of monetary disorder, decelerating growth, rampant 
inflation and mass unemployment, how to accommodate incompatible national crisis 
responses in an interdependent world economy, and how to influence the policy choices 
of others. In their efforts to cope with these problems, the leading states chose creatively 
and competitively among a range of policy responses that impinged on one another, and 
that combined to fundamentally reshape the international character and social purpose of 
capitalism. 
To fully understand the new world order that emerged out of the crisis of the 1970s, then, 
it is necessary to shift attention from the agency of the United States and its elites to the 
strategic perspective of other states and social forces, and the specific political and 
economic challenges and opportunities they confronted. This study has chosen Germany 
as its focal point of analysis. After 1945, the German state turned from erstwhile saboteur 
of American globalism to one of the most influential supporters of an open and 
multilateral world economy. For this reason, it offers crucial insights into the nature of 
American hegemony during the 1970s and beyond. 
The analysis has found that, in the face of a global economic crisis that threatened to 
undermine the basis of its social compact with labour, Germany’s capitalist state 
mobilized its monetary power to defend its main export markets against protectionism 
and to protect the cost advantage of its export model from imported inflation. The success 
of this grand economic strategy had highly contradictory consequences: while it 
stabilized the relationship between capital and labour internally, it led to the gradual 
erosion and, in the case of the US and UK, the outright abdication of embedded 
liberalism. 
The point of this study, on both methodological and empirical grounds, is not at all to 
argue that Germany alone was responsible for neoliberal globalization. It is instead to 
argue that we need to broaden our analysis of the origins of neoliberalism, and that the 
findings of this study can help us do so in several respects. 
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First of all, the examination of German economic crisis strategies provides an important 
corrective against accounts that—with the benefit of hindsight—have tended to overstate 
the unilateral agency and strategic vision of the United States that, in a bid to restore its 
supremacy, acted as the architect of neoliberal globalization. The transition from the 
golden age of embedded liberalism to the global age of neoliberal capitalism cannot be 
told in terms of a single dramatic arc extending from Nixon’s decision to close the gold 
window in 1971 to Volcker’s punitive interest rate shock in 1979. Rather than pursuing a 
coherent and aggressive master plan, US policy makers only hit upon and fully embraced 
a neoliberal solution after much trial and error (Krippner 2011), and under pressure from 
a German state and central bank that for years had urged the US to live up to its global 
responsibilities of managing capitalism in the collective interest of the West. 
Far from arguing that the United States was unimportant, the point is simply to argue that 
its global role in the 1970s cannot be understood through the lens of hegemonic decline 
or resurrection. Reflecting the new international power and purpose of the United States, 
the US dollar had emerged after 1945 as the central currency of the reconstituted 
capitalist world economy. The American payments deficit—primarily the result of 
foreign development aid and military support—symbolized the growing responsibilities 
that the US had assumed for the construction and maintenance of global capitalism. The 
ability of the United States to issue the international currency with which to settle its 
payments deficit, to be sure, meant that it could avoid deflationary measures in order to 
restore international balance (Hudson 2003: 15). Yet the true testament to American 
power was not its putative ability to toss aside the rules of Bretton Woods once they no 
longer suited its immediate self-interest, but rather to extend the lifeline of a system that 
had been critical to capitalist reconstruction but had become economically unsustainable 
and politically contested in the 1960s. Chapters 3 has argued that France in particular 
frustrated these attempts at preserving the status quo and that the Nixon shock had been 
predetermined by France’s attack on the gold pool. And Chapter 4 has argued the 
German float had weakened the fixed-exchange rate regime before the United States 
supposedly jettisoned it. 
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Rather than inaugurating a Faustian bid for global dominance, Krippner (2011: 91) 
explains that Nixon’s decision to cut the dollar from gold “was still an effort to escape the 
constraints of the global system and not yet an effort to harness global capital markets to 
domestic political objectives.” It allowed the US to externalize and postpone an 
economically painful and politically cumbersome internal adjustment. 
The perplexing consequence of finally accepting neoliberal discipline, or rather of 
imposing this discipline on its working class (Panitch and Gindin 2012: 15), was to 
broaden the international economic and geopolitical scope of action of the US by 
boosting its capacity to draw in foreign capital and to borrow without limits.
333
 Yet the 
long-run process of financial deregulation that made this possible—involving the phasing 
out of capital controls in 1974, the lifting of interest rate ceilings under Carter in 1980 
(Jones 2012), and the authorization of an ‘offshore’ banking centre in New York 
(Helleiner 1994: 138-139)—proceeded haphazardly (Krippner 2011) and involved a 
dialectic of “state intervention and financial innovation” (Hawley 1987: 120) that cannot 
be reduced to a “seamless alliance between government officials and business elites” 
(Krippner 2011: 13) any more than it adds up to a coherent programme of hegemonic 
reassertion. 
In a number of respects, of course the neoliberal revolution was indeed bound up with the 
coercive reassertion of American power. The access to international finance allowed the 
United States to engage the USSR in what turned out to be a ruinous arms race for the 
Soviets. The ideological and military confrontation with the Soviet Union under Reagan’s 
presidency also reinforced the role of the United States as leader of the West and imposed 
a greater measure of alliance coherence after a decade of economic and political détente 
(Saull 2007: 157-8). The military standoff also produced frictions with those of 
America’s NATO allies who had entertained close economic ties with the Soviet Unions. 
But whatever losses resulted from the economic sanctions against the Soviet Union were 
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more than compensated for by the considerable, and far more politically reliable, export 
opportunities produced by Reagan’s military spending. 
The anti-communist crusade of Reagan and Thatcher, supplemented by the latter’s 
Falklands War, also served as a classic political expedient to unite society against an 
external enemy, and afforded a degree of cohesion amidst the structural transformation 
both societies were undergoing. The new Reagan Doctrine reignited the cold war in the 
third world, where the United States pursued a strategy of low-intensity warfare against 
revolutionary governments in Nicaragua and Grenada and an often imagined Soviet 
encroachment (Saull 2007). The United States, Thatcher related the Manichean 
worldview to an incredulous Schmidt, confronted a communist problem in Latin America 
just as Europe did in its backyard.
334
 More important still than the defeat of national 
liberation movements was the third world debt crisis induced by the Volcker shock, 
which destroyed whatever hopes remained that European social democracy might side 
with the forces of a New International Economic Order.  
The key point remains that America’s triumph over labour militancy, third world 
nationalism, and Soviet communism in the 1980s and 1990s was about far more than 
simply renewing America’s global dominance and its relative strength vis-à-vis its 
capitalist partners. With the Volcker shock and Reagan revolution, to be sure, the allied 
attempts to gain a more direct say in the making of America’s international policy 
backfired. And yet even as the Reagan administration eschewed multilateral coordination 
(or rather their Keynesian agenda) in favour of unilateralism, it outlined the contours of a 
general solution to the crisis of global capitalism. And the institutional framework created 
in part to promote a more equal sharing of privileges and responsibilities now facilitated 
the radical redefinition of social purpose that was involved in the entrenchment of global 
capitalism. Out of the crisis of post-war capitalism and the defeat of the forces of social 
and economic democracy, a qualitatively new social and international order arose. 
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To stress the unintended consequences of Reagan’s neoliberal experiment is not suggest 
that the role of the United States can be wholly reduced to that of a blundering giant. 
Krippner’s otherwise compelling account may give this impression as it focuses on a 
cascade of internal crises facing US state managers while ignoring the international 
causes and consequences of their actions. The argument of this dissertation, by contrast, 
is that the crisis and transformation of embedded liberalism is best understood as an 
interactive process driven by a number of states. While the 1970s are indeed “a decade 
during which capitalist states and bourgeoisies stumbled through strategic confusions as 
well as class and international conflicts” (Panitch and Gindin 2003: 17; Newstadt 2008: 
96), the key point is that they did so collectively—though not always cooperatively. From 
this perspective, unintended outcomes are not simply the product of chance or 
miscalculation on the part of one country’s policy makers, but rather are to be seen as a 
composite of the attempts of several states to solve problems and prod others in a desired 
direction.  
While this dissertation has focussed primarily on the crisis management (and its profound 
but self-undermining effects) of Germany, US policy makers pursued an even more 
comprehensive grand economic strategy. To emphasize the contingent and unplanned 
success of the final and decisive step towards neoliberal globalization taken by the 
Reagan administration is at once to recognize that American policy makers had worked 
consistently towards a resolution of the crisis throughout the 1970s and in numerous 
respects. While outside the purview of this study, one may hypothesize that these aspects 
in the making of global capitalism may have been subject to similar dynamics of strategic 
action and response. 
The previous two chapters have argued that Germany had helped to create the necessary 
international and social conditions for neoliberalism to succeed. The argument that 
German state operators both frustrated Carter’s attempts to fuel global demand and 
limited Volcker’s options to global deflation challenges the narrowly instrumentalist 
conceptions of neoliberalism as a coup of financial elites. The fact that German state 
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managers had pushed monetary and fiscal responsibility onto the US for the better part of 
a decade makes it difficult to maintain that a financial or rentier fraction of capital 
hijacked the policy making process to advance its agenda (e.g. Greider 1987; Crotty and 
Epstein 1996; Epstein and Jayadev 2005; Stein 2010). It is of course difficult to disprove 
the counterfactual case that the Volcker shock would have happened even without the 
intense German pressure on US policy makers.
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 Yet the crucial point remains that the 
foreclosure of what may have been viable alternatives had already occurred much earlier, 
and Germany, we have seen, had been central to this through its actions and inactions. 
Moreover, the plausibility of the counterfactual argument rests squarely on the 
assumption that a broader realignment of social forces and more incremental shift in 
economic thinking had already occurred in the United States and thus made an outside 
imposition redundant. The notion that Volcker acted on behalf of financial elites is 
misleading precisely because it abstracts from the broader change in the social balance of 
power and intellectual climate that made the neoliberal experiment possible (Duménil 
and Lévy 2004: 165; Stein 2010: 227). 
In this respect, the argument that the most immediate political pressures Volcker 
responded to came from the German state and central bank rather than haute finance 
turns out to be crucial. Rather than simply shift the focus from the ‘special interests’ of 
international finance to those of German state managers, it serves to open up to this 
critical turning point to a more fine-grained and full-scale investigation. 
The conclusion of this dissertation, then, is not that Germany’s influence was somehow 
all-decisive, but rather that we need to consider the whole range of state actors, social 
forces and ideas that contributed to the making of neoliberalism. This means that critical 
scholarship needs to insert an intermediate step in its explanations of the origins of 
neoliberalism that interrogates the failure of potential alternatives on its own terms rather 
than deriving it from the strength of the neoliberal project (Schmidt 2011). The neoliberal 
restructuring of the global political economy could ultimately only triumph after 
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progressive challenges to the failing Keynesian order had been removed. And the reason 
they fell by the wayside, the German experience suggests, may have little to do with the 
social and ideological forces promoting neoliberal solutions.  
In the case of Germany, we find a government that remained uncommitted to 
neoliberalism as a project of restoring ruling class power (van der Wurff 1993: 182). On 
the contrary, German policy makers sought to sustain, as far as possible, the productivist 
consensus that was being threatened as a result of the crisis. Nevertheless, we have seen 
that the particular way in which they strove to do so domestically led to the opposite 
outcome internationally. Far from being the helpless victim of the neoliberal 
counterrevolution of the late 1970s, Germany had made an initial and decisive, though 
not fully deliberate, contribution to its global emergence. 
This, then, raises the question of whether the shift from embedded to neoliberalism can 
still be understood in terms of a paradigmatic change of ideas (cf. Helleiner 1994; 
McNamara 1998; Blyth 2002). The assumption that policy makers shifted from Keynes 
to Hayek not only underestimates the importance of non-ideational factors, but also 
misses out on qualitative shifts in the constitution of social and international order and 
the inter-subjective understandings that underpin them. 
The decisive victory over the working classes in the United States and the United 
Kingdom created an intensely competitive form of capitalism. This new model of 
economy and polity derived its advantage from its ability to dispose of, and do without, 
the compensation and protection that had hitherto been considered indispensible for 
buying the allegiance of labour and for maintaining social cohesion and political stability. 
It is in this sense that one may speak of a ‘transnational learning process’ that, rather than 
guided by economic ideas or institutionalized interactions (McNamara 1998; Mourlon-
Druol 2012), was shaped by practical results and had started with the relative success of 
German state managers in combating inflation. From the German vantage point, the 
experiment involved the inversion of what the political left had demanded in the early 
1970s. Rather than “test the weight of the financial burden which the private sector 
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economy could be made to carry”, as a former politician of the SPD had put it (Jochen 
Steffen, cited in Webber 1983: 66), neoliberal politicians now sought to probe the 
carrying capacity of society in the interest of private enterprise.
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 In this respect, the 
neoliberal programme of Thatcher and Reagan not only had a disciplinary intent but also 
a demonstration effect. Their re-election proved not only that organized labour could be 
taken on and defeated, but also that such class confrontation could be politically 
stabilized and could serve to restart the capitalist engine.  
The great unwinding of the embedded liberal compact rewarded the US and the UK as 
the prime movers towards neoliberalism. It rendered the economic success of the 
capitalistically developed societies contingent upon the degree to which they could mimic 
the Anglo-American example. The diffusion of a neoliberal form of capitalism reinforced 
the centrality of the US. But it proceeded very differently than the replication of the 
American state/society complex after 1945. The US had actively encouraged the import 
of Fordist and Keynesian methods of economic organization and social stabilization. It 
had tolerated a variety of organized capitalisms that employed various strategies of state 
intervention, nationalization, and economic planning in the pursuit of the embedded 
liberal compromise. And it had sought to create an international environment in which 
these different institutional variations could flourish. By contrast, the neoliberal 
reorganization of the core capitalist economies in the 1980s and 1990s was structurally 
induced (Gill 1989: 33).  
America’s post-war hegemony had been premised upon the internationally and socially 
organized consent of both potentially rival capitalist elites and potentially unruly masses. 
The emerging world order was of a different quality. Even where neoliberalization did 
not involve the one-sided termination of the post-war social contract, the creeping erosion 
of welfare state regulation, the de-legitimation of social democracy and the decline of 
trade unionism turned the active consent of an economically organized, politically 
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represented, and socially protected working class into the passive acquiescence of an 
increasingly fragmented, marginalized, and precarious labour force (Gill 2008: 125).  
The disparaging description of ‘consensus’ given by Thatcher in her speech at Monash 
University in 1981 as “something in which no one believes, but to which no one objects” 
may serve as an apt description of a new economic philosophy that was shared initially 
only by a handful of ideologues but soon appeared to be without alternatives and beyond 
the reach of democratic politics even to those that had derided these ideas only a few 
years earlier. One question for further research is thus whether the so-called Washington 
Consensus and post-war Keynesianism can really be understood as functionally 
equivalent ‘economic paradigms’ (cf. Babb 2013), or whether neoliberalism is best 
approached as a different order of social knowledge. The new consensus, after all, is no 
longer premised upon a politically negotiated agreement but on the silent understanding 
that there is no alternative. The embedded liberal compromise was explicitly understood 
as a bargain between two formally equal partners, even as the organization of the 
economy systematically privileged the power and interests of one over the other, external 
supports. Neoliberal ‘common sense’, by contrast, has largely accepted the market as the 
unquestioned arbiter of life chances. It is in this sense that one may qualify the new type 
of international and societal rule that was built upon the rollback of the labour movement, 
the resubordination of the South and the collapse of really existing socialism as ‘post-
hegemonic’ (Gill 2008: 204).  
The contemporary crisis has raised concerns about the future of international order that 
echo the situation of the 1970s. In keeping with the insight of critical scholarship that the 
character of the crises, as well as the forms of capitalist sociality that constitute the 
international system, vary across space and time, direct parallels between then and now 
cannot be drawn.  
The relative resilience of Rhineland capitalism in the face of the neoliberal onslaught of 
the last thirty years has led some to speculate that “[h]ad the countries of the Keynesian 
compromise been able to define an alternative less inflationary policy, under German 
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leadership, it is not obvious that the turn to neoliberalism would have been taken” 
(Duménil and Lévy 2005: 37). Building on these insights, some contemporary observers 
have called upon the German government and opposition parties to assume the 
responsibilities of a “benevolent hegemon” (Soros 2012) and act as sponsor of a global 
New Deal (Hein and Truger 2010). 
Against such aspirations and prescriptions, it needs to be pointed out that Germany’s 
strategy of crisis management in the 1970s pointed in a post-hegemonic direction. To be 
sure, within German society, the low-inflation model based upon reciprocal wage and 
price restraint had offered advantages to, and gained the support of, both dominant 
exporters and incorporated trade unions. The international extension of this model, 
however, could not offer the same opportunities and did not entail a similar degree of 
consent. At least initially, the German model was adopted not because of any shared 
understanding among political (and economic) elites of the preferable solution to the 
crisis but under the immediate impression, and indeed pressure, of Germany’s practical 
achievements.
337
 The problems of wage-push inflation were certainly recognized, but the 
political and economic costs of disciplining labour through monetary tightening seemed 
prohibitively high. Only in Germany, were relative price stability translated into export 
competitiveness, could monetary restraint stabilize the social-democratic bargain. The 
extension of the German anti-inflationary project via the snake and EMS, however, 
contained a compulsive element, offering exchange-rate stability while forcing adhering 
countries to follow the macroeconomic example of Germany. And lastly, even when and 
where an anti-inflationary program had gained the support of financial and industrial 
circles (Moss 2000: 265), the model of monetary and fiscal prudence could not be 
replicated without undermining the Keynesian compromise. 
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The German solution, to be sure, involved constructing, extending, and maintaining a 
zone of stability in a highly inflationary global environment. But this was only the 
necessary and not the sufficient condition for Germany’s economic success. For the 
model to work, Germany had not only to keep down inflation but to maintain lower rates 
of inflation than its competitors. This competitive element meant that Germany’s was an 
inherently particularistic mode of crisis management that turned out to be self-limiting 
when exported to other state/society complexes. 
The chances that Germany today might emerge as the new driver of demand-led growth 
are virtually nil if we recall that German policy makers in the 1970s turned down similar 
propositions under conditions that were far more favourable to a progressive 
reorganization of the global political economy. Although social democrats were in 
government, and despite a strong political left and organized labour movement as well as 
widespread social and international demands for redistribution, German state managers 
would not cede to calls for a global reflation for fear that this would undermine its anti-
inflationary path out of the crisis (Cesaratto and Stirati 2010: 79). And yet while 
Germany is unlikely to play such a leadership role in the current context even under a 
new government, past experience suggests that it is not going to withdraw from the 
European project either (cf. Young and Semmler 2011). In the context of the 1970s crisis, 
after all, German state managers also renounced an inward-looking and self-reliant course 
of action. They instead chose the ‘flight forward’, elaborating a grand strategy that gave 
impetus to the further monetary and economic integration and institutional organization 
of Europe, while limiting decisively the leeway for solidaristic alternatives. The onset of 
the financial crisis has coincided with a remarkable recovery of the German model of 
capitalism from almost two decades of relative stagnation and malaise. In a situation 
where Germany’s managerial capacities to shape the future of the European and 
international order have been strengthened by a rebounding export economy, rising tax 
revenues and low borrowing costs just as disintegrative social, economic and political 
pressures are mounting, we can expect Germany to project its monetary and financial 
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influence across and beyond Europe in ways that will be similarly transformative, and 
perhaps just as socially regressive, as in the 1970s. 
The dissertation serves to draw attention to the unintended consequences not only of 
German crisis responses in the 1970s, but—more broadly—those of the leading states 
and social forces today. As the progressivist view of the globalization project is rapidly 
fading, and a declinist scenario has reasserted itself, a comprehensive political-economic 
analysis of the current crisis would do well neither to overstate the significance of 
purposive globalist designs, nor to exaggerate the dangers of economic and political 
fragmentation, but instead to focus on the complex interplay of divergent and potentially 
conflicting strategies that are likely to propel the global political economy of the early 
twenty-first century in novel directions. If history teaches us that revolutionary 
movements may seize upon splits within the ranks of the ruling classes, one important 
task of radical IPE may be to trace the frictions that emerge between those in power in 
moments of crisis, past and present. 
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